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Abstract 
There have been numerous attempts to explain morality as a product of biology. 
These accounts however do not do justice either to the nature of morality or the 
biological mechanisms which are attributed to its origin. This thesis addresses these 
problems and provides an account which satisfactorily explains morality as the 
product of a number of human biological adaptations, but not as biological adaptation 
itself. As such it is a rejoinder to prominent sociobiologists Michael Ruse, E.O. 
Wilson and Richard Joyce who suggest the contrary. 
This conclusion derives from a detailed exploration of morality as both a biological 
and cultural phenomenon that seems to have strayed far from the Darwinian 
evolutionary framework. Holding it back firmly, however, are a suite of emotions 
which are here argued to be a primary source of belief in the prescriptive, categorical 
nature of morality, a core feature of morality which distinguishes it from other human 
rules. This account of moral motivation is not a novel account. What is new, 
however, are the further conclusions that can be drawn from growing evidence for the 
neurological bases of these emotions. Of particular relevance to this thesis is the 
likelihood that emotions were not selected because of their role in generating 
morality. Rather, emotions appear to be prerequisite for functions such as familial 
bonding which predate morality. This hypothesis supports the main conclusion of 
this thesis. 
The human emotional reservoir is not taken to be the sole explanation for why we 
have morality, however. Morality is a multi-facetted phenomenon which is also 
formed and influenced by active reasoning and more passive processes such as social 
learning. To demonstrate this, a significant portion of the thesis is devoted to 
considering the connection between morality and human sociality. This will provide 
subsidiary support for the conclusion that morality is a bi-product of a number of 
different biological traits, in this case selected in humans for their contribution to 
social learning, and kin bonding. 
From these main areas of discussion, secondary conclusions emerge. Firstly, the 
biological basis of the capacities involved in the generation of morality is also used as 
the grounds for rejecting the commonly held belief that there are mind-independent 
moral facts. Secondly, the range and complexity of these capacities in humans will 
be used as an explanation for why morality appears to be a human phenomenon. 
Finally, it will be argued that the conclusions reached in this thesis needn't undermine 
the significance of morality in our lives: rather, morality requires redefinition which 
recognises both its true origins and its role in protecting and promoting that which is 
of utmost importance to us. 
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...genes hold culture on a leash. The leash is very long but inevitably 
values will be constrained in accordance with their effects on the human 
gene pool. The brain is a product of evolution. Human behavior--like 
the deepest capacities for emotional response which drive and guide it-- 
is the circuitous technique by which human genetic material has been 
and will be kept intact. Morality has no other demonstrable ultimate 
function (Wilson, 1978: 167). 
General Introduction 
When Daniel Dennett wrote his epic Darwin's Dangerous Idea, he not only 
succeeded in conveying the complexities of Darwin's theory of natural selection, but 
also the enormity of its impact - including the controversies - that this theory 
generated. In his own words: 
From the moment of the publication of Origin of Species in 
1859, Charles Darwin's fundamental idea has inspired intense 
reactions, ranging from ferocious condemnation to ecstatic 
allegiance — sometimes tantamount to religious zeal. 
Darwin's theory has been abused and misrepresented by 
friend and foe alike. It has been misappropriated to lend 
scientific respectability to appalling political and social 
doctrines.. .Almost no one is indifferent to Darwin, and no 
one should be (Dennett, 1995:17-18). 
I will explore one such controversy in this thesis; the connection between human 
biological evolution and morality. In particular, my aim is to illustrate how this 
connection can be plausibly made. Traditionally, this has been the field of "socio-
biology," a term which encompasses a broad range of attempts to explain social 
behaviour with reference to human biology. One of its main spokespeople, 
E.O.Wilson, set the wheels - or, in this case, the "dogma" - in motion when he 
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famously claimed that he felt that it was time "...for ethics to be removed temporarily 
from the hands of philosophers and biologicized" (Wilson, 1975: 27). 1 
My topic, then, is by no means original, but it is not a topic that has been widely 
appreciated. In fact, attempts to "biologicize" morality have often met with sturdy 
resistance both in the general population and also in the academic community for 
many and varied reasons. 2 Often, attempts to link morality and human biology are 
rejected because (A) they inadequately represent the multifaceted nature of morality 
and/or (B) they oversimplify the processes of human biological evolution. For 
example, in Part Three of this thesis I will argue that while Jonathon Haidt offers 
compelling arguments for the emotional basis of moral judgements, he does not pay 
adequate attention to the role of reason in making moral judgments: as such, I argue, 
his arguments succumb to problem "A" above. Richard Joyce, who also offers many 
highly plausible arguments for a connection between morality and biology, will 
nevertheless be criticised in this thesis for oversimplifying biological evolutionary 
processes (problem "B" above). For instance on the one hand he argues that moral 
judgements and rules "implicate" different biological mechanisms, (2006: 140) and 
that "...emotions are of central significance to morality" (2006: 51) thus implying 
that morality is the product of a series of biological mechanisms — a conclusion that 
this thesis supports. However, he then goes on to make the sweeping claim that 
"...morality is a distinct adaptation wrought by biological natural selection" (2008: 
213).3 In claiming this he misrepresents Darwinian selective processes since it is 
unclear how a "distinct adaptation" (as Joyce represents morality) could itself be the 
product of a number of other "distinct adaptations" (such as those implicated in the 
generation of the very emotions that he claims are "...of central significance to 
morality"). In suggesting this, then, he becomes guilty of the same kind of 
"simplistic thinking" which he himself specifically cautions against (2006, 140). 
E.O. Wilson is considered by many to be the "father" of sociobiology, and in fact coined the term 
"sociobiology" in the first place in 1975. According to Wilson, " The central tenet of human socio-
biology is that social behaviors are shaped by natural selection" (Lumsden and Wilson, 1981: 99) 
2 (See Marshall Sahlins' 1976 criticism of sociobiology, for example.) 
3  Note that while this quote (2008)comes from an article written two years after the earlier 
quotes(2006), suggesting that he might have changed his mind, the 2008 quote in fact comes from 
Joyce's own "précis" of the book in which the 2006 quotes were made. 
2 
One must not be too harsh, however. Joyce almost certainly means to be more 
specific in his claims about morality: by "morality", for instance, Joyce seems to 
mean what he refers to as "the moral sense," a concept that I will explore more 
thoroughly later in this thesis. Indeed, one of the difficulties that arise in discussing 
morality is that the term "morality" itself is a somewhat vague term which 
encompasses a range of different aspects and connotations: for example, when people 
use the term "morality" they might be referring to the "practice" of morality in terms 
of adherence to a set of rules or principles, or they might be referring to our beliefs 
about the nature of these rules and principles. In a bid to clarify what I mean by 
"morality," I devote the next section to exploring the term in more detail. 
Another major obstacle in considering a connection between biology and morality is 
that conclusions are bound to suffer from the gaps in both our knowledge and 
understanding of human evolution and biology. Such difficulties do not constitute an 
adequate argument for the abandonment of such a project, however, but instead invite 
continued exploration, noting however that the best we can do is mount arguments 
based on the logic of inference to the best explanation. 
I will take up the invitation, place morality back into the hands of the philosophers, 
and attempt to bridge gaps that appear in some of the more recent sociobiological 
explanations of the origin and nature of morality. In particular, I will argue that 
morality (in terms of both rules and concepts) emerged as a bi-product or "spandrel" 
(Gould and Lewontin, 1978) of a number of biological traits which themselves were 
selected for different, albeit related, advantages they conferred. This is in opposition 
to Richard Joyce (2006), for example, who - as we have seen - hypotheses that the 
evolution of a "moral sense" adaptation is central to an explanation of the emergence 
of morality. 
However, while I will conclude that biological mechanisms are fundamentally 
implicated in an explanation of morality — and much of this thesis will focus on how 
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they are implicated — I will also argue that the role of environment must not be 
discounted. To this end, a significant portion of this thesis will also be devoted to 
exploring morality as not only the product of biology, but also the product of both the 
social and physical environment in which human beings have evolved. In particular, 
I will discuss the way in which human culture shapes the content of moral codes. 
This will illustrate my point that morality, while importantly linked to matters of 
survival and reproduction, is also linked to the promotion of values which have no 
obvious connection to these considerations. 
These conclusions will be arrived at via a consideration of different approaches that 
might plausibly be employed in an attempt to explain morality as a product of human 
biology. Before going any further, however, we must clarify what we mean when we 
talk about "explaining" morality. The first step, of course, will be to specify what we 
might mean when we employ the term "morality" itself. 
0:1 What do we mean by "morality"? 
Morality is a central feature in the lives of human beings, constituting a powerful 
motivational and governing force in the interplay of their relationships. But while 
people seem to have little difficulty using the term "morality," when they do so they 
might often be talking about a number of different things, as I mentioned above. 
They might, for example, be talking about normative or metaethical matters, or they 
might be describing different elements of morality such as moral rules and concepts. 
Some of these aspects of morality will be briefly discussed here in order to set the 
stage for the way I will employ the term "morality" in this thesis and, in particular, 
which aspects of morality will be my primary focus. 
Normative Issues 
Firstly, when talking about morality one might be asking normative questions about 
the ends with which morality should be concerned. For some, morality is concerned 
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with consequences of actions (Utilitarians), while others are more concerned with the 
notion of duties (Deontologists). While this thesis will not be concerned with making 
decisions about which approach is the correct approach, what would be useful here is 
to talk about the central characteristic of morality to which these theories provide 
answers. In the words of Michael Ruse "Morality is about what we ought or should 
or may do" (1986: 69). Morality as such is about attitudes and sentiments that we 
ought to harbour, it is about rules we should follow, it is about behaviour that we 
believe we may perform. When asked why we ought to live, behave or "be" a 
particular type of way, the morally relevant answer will typically be that it is the 
"good" or "right" way to live: it is in this answer that we find the core of morality 
which traditionally distinguishes it from other basic rules and regulations that govern 
ordinary daily procedures. For example, if you would like to make a cake that rises, 
you ought to add a rising agent to the mixture. If you want to make a tree grow, you 
ought to give it water. For such actions, judgements of "good" or "bad", "right" or 
"wrong" are relative to the success or failure of a given venture; if the cake rises, you 
did the right thing, if the tree dies, then you most probably did the wrong thing with 
regards to the goal you were aiming to achieve. The "ought" in "you ought to give it 
water", then, is an "instrumental" ought, or, as Kant famously labelled it, a 
"hypothetical imperative" (Kant, 1993). 
When it comes to morality, however, the answer as to why particular actions ought to 
be performed is generally given in terms of it being "good" or "bad" tout court. It is 
this kind of "ought" which represents for a lot of people the sense of inescapability of 
morality, an inescapability, moreover, which extends to others and is not just limited 
to ourselves (Brink, 1997). It is represented — as suggested above - by Kant's 
categorical imperative which, in his own words, "...declares an action to be 
objectively necessary in itself without any reference to any purpose." (Kant 1993: 
78); helping people in need is a good thing to do not because it will lead to some 
desired outcome, but quite simply because it is the right thing to do and as such it is 
categorically binding. Even Utilitarians and other consequentialists who do prescribe 
actions on the basis of a desired outcome, do claim ultimately that the outcome, for 
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example "happiness," should be pursued because it is intrinsically good. Morality, 
then, represents more than a set of prescriptions; it also represents the common belief 
that these prescriptions are categorically binding, not just for the person prescribing 
the rule, but for everyone. In this thesis, I will undertake to explain how it is that we 
come to have this belief. 
A third tradition in Western ethics might explain morality not in terms of what we 
ought to do, but rather in terms of how we ought to be. Virtue ethicists, as they are 
known, concentrate on the development of traits of character. Discussion of virtue 
has a long history, dating back notably to the famous ancient Greek philosophers 
Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. This tradition, however, is not at odds with the central 
characteristic of morality identified above (that morality is about "what we ought to 
do, be, think...") since developing moral virtues is essentially involved with these 
matters. Moreover, when asked why certain virtues are worth developing, we will 
almost certainly make appeal to the notion of their having intrinsic value. 
Metaethical considerations 
When we talk about morality we might be discussing metaethical questions about the 
nature of morality: that is, we might be trying to pinpoint what, exactly, it is that we 
are doing when we engage in moral reasoning, or make moral judgements. For 
example, morality is taken by some to refer to a set of objective mind-independent 
moral facts upon which we base our decisions and judgements (moral realism), while 
for others morality has no reality beyond the moral agent (moral subjectivism). 
Settling these questions will not be the focus of this thesis, but consideration of them 
will be made in Part Four once the more descriptive project of exploring the source of 
moral rules and concepts has been accomplished. This is because I argue (as others 
have done before me) that the metaethical status of morality is intimately linked with 
answers about the source of these rules and concepts: this "source", then, must be 
established first. One thing I do emphasise when I discuss morality throughout this 
thesis, however, is that moral realism is often implicit in the way we talk about 
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morality. As Michael Smith put it, "...we seem to think moral questions have correct 
answers, and that the correct answers are made correct by objective moral facts" 
(Smith, 1991:400). 4 In this thesis I will begin with the assumption that there are no 
such things as mind-independent moral facts, and then I will demonstrate how all 
aspects of morality (such as moral rules, beliefs, and concepts) can be accounted for 
without recourse to the actual existence of such facts. From this, I will draw the 
conclusion that it is highly plausible that they do not exist. 
The different components of "morality". 
Finally, the term "morality" itself can be used to describe a number of different 
things. By morality, for example, we might be referring to (A) the belief that certain 
specific thoughts and actions are morally right or wrong; (B) we might be referring to 
the propensity itself to believe that certain thoughts and actions are morally right or 
wrong; or (C) we might also be referring to morality as the ensemble of moral rules. 
Consequently, an attempt to "explain" morality as a product of human biology needs 
to take into account these different aspects and address them accordingly. 5 On 
occasion, however, I will use the term "morality" in a generalised way to encompass 
these different aspects, but I will be more specific when required. For example, in 
Part One I will explore the possible origins of certain moral rules. In particular, I will 
consider a somewhat traditional sociobiological conclusion that moral rules emerged 
as a human response to some of the problems arising from maintaining and managing 
human relationships of many types. I will conclude that while some moral rules can 
be considered fitness enhancing, the behaviour itself that is encoded by the rules is 
not the product of specific biological adaptations: rather, the moral rules are the 
" Simon Kirchin also makes a similar claim. As he puts it, "I think that the intuition which I have 
developed briefly [independent moral realism] is present in many if not all of us to some degree and it 
may have a very strong hold on some of us" (Kirchin, 2000: 416). He describes Independent Moral 
Realism, in turn, as being a "strong" version of moral realism. For Kirchin, it encapsulates two 
essential claims about morality: (1). that there are such things as moral properties, and that (2).these 
are "mind-independent" which means that they have no dependence on human beliefs, desires or goals 
(Kirchin, 2000: 414). This is the view that this thesis will eventually oppose, while recognizing that it 
is, in fact, the way in which many people actually perceive morality. 
5  Unless, of course, one can convincingly argue that morality as a whole is explained with reference to 
one of these aspects in particular, as Joyce attempts to do. 
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product of human decision to include them as moral rules. The fact that people are 
able to make these decisions, however, is due to their possession of a series of 
evolved biological adaptations. In this sense, then, the moral rules and the behaviour 
they prescribe (or proscribe) are a bi-product of having a number of different 
biological traits, but are not adaptations themselves. 
This, however, is far from the end of the story. Human moral rules are considered 
quite different to other rules that humans devise such as those that pertain to laws or 
etiquette. I will explain this in terms of the common belief that moral rules and 
judgments correspond to mind-independent moral facts which render certain 
thoughts, dispositions and actions intrinsically right or wrong, and as such, are 
categorically binding in something like the way Kant argued. 6 As John Mackie put it, 
"The ordinary user of moral language means to say something about whatever it is 
that he characterizes morally . . . [which] involves a call for action . . . that is 
absolute, not contingent upon any desire or preference or policy or choice"(1977: 33). 
Morality, in this sense, is not just a set of rules; rather, it represents a propensity to 
see these rules as somehow intrinsically right or wrong. In this thesis, I will account 
for this aspect of morality again with reference to a series of different biologically 
generated capacities - notably the capacities to reason and to experience emotions. 
Explaining the adaptive functions of some of these capacities is fairly straight 
forward (such as those that facilitate the bonding process between caretaker and 
child, for example). Others are less obvious, but speculation will be included here 
nonetheless. What does seem clear, however, is that reasoning ability and the human 
affective system are not adaptations evolved specifically for their role in generating 
either moral rules or, more specifically, belief that moral rules are categorically 
binding. This in turn, has metaethical ramifications. For in explaining the connection 
between the possession of these capacities and the generation of moral beliefs, we 
eliminate the need to postulate moral facts as an explanation for our beliefs since 
these beliefs are accounted for without reference to or need for the existence of such 
6 Here I am using Richard Joyce's simplification of the Kantian term to denote "an imperative that 
does not recommend a means to an end." (Joyce, 2006: 61) Each time the "categorical" nature of 
morality is referred to throughout this thesis, it is likewise in this sense. 
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facts at all. As such we meet Gilbert Harman's requirement for the type of 
explanation that would succeed in making moral facts redundant (Harman, 1977). 7 
The plausibility of the argument that there are these multiple routes to and multiple 
conceptions of morality will support one of the main conclusions of this thesis: that 
morality as a whole cannot be considered the product of a singular biological 
adaptation. Rather, both moral rules and the propensity to believe and be motivated 
by moral rules are the product of a whole suite of evolved traits in liaison with 
environmental factors. As stated earlier, then, this thesis will both contribute to and 
improve the arguments of other philosophers who have made important contributions 
to the exploration of a connection between biology and morality. Some of these 
positions will now be briefly sketched. 
0:2 Some other approaches to the topic 
Richard Joyce's The Evolution of Morality (2006) is an important work that comes 
under scrutiny throughout this thesis. One major area of divergence between my 
arguments and Joyce's work lies in Joyce's contention that humans have evolved a 
special adaptation — the "moral sense" - which accounts for the belief that moral rules 
are categorically binding: in his own words, "... humans have an innate tendency to 
make moral judgments." 8 For Joyce, this is more than a disposition which favours a 
particular act, per se, or an emotion which makes us desire the particular action, but 
rather it is something which leads us to feel that we "ought" to desire it; that is, it 
explains the "...movement from desiring something to finding it desirable" 
(2006:133). This evolved trait, in sum, instils the sense of moral obligation. In 
claiming that "morality is an adaptation", then, he is obviously implying that it is the 
moral sense which is the defining characteristic of morality. Joyce's hypothesis is 
very tempting; in particular, it provides a very neat explanation for how it is that we 
7 That is, an explanation for moral judgements and beliefs that does not appeal to moral facts. 
8 By innate, Joyce means "that the present-day existence of the trait is to be explained by reference to a 
genotype having granted ancestors reproductive advantage" (Joyce, 2008: 213). In other words, Joyce 
is claiming that this "tendency" is an adaptation. 
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make moral judgements. In this thesis I will argue that morality is more complex 
than Joyce has implied, however. I will also argue that there are many different 
adaptations - and not just one in particular — which are implicated in morality. For 
instance, I will argue that the capacities to both experience emotions, and reason are 
central to an account of what Joyce refers to as "the moral sense." While Joyce 
himself does not discount the role that other adaptations, such as those that give rise 
to emotions, have to play in morality, he nevertheless suggests the existence of 
something "extra" which enables the transformation from emotional reaction to moral 
judgement. The postulate of this extra adaptation, I argue, seems unnecessary in 
explaining this transformation. 
Michael Ruse offers what has been referred to by John Collier and Michael Stingl as 
a "mischievous argument" (Collier & Stingl, 1993:.49) for what he takes to be the 
evolution of morality. In some ways, it is a position which is not significantly 
different from Joyce's, but it is less precise in terms of the actual postulation of a 
specific adaptation. For Ruse, what has evolved is a mechanism which gives us the 
"illusion" that morality is something objective. Without this illusion, he claims that 
morality "will not work". (1990: 66) At times, Ruse does not seem to refer to a 
generalized mechanism which creates this illusion, however, but rather refers to what 
he (and E.O.Wilson) call "epigenetic rules" which lead us to believe that "...certain 
courses of action are right and certain courses of action are wrong." (Ruse and 
Wilson, 1986: 180) and which in turn incline us to embrace certain types of 
behaviour and not others. In other words, he seems to talk about adaptations which 
give rise to specific moral beliefs. He claims, for instance, that "We are moral 
because our genes, as fashioned by natural selection, fill us full of thoughts about 
being moral" (Ruse, 1991:504). This hypothesis is more in line with the arguments 
that will be offered in this thesis, as it does not refer to a single mechanism, but rather 
a plurality of mechanisms responsible for some of the beliefs that we might have with 
regards to morality. I will refer to some of Ruse and Wilson's arguments in Part One 
where, like them, I will focus on the role that incest avoidance mechanisms play in 
explaining some of our "moral beliefs." 
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Another way of approaching the connection between morality and biology is to argue 
that while morality is not an adaptation itself, it nonetheless serves as a means of 
enhancing our fitness prospects by enabling cooperation. This is a version of the 
famous social contract theory argued for notably by Thomas Hobbes which not only 
explains the emergence of moral rules, but explains their importance in terms of 
survival enhancement. According to this approach, Hobbes' "war of every man 
against every man" (Hobbes, 1651: 64) could be seen as a major threat to survival 
which is countered via the creation of moral rules. While Hobbes was not talking 
about a literal history of human beings, there is nonetheless some plausibility to the 
argument that moral rules have such a function. In Part One and Part Two this idea 
will be explored with the conclusion that while there is some merit to the argument 
with regards to many of our moral rules, on its own the social contract approach does 
not suffice to explain certain significant aspects of how we perceive morality. 
Accepting that morality does have a fitness enhancing role, and that humans have and 
continue to deliberately use morality to serve this role, will, however, contribute to 
my conclusion that morality is the product of a number of biological mechanisms. 
This, I argue, is because the ability to employ moral rules in such a way requires a 
number of biologically generated capacities, such as language, memory are rational 
reflection. I will discuss these in Part Two. 
A positioning of this thesis in terms of the current literature would place it close to 
the writings of philosopher Neil Levy who takes what he himself refers to as a 
"middle course" between those that deny that evolution can tell us anything about 
morality and those that believe that biology can explain everything about morality 
(2004: 88). He believes that morality is essentially the product of adaptations 
selected for other adaptive functions (emotions, for example) that give us the 
impression that some things are "objective and unconditionally binding" (the moral 
concept). He then claims that we have "exapted" this impression and used it as a 
concept to judge other behaviour (2004: 86). Levy speculates that we are able to do 
this, because - amongst other reasons - we evolved the capacity to deceive ourselves 
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(2004: 84, based on arguments of Trivers [19851). The strength of Levy's position 
lies in his pluralist approach which allows an active role for not only various 
emotions in generating belief in moral rules, but also the role of reason. This allows a 
more comprehensive view of morality which adequately represents both the process 
of biological evolution and the multi-facetted nature of morality. 
0:3 Summary of major sections 
I have suggested that morality is the product of the interplay of aspects of both human 
biology and the environment. In order to support these claims, I will examine 
evidence drawn from the history of human biological and cultural development in a 
bid to reveal the nature of morality as a human construct born of behavioural 
plasticity and aimed at securing what humans desire, and/or believe they require from 
life. As I will not be suggesting that there is any one biological mechanism or 
environmental factor that is uniquely responsible for generating morality, my 
hypothesis will require a rather elaborate exploration of the various contributing 
factors. In section 0:2, I suggested that the term "morality" has different 
connotations. I suggested, for example, that when we use the term we might mean 
(A) the propensity to believe that specific actions (thoughts, characteristics...) are 
morally right or wrong; (B) we might also be referring to morality as the ensemble of 
moral rules or (C) the belief that there are thoughts and actions which are morally 
right or wrong in general. These key elements of morality will be separated and 
analysed in turn. The first three parts of this thesis represent each of these key 
elements. A fourth part will briefly consider the metaethical status of morality. 
These parts are further divided by chapters and the chapters by subsections. At the 
end of these four parts I have provided a final chapter which will serve as a detailed 
synthesis of the main conclusions I have reached in this thesis. 
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Part One 
In Part 1, I will begin with the observation that morality is concerned with how 
humans behave and think. The principal issue addressed in this section, then, will be 
the determination of the forces which govern our behavioural propensities. To this 
end, the search for a plausible connection between biology and morality will begin at 
the most basic biological level: the gene. I will argue that while behaviour is 
influenced by our genomic composition, behaviour is most accurately portrayed a 
"multilevel" affair which is influenced to a greater or lesser degree by the 
interdependent relationship of genes (nature) and environment (nurture). Recognition 
will be made, however, of the fact that certain behaviours will be influenced more 
heavily by one or the other, depending on both the type of behaviour in question, and 
the type of organism exhibiting the behaviour. Finding a connection between 
morality and biology, then, will require determining where moral behaviour sits on 
the nature/nurture spectrum. A practical way to investigate this is to place it at one 
end of the spectrum in order to see if it is adequately explained in that way. 
To this end, the second chapter of Part One will begin my consideration of whether it 
is possible to consider morality to be a biological adaptation that has been selected 
because of its contribution to the biological fitness of the individual. The first thing I 
note in this chapter is that if morality is to be thus conceived then it is important to 
consider we mean by "morality" in this context: is it, for example, certain types of 
behaviour (or, more accurately, biological mechanisms which produce the behaviour) 
that we then formalise into moral rules, as Ruse and Wilson have suggested; or is it 
the sense that moral rules are categorically binding, as Joyce suggests. I will consider 
the first of these options in Part One and illustrate why, when taken alone, this 
position inadequately represents morality. 
The first step will consist of isolating possible candidates for consideration amongst 
the various moral rules. I will do this by choosing from a series cross-culturally 
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common moral rules. This approach is in keeping with the suggestion that 
universality of particular behavioural traits (such as, the propensity to avoid 
incestuous relationships) may point to a biological origin, since organisms of a given 
species generally share a large portion of their genome. I will explore the incest 
taboo first and conclude that while incest aversion has a weak but definite biological 
basis, a cultural explanation provides a more comprehensive (and thus plausible) 
account of why we morally condemn incest. 
Altruism towards kin is the second candidate that I consider. This is because there 
are very good explanations for how altruistic behaviour towards kin can plausibly be 
attributed to biological mechanisms evolved to ensure that our genes survive into 
future generations. I will conclude, however, that the connection between these 
mechanisms and a moral rule which prescribes kindness to kin itself is more one of 
subject matter rather than a derivation of the latter from the former. 
Finally, I will argue that even if we do at least concede that biological mechanisms 
might contribute to the belief that kin altruism is morally desirable, or incest morally 
condemnable, we are far from explaining the existence of the entirety of what are 
considered moral rules, especially considering some of these rules proscribe the 
behaviour favoured by some of these mechanisms (such as, ironically, moral rules 
against nepotism). 
At the end of Part One, morality will be placed on the other end of the nature/nurture 
continuum to see if "nurture" or environment serves as a better explanation for the 
existence of moral rules. The principal "environment" that I will discuss is the social 
group into which one is born. Here I will adopt a fairly traditional social contract line 
of reasoning to illustrate the various ways in which morality serves to help maintain 
relationships within the group. For example, I will consider a social or "cultural" 
explanation for why incest taboos might be imposed, thereby supporting my earlier 
contention that incest taboos are cultural rather than biological products. I will, 
nevertheless, link morality back to biology. I Will argue, for instance, that 
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cohabitation enhances human survival prospects as long as conflict is minimised and 
cooperation is maximised. I will then suggest that the imposition of moral rules is 
one of the ways that these ends are achieved. Consequently, while the moral rules are 
not biologically selected traits, they nonetheless contribute to enhancing our 
biological fitness. 
Part Two 
In Part Two, I will argue that while morality's contribution to social cohesion is 
undeniable, an argument which explains morality uniquely in terms of this 
contribution is inadequate in a number of important ways. To begin with, it does not 
explain the variability of moral rules cross-culturally. In Part Two, I will partially 
account for this variability with recourse to the various attributes of human life that 
have come to be known collectively as "culture." In particular, I will illustrate how it 
is that different cultures shape morality in accordance with the needs, wants, 
traditions and beliefs that constitute them. This will contribute to my claim that 
morality is a product of human biology by revealing the ways in which moral rules 
are shaped by the requirements and circumstances of human life. 
While such a descriptive enterprise is informative, it still does not tell us much about 
the mechanics of the process, however. The next step, then, will be to explore how it 
is that morality has been able to develop in conjunction with human culture. I will 
conclude that morality and culture are in part bi-products of a number of capacities 
which play a role primarily in the development of social learning and social 
coordination, which are pivotal to the successful group living. Amongst those briefly 
discussed will be the capacity for imitation, learning and language. I will emphasise 
in particular the ways in which these abilities have enabled humans to pass from 
being passive inhabitants of their environment, to active manipulators of their 
environment. Of particular note is the evolution of traits which have enabled humans 
to create, transmit and apply rules — including moral rules - which manage 
relationships amongst people in the group. This observation, however, leads to 
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concerns about how it is that we differentiate the ordinary rule from the moral rule. I 
will provide the beginnings of an answer here by suggesting that moral rules 
represent, in part, the beliefs we have about the world, its significance and "meaning" 
and the values that these beliefs generate. The importance we place in these values 
explains why we might seek to "objectify" them. This, I will argue, in turn explains 
why our moral rules are no longer uniquely concerned with prosocial considerations. 
I will also suggest that moral concepts wield a certain power and authority and may 
have been employed in part for this purpose. 
Part Two, then, will constitute a significant step towards establishing another 
plausible connection between morality and biology. This will be achieved via the 
contention that the ability to form, apply and transmit moral rules is the product of a 
whole range of different biologically generated capacities. It is, however, social 
learning and coordination - and not the moral rules -which are the functions for which 
many of these capacities appear to have been selected. As such, they cannot be 
considered adaptations for morality; morality, rather, is the bi-product of having these 
capacities. 
Part Three 
In Part Three, I will examine the issue of moral motivation. In Part Two, I suggest 
that moral rules may have developed as a predominantly cultural phenomenon in the 
service, partially, of the evolutionary end of promoting individual survival. These 
rules - which in Part Three I will refer to as "public morality" - arose alongside the 
groups they helped to bind and include a wide range of sanctions. The difficulty that 
arises from such account, however, is that it does not explain the categorical force of 
moral rules which was earlier identified as being central to morality. 
In Part Three I will propose that our belief in the categorical force of moral rules and 
judgements issues from a number of different sources, including our social milieu 
(which tells us what is morally right and wrong); our reasoning ability (which helps 
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us to decide whether these rules are justified) and our emotional experiences (which 
allow us to experience certain moral rules as right and wrong). These sources also 
provide, in different ways, the motivation to uphold these binding rules. 
Firstly, I will argue that motivation to uphold moral rules is provided in part by 
systems of social rewards and punishment implemented in social groups. This may 
include both tangible punishments and rewards, such as prison sentences, or public 
decoration, and non-tangible punishments and rewards such as reputation 
enhancement or debasement. I will argue, however, that this source on its own is 
drastically incomplete as an explanation for moral motivation in general. In 
particular, it does not fully account for how it is that we are motivated to perform 
actions which have little or nothing to do with prosocial behaviour at all. For 
example, sometimes moral rules sanction beliefs and behaviour that are completely 
divorced from human survival requirements. I will use vegetarianism as an 
illustration of this point. More importantly, however, I will argue that while systems 
of reward and punishment may encourage a certain subset of behaviours, as a 
complete explanation for motivation it ignores what for some is considered to be the 
core of moral motivation; the belief that certain behaviours (for example) are 
irreducibly wrong or right and that recognition of these "truths" provides the requisite 
motivation for their performance. 
I will attempt to explain these beliefs without recourse to "ultimate truths", but rather 
as an expression of both our emotional reactions to and rational considerations of the 
world around us. Here I will consider Richard Joyce's hypothesis that we have 
evolved a special "moral sense". I will reject this hypothesis on the grounds that the 
belief that morality is categorically binding can just as plausibly — if not more 
plausibly — be explained with reference to the traits which enable us to experience 
emotions and to reason. This will complete my argument that morality cannot, in any 
sense, be considered a biological adaptation. 
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Part Four 
In this part of the thesis, I will briefly discuss the metaethical implications of my 
thesis. I will begin by providing a basis for my assumption that there is no such thing 
as mind-independent moral facts. I will then discuss the "error theory" made famous 
by JL Mackie. Here, like Mackie (and Ruse and Joyce, for that matter) I will 
conclude that a belief that morality corresponds to a set of categorically binding 
mind-independent moral facts is erroneous. This, however, does not render morality 
itself illusory, as Ruse correctly argues (Ruse, 1986:252-255). For while this thesis 
will focus on demystifying morality, it will not do so at the expense of morality. 
Instead, I will argue that morality needs to be redefined in a way that recognises its 
role as representative not of a set of mind-independent moral facts, but rather of a 
group of rules aimed at protecting a number of shared and personal values. Finally, I 
will briefly consider whether or not other animals have moral rules. 
Synthesis and General Conclusion. 
This chapter will comprise a synthesis of the main conclusions drawn throughout the 
thesis, as well a brief general conclusion. 
0:4 Summary of major conclusions 
+ Certain moral rules, such as those that prohibit incest and those that encourage 
altruism towards kin, coincide with biological mechanisms which both 
disincline and incline us respectively towards these same actions. The fact 
that they are moral rules, however, cannot be explained solely with reference 
to these adaptations. (Part One). 
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+ Certain moral rules can be considered fitness enhancing in terms of the role 
they play in enabling humans to live together in groups harmoniously (itself a 
fitness enhancing way of life for humans). (Part One). 
+ Consequently, there are a number of moral rules that are cross-cultural, since 
the bulk of the problems that arise in human groups revolve around the 
universal problem of sharing limited resources amongst individuals. (Part 
One). 
• Cross-cultural moral variety can be partially explained with reference to the 
differing environments in which people live. (Part Two). 
• Morality is the fruit of our ability to formulate, transmit and be motivated by a 
number of different rules that we consider to be categorically binding. These . 
abilities derive from a series of evolved biological mechanisms. (Parts Two & 
Three). 
• As the process of formulating, transmitting and motivating moral rules calls 
upon a whose range of different biological traits working together at times, 
and alone at others, it is not plausible to maintain that morality is the product 
of a single biological adaptation. (Parts Two & Three). 
• That moral rules are perceived to differ from other rules is often because they 
are (mistakenly) believed to derive from objective, mind-independent moral 
facts — as such they are considered true not just for ourselves, but for 
everybody. This belief provides motivation to uphold moral rules for many 
people and as such is a core feature of morality. (Part Three). 
+ Our tendency to make moral judgements that we consider categorically 
binding is not, contrary to the suggestions of Richard Joyce, the product of a 
biological adaptation. Rather, it is the product of a number of different 
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biological traits in combination with a range of environmental factors. In 
particular, our belief that the moral judgements we make are categorically 
binding springs from or is reinforced by a number of different sources 
including (A) inculcation by one's social group (B) emotional experiences of 
an intrinsically pleasurable or painful nature, and (C) rational reflection. (Part 
3). 
• While we might believe that moral rules derive from objective, mind-
independent moral facts, we are mistaken in doing so. This claim is supported 
by the fact that the sources of this belief do not require the truth of moral rules 
to explain why we believe them (Part Four). 
• While belief in objective mind independent moral facts is erroneous, this does 
not entail that we should eliminate moral concepts or rules. Moral concepts 
and rules express, promote and protect what we consider to be deeply 
important beliefs, needs and desires. If morality can be redefined to exclude 
reference to moral facts and to include considerations such as these, it regains 
an important role. (Part Four). 
• It is highly unlikely that other animals have morality. (Part Four). 
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 General Introduction 
The nature/nurture dichotomy is so dead and buried that it is wearisome even 
to mention that it is dead and buried (Joyce, 2006: 8). 
In this thesis I will be arguing that morality is ultimately both the product and servant 
of human biology. This argument will also serve as the basis for a secondary 
conclusion: that our belief in the prescriptive, categorical nature of moral principles 
needn't be explained with reference to mind-independent moral facts. To support 
these conclusions, I will elaborate a plausible hypothesis which explains how a suite 
of biological capacities, rather than a single innate trait - or adaptation - have been 
instrumental in both the formation of moral rules and in the generation of motivation 
to uphold these rules. 
The first thing to note is that one needs to take care in how morality is explained as a 
product of human biology. For while this is not a novel approach, recent treatments 
of this proposal have tended to oversimplify morality and/or human biological 
processes. In this thesis I will endeavour to fill some of the explanatory gaps that 
other attempts have left open by presenting arguments linking between morality to 
biology that represent the connection more accurately. In particular, this thesis will 
provide a response to philosophers such as Richard Joyce who have suggested that 
morality is an adaptation. 
The complexity of both morality and human biology entails that an explanation of 
connections between the two is likely to be rather long and complicated. To facilitate 
matters somewhat, I will draw out and discuss different aspects of each - and, 
importantly, how they are connected - piecemeal throughout the three major parts of 
this thesis. Part One, for instance, will start by introducing aspects of human biology 
relevant to establishing this connection. This will entail that the discussion in this 
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initial section will seem at times to wander far from philosophy. In order to properly 
introduce key concepts, however, this excursion is unavoidable. 
To begin with, I will briefly examine the biological foundation of many human traits 
— the gene — so as to highlight misconceptions that surround the term, particularly in 
terms of its autonomy in determining behaviour. In the following chapter, I will 
consider the claim that certain moral prescriptions are the cultural formalisation of 
specific biological mechanisms which incline us or deter us from performing certain 
actions (Ruse and Wilson, 1986), focusing in particular on moral rules which exhort 
us to be kind to kin, but to avoid having sex with them. 
The following main conclusions will be drawn: 
+ Firstly, the way organisms develop, function and behave is the product of the 
interplay between the environment and the genome. To speak then of 
morality in any sense as being biologically determined is misleading and is 
representative of the type of error generated by a perception of human 
behaviour as uniquely the product of either side of the artificial division 
known as the "nature/nurture" divide. 
+ Secondly, while biology is almost certainly implicated in the formation of 
moral rules, it is not uniquely via the evolution of distinct biological 
mechanisms that predispose us to act (or refrain from acting) in ways that we 
then formalise into moral rules. Rather, morality might be required in order to 
oblige us to behave in ways that we otherwise might not be inclined to 
behave, but which might nonetheless prove biologically advantageous either 
directly or indirectly. Humans meet these requirements by creating rather 
than merely formalising some of the moral rules themselves. 
• Thirdly, morality can nonetheless partially be accounted for in terms of its 
contribution to boosting human survival chances (like an adaptation) though 
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not because it is an adaptation itself. I will argue instead that as group living 
is a fitness enhancing way of life for humans, moral rules that contribute to 
group cohesion will also be beneficial to our survival prospects. For example, 
moral rules often facilitate and encourage cooperation by limiting self-serving 
behaviour that may incite conflict. To illustrate, I will give examples of 
different ways that moral rules serve to bolster cooperation and inhibit 
aggression. With respect to this point, my thesis accords with aspects of 
certain contractual accounts of morality (Hobbes, for example). It differs, 
however, with regards to the next point. 
• My fourth point is that an explanation of morality solely in terms of its social 
utility only partially explains the developmental story of morality: morality is 
far more complex than the prosocial portrait sketched in this part will provide. 
These complexities will be addressed in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
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Introduction 
In this chapter I will consider the connection between biology and morality at its most 
fundamental level: the gene. This will serve several purposes. Firstly it will fulfil its 
ostensible purpose in eliminating the possibility that morality might be genetically 
determined. While not a surprising conclusion, discussing the possibility will reveal 
facts central to an exploration of a connection between biology and morality. For 
example, it will highlight the role that environment plays in determining human 
characteristics. Since the origin of certain moral rules is also considerably influenced 
by the environment (as I will argue in Part Two), it is important to understand this 
interplay. This chapter will also serve as a means of introducing some of the 
terminology that appears throughout the rest of the thesis. 
1:1 Genes and genetic determinism 
In his book The Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins gives a fascinating account of an 
experiment conducted on a hive of bees aimed at pinpointing the biological 
mechanisms involved in eliminating diseased larvae from the hive (Dawkins, 1976: 
60-62). It began with the observation of a caste whose responsibility seems to be the 
identification of diseased larvae, the unsealing of the wax enclaves in which they lie 
and the subsequent disposal of them. Cross-breeding revealed that these different 
steps were under fairly tight genetic control; that is to say, each individual step 
required the possession of a particular DNA sequence. Consequently, if certain 
genetic components were bred out of a given bee, the process of removing the 
diseased larvae was arrested at certain key steps. For example, bees with only the 
genes for uncapping were able to uncap the wax enclaves but nothing more. Other 
bees found to be seemingly void of any removal instincts whatsoever were later 
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found to merely lack the genes required to un-cap the cells: if the cells were uncapped 
already, the wasp would proceed to remove the diseased larvae. 
The results of such experiments provide fairly strong evidence that the genome is 
largely responsible for at least some of the ways in which organisms develop and 
consequently behave. In this case, the wasp uncaps the wax enclave because it is 
genetically programmed to do so; if the genes are "removed" the wasp no longer 
performs the act. However, while it is certainly true that an organism's development 
will be importantly influenced by its genes, this does not entail that everything that 
organisms do is genetically determined. 9 That we might be misled into thinking that 
they are is partially due to misunderstandings of both the "gene" and the role that it 
plays. In fact, it should be noted that the concept of the "gene" itself appears to be in 
a state of flux as new discoveries about the functioning of the human genome surface. 
For instance, the concept is now wandering further and further away from its former 
representation as a discrete unit of inheritance responsible for the production of a 
particular protein, but it has not settled into another neatly confined definition. In fact 
the extent of current indecision about the exact nature of the gene is epitomized by 
scientist Karen Eilbeck's account of a meeting of 25 scientists which was initially 
hampered by the considerable amount of time it took for the participants to come to 
some consensus about the definition of a gene. In the end they agreed that they 
would define the gene as "[...] a locatable region of genomic sequence, 
corresponding to a unit of inheritance, which is associated with regulatory regions, 
transcribed regions and/or other functional sequence regions" (Pearson, 2006: 401). I 
will likewise adopt this definition when reference to genes is made in this thesis. 
Putting such difficulties aside for the moment, what is fairly uncontroversial is that 
the genome is integral to the biological development and behavioural repertoire of 
9 Genetic determinism is the view that all of what we are and do is determined by our genome. In its 
most extreme form, genetic determinism is taken to imply that individual genes are responsible for all 
of our individual characteristics, a misguided view that is aided and abetted by the reasonably frequent 
references in popular media to the alleged discovery of phenomena such as the "fat gene"; "the 
homosexual gene", or the "aggressive gene". 
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organisms. What is interesting about humans, however, is that while we seem so 
behaviourally complex and flexible in comparison with certain other species, there is 
not a huge difference in the number of these "regions of genomic sequence" between 
us and them. This suggests that the genome alone is not solely responsible for the 
traits that we have. 
It is of course true that a certain amount of this complexity can partially be explained 
by the fact that certain genes may behave differently in different circumstances. For 
example, one gene sequence in combination with another may produce one trait, but 
in conjunction with another may produce an entirely different trait. Gene sequences 
themselves also have different potentials (pleiotropy), I° Genes may also be selected 
for one adaptive trait, but then later be instrumental in producing a different trait." 
These factors might help explain why we exhibit more behavioural complexity than 
species with which we share a similar genetic count. 
The most significant problem with a genome-centric view, however, is the suggestion 
that the genome works in isolation in producing traits. The genome does not operate 
alone; it requires an environment, and the final expression of a particular genetic 
sequence is inextricably linked to the way in which it interacts with this 
environment. 12 Some have referred to this system as a "developmental matrix" which 
involves much that is environmentally dependent, physiological and non-genetic 
(Sterelny and Griffiths, 1999:95). 13 Internally, for example, much of gene expression 
io Sterelny and Griffiths cite David Hull's example of the allele in the drosophila which has 
consequences both for the eye colour of the fly and also the shape of the spermatheca (Sterelny and 
Griffiths, 1999:122). 
11 The feathers of a bird for example are thought to have evolved for their fitness enhancing 
contribution to thermo-regulation, rather than for flight for which they were later used. (Ostrom, J.H. 
[1974, 1979]). I will talk about this example again in Chapter Two. 
12 For an interesting discussion of this, Kim Sterelny and Paul Griffiths devote an entire chapter of 
their informative book Sex and Death_to the "developmental systems theorists" (1999, 94-110); that is, 
scientists who challenge the omnipotence of the genome and concentrate rather on other factors which 
play what they deem an equally important, if not even greater role, in the conception and development 
of the individual organism (Sterelny and Griffiths, 1999: 94-110). 
13 The study of these developmental processes is referred to as "epigenetics", a term introduced by 
Waddington (1952) and which has been defined as "...the interactions between genes and their 
products, and the various other conditions composing the milieu required for developmental processes 
to take place." (Wolf, [1995: 1281, as quoted in J.S.Robert, 2002: 598). 
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is regulated by the cellular environment in which the gene is to be found. Externally, 
the environment will determine much about the way in which the organism will 
develop and behave; a baby may be born healthy, for example, but unless it is born 
into an environment that can provide for its needs, it will not survive. Indeed, the 
role of the environment will be a major part of the developmental story of morality 
provided in thesis. 
In sum, one could say that the genome is like a collection of raw materials without 
which an organism could not be built. The way in which the final product - the 
phenotype - will appear, however, will depend upon a series of internal and external 
influences. This is not to say that the final product will be completely random; for 
while it is true that there is the possibility of variability, gene complexes nonetheless 
have a limited range of expression, some of which are more tightly restricted than 
others — recall my example of the behaviour of the bees. In other words, plasticity is 
not unlimited. Certain environmental changes are completely incompatible with 
organismic development and may kill the organism in question, something which 
occurs frequently (Rose, 1999: 876). Recall also that for the majority of species, the 
viable organism will be born with a certain set of features that it requires to live. 
Human beings could not survive without the organs necessary to breathing and 
nourishing themselves, for example. There are certain features about us which are 
less "plastic" than others. 14 
Human traits, then, cannot be accurately described as solely being determined by the 
genome. That they might be seen as such is characteristic of the "nature/nurture" 
divide which depicts behaviour, for example, as either innate, in the sense that one 
cannot do otherwise, or completely plastic and primarily subject to environmental 
shaping. Such divisions are highly misleading. Instead of being two sides of the 
behavioural coin, "nature" and "nurture" are mutually dependent in their effects on 
behaviour. Genes, for example, are better perceived as propensities, some of which 
14  If I inherit the gene for Huntington's disease, for example, I will suffer the consequences of having 
the disease, unless of course a cure can be found. 
27 
are more likely to be manifested than others given the right circumstances; the bee is 
genetically predisposed to uncap wax enclaves, but will only do so if there are wax 
enclaves to uncap. 
To conclude, in answer to what would initially seem a reasonable question — that is, is 
morality or any of its constituents genetically determined — it is with confidence that I 
can say "no". Human behaviour, for one thing, is far more complex than this and 
can be more accurately conceived, in the words of Wahlsten and Gottlieb, as a 
"...multilevel affair involving at least culture, society, immediate social and physical 
environments, anatomy, physiology, hormones, cytoplasm, and genes"(1997:183). 
Inasmuch as morality is concerned with human behaviour, then, we cannot look 
solely towards the genome for an explanation of this aspect of morality. Indeed, the 
remainder of this thesis will be concerned with exploring the nature of the connection 
between biology, environment and morality, and will plumb both biological processes 
and environment features to seek out the contributing factors. In the next section, the 
search will continue via a process of elimination in which the possibility that moral 
rules might be the direct issue of biological adaptation will be considered and 
rejected. 
Conclusion 
If one seeks to provide a biological explanation of morality, it is important to pinpoint 
the contributing factors. What has been established here is that morality is not the 
product of our genome alone. While this may not come as any great surprise, 
exploring the reasons why this is the case has had a revelatory function. Here, for 
instance, the importance of the environment to the biological development of 
organisms has been underlined. As I will argue that both biology and environment 
working in tandem can explain the origins and various aspects of morality, the first 
important steps in the exploration of morality have been taken. The next step is to 
now determine how it is that biology and environment - or "nature" and "nurture" - 
interact to produce morality such as we know it today. 
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Ciliapter 28 Moral 039 :4;3 g adaptations 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the possibility of explaining the origin of morality as the 
product of genes alone was eliminated. This however does not eliminate a possible 
role for biological traits in the developmental story of morality; it merely highlights 
the need to explore the interaction of biology with environment in such an account. 
Human biology is far from being out of the picture. 
In this chapter, I will commence the exploration of possible connections between 
morality and biological adaptations. There are several plausible connections that 
might be made. For example, in Part Three I will consider (and reject) Richard 
Joyce's contention that the actual propensity to judge things morally right or wrong — 
the "moral sense" - is an adaptation. Joyce uses this to explain — for instance — the 
fact that most people, including small children, are able to make the difference 
between conventional rules and moral rules (Joyce, 2006: 139). 
Secondly, it might - and in this thesis will - be argued that morality is the bi-product 
of a series of biological adaptations. Arguments to support this conclusion will be 
developed over the course of this and the following parts. 
Thirdly, it might be argued that certain moral rules are the formalisations of 
biological adaptations (Ruse and Wilson, 1986: 429-430). I will now discuss why 
this argument might be considered inadequate on its own in explaining morality as a 
whole. Two different (quasi) universal moral principles - that we ought to be kind to 
our kin, but that we ought not to have sex with them - will be targeted. 15 In the case 
of incest taboos, I will conclude that (A) a biological basis can be established for 
15 I will use the word "quasi" here to indicate that while there is a degree of universality in these rules 
cross-culturally, there have been or might be exceptions. 
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disinclination towards certain incestuous behaviour, and (B) this disinclination might 
contribute to the formation of the moral taboo (C) it is nonetheless insufficient by 
itself to explain the moral taboos against incest that exist in most societies. In 
Chapter Three the appearance of the moral rule will be given a cultural explanation in 
terms of its role in securing familial cohesion, with the suggestion that it may have 
been implemented deliberately by humans to serve this end. 
Likewise, different forms of altruistic behaviour could be seen at certain levels to be 
explicable in terms of biologically selected traits that favour them. 16  The propensity 
to help one's kin, for example, has been (famously) explained via its role in 
enhancing one's own biological fitness; the genes that family members share have a 
greater chance of being passed on should those that share them help each other 
survive (Haldane, 1932, Hamilton, 1964). There is, moreover, plausible evidence for 
the presence of biological mechanisms that not only enable the easier identification of 
kin, but that also engender feelings of attachment or detachment depending on the 
relationship in question. I will nonetheless argue that kin altruism in this sense, 
cannot on its own explain moral rules which encourage similar behaviour. 
Based on these arguments, I will conclude that specific moral rules cannot plausibly 
be explained uniquely with reference to biological mechanisms that lead us to believe 
that they are right or wrong: morality is far more complex than this. What I will 
conclude, however, is that a series of different biological traits can contribute to the 
formation of some of the moral rules that we have. This observation will contribute 
to my more general claim that while biological adaptations are not solely and directly 
responsible for the fact that we have morality, they are nonetheless centrally 
implicated in explaining how humans themselves are able to formulate moral rules, 
be motivated by them and to also believe these moral rules are categorically binding. 
16  I note here that cases of reciprocal altruism are often explained in this way (See, notably, Trivers, 
[1971]). There is not the space, however, to enter into the vast details of this argument; a brief 
discussion of kin altruism will be sufficient in establishing the point that some moral rules are boosted 
by biological adaptations, but cannot be solely accounted for by these mechanisms. 
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2:1 Adaptations 
Before going any further, some terminology requires clarification. Since I will refer 
often to "biological adaptations" it is important that I clearly define what I mean by 
this in order to avoid confusions that talk of adaptations often generate. 
Central to Darwin's famous Origin of Species was the observation of differences 
between species and the conclusion that they had been wrought through a process of 
gradual change, or "evolution", over a considerable length of time, all organisms 
ultimately having descended from a single original species. The process is 
sometimes likened to a tree, the branches of which are the various species, joined 
ultimately at the base by a common ancestor. Throughout the history of life on earth, 
organisms have reproduced and multiplied, certain organisms undergoing changes or 
mutations during reproduction which have led to the eventual diversification of 
species or "speciation". The species that survive do so because they have 
advantageous features which have given them the edge over their rivals in a 
competition for limited resources; or, using Darwinian terminology, they have 
survived because they are the fittest, and they are the fittest because of their 
(relatively) superior features called "adaptations." These adaptations are passed on 
via reproduction to future generations and will continue to do so as long as they are 
advantageous (or, if no longer specifically advantageous, not detrimental) in terms of 
their contribution to the organism's survival. 
To say that a trait is a biological adaptation, then, is to say that it has been selected at 
some point in an organism's past because it has enhanced the organism's ability to 
survive and reproduce. The fact that I walk upright for most of my life, as opposed to 
on all fours like some of my ancestors, is due to a series of adaptations which were 
selected at some point in the evolutionary history of my ancestors and which were 
most likely retained because of the advantages that they conferred. The exact nature 
of the advantage walking upright itself conferred in our evolutionary history, 
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however, is subject to debate. 17  What is fairly clear is that some of these changes 
contributed - or at least were not detrimental - to our ancestors' fitness such that they 
survived long enough to pass these changes on to their offspring and so on, 
culminating in the universal upright walking position of humans today. 
Drawing conclusions about the precise adaptive function of some traits is very 
difficult. More pertinent to this thesis, however, is the difficulty involved in 
establishing that traits are even biological adaptations to begin with. Since I am 
arguing that morality is not a naturally selected, biological adaptation, a few words 
about the difficulties involved in locating adaptations is important here. 18 
As stated, one of the major difficulties involved in discussions about biological 
adaptations is determining which traits are in fact adaptations to begin with. It is very 
easy and indeed, it has been very common, to isolate individual traits exhibited by 
organisms and to blithely hypothesize as to why the particular trait seems 
advantageous, and is thus a biological adaptation. Biological literature is of course 
replete with such accounts, some of which are considered more plausible than others; 
that teeth are adaptations for eating is generally accepted, for example. Other 
accounts, however, are much more fanciful, and are often reminiscent of "just-so" 
stories told to us as children to explain how and why some particular animal got a 
particular feature. 19 Some accounts are especially noteworthy for the ingeniousness 
of the reasons proposed to explain certain traits. (For example, a particularly alluring 
explanation of the pink colouring of flamingos is that it is an adaptation designed to 
17  It may, for example, have been the advantage of increased and prolonged mobility that it conferred 
in a time where the savannah became the predominant hunting ground. It may also have been the 
advantage that having liberated hands offered in terms of wielding and using various tools. As with 
many adaptations, exact explanations of their survival advantage — if indeed there still is a survival 
advantage — are not always easy to discover. 
18  For a further, interesting discussion on adaptations and the some of the misconceptions and abuses 
of the term, see Gould and Lewontin's famous 1979 paper "The spandrels of San Marco and the 
Panglossian paradigm: A critique of the adaptationist programme." 
19  The concept of "just-so stories" refers to Rudyard Kipling's famous fables invented to explain how 
different animals acquired various characteristics (Kipling, (1952, [19121). 
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camouflage flamingo flight at sunset [Rose, 1999: 883]). 20 It would perhaps be best, 
as Bernardo Dubrovsky points out, to keep such "adaptationist" tendencies in mind 
before embarking on the search for purpose at all costs. 
Adaptationists regard each aspect of the organism's 
morphology, physiology, and behaviour as a specific 
adaptation of the entire organism. For them the problem of 
evolutionary science is finding out what an adaptation is for, 
when in fact the first cluestion should be whether it exists 
(Dubrovsky, 2003: 95). 2 
Of course the difficulties involved in seeking adaptive explanations are manifold. 
Firstly, there is the problem of supporting one's claims with sufficient evidence based 
on an analysis of both present and past. As Robert Richardson cautions, "...the task 
of explaining some trait as an adaptation ... depends on understanding the 
evolutionary history which produced it."(Richardson, 2003: 707) While it might be 
easy to consider the current function of a trait, and then conclude that this is its 
adaptive function, such reasoning may be misleading. For example, one might 
conclude on seeing birds fly that feathers are adaptations that evolved for this 
purpose. Investigation of their evolution, however, suggests that in fact they evolved 
as an insulating mechanism (Ostrom, 1979: 45-56). A trait only becomes adaptive 
when it has been selected for and perpetuated over time: time itself, however, may 
give rise to circumstances which afford new usages for old adaptations, such as 
feathers used for flying. Stephen Jay Gould and Elizabeth Vrba famously labelled 
such functions "exaptations" (Gould and Vrba, 1981). 
Determining the adaptive function of a trait is made even more difficult by the fact 
(mentioned earlier) that gene complexes can be responsible for producing different 
traits depending on the environment in which they are found. To further confound 
matters, there is also the fact that certain traits simply do not seem to have — or no 
20  This example was given by Steven Rose as an example of some of the more outlandish explanations 
provided to account for the functions of different traits. 
21  Dubrovski makes note that this point is derived from Fodor (2000) and Mahner and Bunge 
(1997:423). 
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longer have - any particular adaptive function at al1. 22 For example, some traits are 
simply circumstantial and totally neutral in terms of fitness enhancement: the red 
colour of blood, for example, is almost certainly not an adaptation, but is merely the 
colour of the haemoglobin that is in the blood (Lewontin, Rose & Kamin, 1984: 262). 
Finally, the actual biological process of transmitting adaptations is often ignored in 
bids to locate adaptations. For instance, in order to prove that something is an 
adaptation one would need to pinpoint the gene complexes that constitute the 
adaptation in the first place. While this of course is not always possible, doing so 
needs nonetheless to actually be a possibility. It is not enough to conclude that a trait 
is an adaptation just because it is advantageous to an organism in some way; it has to 
also be physically possible. 
This latter point is central to this thesis since I am arguing that morality is a 
composite phenomenon that is the product of many adaptations. If my arguments 
succeed, this would suggest that saying that morality is an adaptation is simply false. 
Even those who claim to have found the moral trait which could be "the" adaptation 
(such as Richard Joyce), fail to demonstrate how it could plausibly be considered a 
naturally selected trait and account for all aspects of morality (See Part Three for 
more detailed discussion). 
With these considerations in mind, we may return to a more focused consideration of 
the nature of a link between morality and biology, aware of some of the pitfalls talk 
of adaptations may present. On a concluding note, however, it should be pointed out 
that in this thesis, the term "adaptation" will be taken in the Darwinian sense of the 
term to refer to a trait that has been naturally selected at some point in an organisms' 
biological history. To denote a trait or characteristic that contributes to the survival 
and reproductive prospects of an organism but which is not the product of a 
22  The obvious example is the appendix, whose only current function could perhaps be seen as its 
propensity to sometimes burst, enabling its bearer a short holiday in hospital. Of course it is believed 
that the appendix did perhaps once serve a purpose, but it is now what is referred to as a "vestigial 
trait" — that is, a trait that once did confer some kind of evolutionary advantage, but which is now 
redundant. 
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biologically heritable adaptation, the term "fitness enhancing" rather than "adaptive" 
will be used; "adaptive" will be reserved for talk of biological adaptation to avoid 
confusions. 
2:2 Universals 
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, there are different ways in which 
morality might be linked to biological adaptation. This section will explore the 
possibility that there are biological adaptations which predispose humans to behave in 
certain ways that are then formalised as moral rules. One angle from which to 
commence the investigation is to find examples of morally regulated behaviour which 
appears to exist universally. This approach is based on the argument that certain 
types of behaviour found commonly throughout the human population are the product 
of adaptations evolved in early Homo sapiens history. This is one of the core 
arguments of evolutionary psychology, for example (Levy, 2004: 460). 23 
Adaptations, recall, are traits that have contributed somehow to survival and have 
been passed on to future generations as a result. If they were selected early in our 
evolutionary history (when presumably there was not considerable population spread) 
one might expect to find certain of these adaptations throughout the entire species. 
As Levy puts it, 
How else to explain the fact that human sexual behaviour 
follows the same generated patterns across all, or almost all, 
known human cultures; that everywhere people prefer their 
kin to non kin, and so on, for all the human universals 
identified by anthropologists? (Levy, 2004: 460) 
One reasonable approach to the question of a link between morality and adaptation, 
then, would be to seek out common features in cross cultural moral codes as a point 
of departure. 
23 Evolutionary Psychology will be discussed more fully in Chapter Eight. 
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The first thing to establish is what, on a general level, might constitute "universal 
human behaviour". It does not take long to find examples. Cross-culturally, all 
humans eat, drink, and reproduce, for instance. These requirements, in turn, are 
regulated by an array of (quasi) universally present biological mechanisms, both for 
the processes themselves, and also for the generation of the urge to perform the 
processes. (Hunger, for example, will lead us to eat). Moreover, while these 
processes may initially seem irrelevant to moral behaviour, they may nonetheless be 
implicated in the formation of moral rules as R.G. Collingwood points out, 
...the historian is not interested in the fact that men eat and 
sleep and make love and thus satisfy their natural appetites; 
but he is interested in the social customs which they create by 
their thought as a framework within which these appetites 
find satisfaction in ways sanctioned by convention and 
morality (Collingwood, 1926: 216). 24 
Collingwood has a good point; having "natural appetites" does impact on a lot of 
what we do since we will always be seeking ways of satisfying these "natural 
appetites". For example, Jared Diamond in his epic Guns Germs and Steel 
persuasively argues for the key role food procuration has had in the development of 
both culture and country (Diamond, 1997). The need to search for seasonal food due 
to the infertility of much of the land inhabited by Australia's Aboriginal population, 
for example, is a contributing factor to their formation of small nomadic tribes. As 
will be argued in Chapter 5, such a lifestyle impacts significantly on social 
organisation, composition and structure and, in turn, the moral rules that regulate 
them. 
At least part of our behavioural repertoire, then, appears to be quasi-universal, 
biologically generated, and also involved in shaping other aspects of human 
behaviour. At first consideration, then, it does not seem impossible that we might 
find moral behaviour that is cross-culturally common and perhaps the product of 
adaptations, or at least, moral rules which are shaped by biological adaptations that 
24 As quoted in Salmon, M. H. (2003: 723) 
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humans have in common. It would be useful, then, to commence a search for a 
tenable connection between biology and morality with a search for universal moral 
rules. 
2:3 The incest taboo as a moral adaptation 
The search for universal moral rules which appear to be the direct product of 
biological adaptation has yielded a number of candidates which have been highly 
debated. There has, however, been a degree of consensus with regards to one or two: 
the incest taboo and kin altruism. Indeed there are few discussions of morality in 
sociobiological literature which do not mention either of these at some point. In this 
section the incest taboo will be discussed. I will conclude that while an adaptive 
aversion to incest may contribute to its moral condemnation by bolstering our 
conviction that it is wrong, the aversion itself is insufficient to explain either the 
condemnation that it receives, nor the fact that sanctioned by a moral rule. 
In most cultures, incest in one form or another is generally considered to be morally 
wrong. 25  Michael Ruse and E.O.Wilson are amongst those who claim that these 
moral taboos are formalisations of adaptations which disincline us to enter into 
certain incestuous relationships (Ruse & Wilson, 1986: 183-185). They claim that 
inhibition towards incest evolved as an adaptation, the function of which is to 
decrease the incidence of mental or physical deficiencies (or even fatalities) likely to 
result from inbreeding. 26 They also argue that incest avoidance mechanisms form 
25 Incestuous practices have at times been actively encouraged in certain cultures, however. Sibling 
marriages were a common occurrence in Ancient Egypt, for example. In a study undertaken by 
Scheidel (1997) of the city of Arsenoe, it was revealed that 30% of marriages that took place between 
90 CE and 200 CE were between siblings. According to the fragmentary evidence available, these 
marriages were highly celebrated occasions which later went on to produce children. 
26 Incestuous relationships increase the instances of homozygosis in offspring, which in turn increases 
chances of pairing of deleterious recessive genes that would otherwise be disabled on their own. (Eva 
Seemanova, 1971, as cited in Wilson, 1978: 37) For example, in one study cited by Wilson, it was 
found that of 161 children born to women from incestuous relationships, 15 of them were either still 
born or died within their first year, and that a staggering 40% of them had either physical or mental 
defects. When 95 children born to the same women from non-incestuous relationships were studied, it 
was found that only five of the children died in their first year, none had serious mental deficiencies 
and only 5% had physical defects. 
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part of the category they refer to as "deep biases" or "epigenetic rules" which shape 
aspects of our neural functioning, including the ways in which we reason morally 
(Ruse & Wilson, 1986). It thus joins a repertoire of protective behaviours left over 
from our hominid beginnings, a repertoire which includes such things as phobias of 
snakes and high places which plague us still in spite of the presence of even more 
dangerous, common threats in our own societies. 27 
Claims of a biological inclination towards incest avoidance, however, do not exist in 
a theoretical vacuum. Research suggests the existence of biological mechanisms that 
when activated or invoked manifest themselves in a lack of interest or even aversion 
to incest. Principal amongst the mechanisms implicated are those responsible for 
generating a "sensitive period" that young children (allegedly) experience between 
birth and 6 years of age (although this varies), during which close proximity with 
certain people will later preclude ability to form strong sexual bonds with these same 
people. Such was the theory advanced by Edward Westermarck in 1921, and which 
subsequently became known as the "Westermarck hypothesis" (Westermarck, 1921). 
Studies have supported this hypothesis, including Arthur Wolf's oft-cited research 
into the Chinese and Taiwanese practice of adopting a future spouse -a "Sim-pua"- 
into the family as an infant, a practice which is believed to strengthen the future 
familial ties of the future spouse and her in-laws (Wolf, 1966, 1968, 1995). Data 
suggests that this close contact between the prospective partners in infancy has led to 
a higher incidence of divorce, infidelity and lower fertility amongst these couples 
later in life. This study has been often cited as major evidence supporting the 
Westermarck hypothesis. 28 
More recent research conducted by Debra Lieberman, Leda Cosmides and John 
Tooby likewise supports this hypothesis (Lieberman, Tooby & Cosmides, 2003). 
Their conclusions were based on a survey conducted amongst 186 subjects who were 
27 This view belongs particularly to the field of Evolutionary Psychology, and, as mentioned before, 
will be discussed more fully in Chapter 8. 
28 These results are also supported by a reported lack of inclination of Kivutza of the Israeli Kibbutz to 
marry those with whom they grew up, in spite of lack of prohibition to do so and regardless of the lack 
of blood tie (Shepher, 1971). 
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asked to rank the moral severity of a variety of incestuous relationships. The results 
showed that the length of co-residence, and not genetic relatedness itself, was the 
main variable that affected subjects' judgements about the moral wrongness of 
sibling incest. That is to say that the longer the co-residency endured, the more 
severe the moral condemnation of incestuous behaviour was considered. Lieberman, 
Cosmides and Tooby also postulate the existence of biological cues for recognizing 
kin, which they refer to as an "evolved kin-recognition system". The system includes 
a range of biological mechanisms, amongst which are olfactory cues. For example, in 
studies conducted it was found that people were often able to identify kin via their 
smell: children, for example, were often repulsed by the odour of opposite sex 
siblings. It has also been shown that people seem attracted to others who have a 
different MHC (Major histocompatibility complex) to their own (Weisfeld et al., 
2003, Wedekind et al., 1995). 
The strong evidence for such biologically-generated inhibitions suggests that it is 
reasonable to conclude that they are adaptations which serve (amongst other things) 
to prevent the possibilities of deformity and disease associated with inbreeding. Ruse 
and Wilson suggest (as mentioned above) that this inhibition has, in turn, been 
formalised by moral sanctioning on the part of cultures (Ruse and Wilson, 1986). 
This, then, might lead one to conclude that moral injunctions against incest are 
derived directly from biological adaptations which inhibit such behaviour. 
In response, I argue that the aversions produced by the proposed adaptations 
mentioned here are not strong enough, or even sufficient, to directly account for 
either the moral condemnation incest often elicits or the variations of the taboo that 
exist cross-culturally. This suggests, in turn, that the connection between the 
biological mechanisms and the moral taboos is more distant than might otherwise be 
implied. 
Firstly, studies have shown that the Westermarck effect does not lead to very strong 
aversions to incest which preclude sexual activity taking place, but rather to simple 
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lack of interest in - or at the most, a mild repulsion at the idea of - any sexual activity 
with one's co-residents (Van Den Berghe, 1983). While the divorce rates amongst 
sim-pua arranged marriages are considered relatively high in Taiwan, they are much 
lower than those amongst the general population in the US, for example, and the 
fertility rates are actually higher than those of North Americans (but still 
comparatively low for Taiwan). This suggests that co-residency merely makes the 
thought of sexual relations seem relatively unappealing, but no insurmountable 
impediment to them actually taking place (Hendrix & Schneider, 1999: 202). 
Secondly, moral taboos against incest, particularly incest between children and their 
parents, usually express the belief that incest is fundamentally condemnable, not just 
something that is "unappealing". Furthermore, the moral taboo itself usually 
expresses condemnation of the act for reasons other than the possible risk to unborn 
children (I will outline some of these reasons in Chapter 3). This fact implies that the 
taboo is the product of human decision to impose the rule, rather than the rule being 
the mere formalisation of a biological predisposition. 
Thirdly, it is plausible that moral taboos may have even been introduced to ensure 
that incest is avoided because the biological disinclinations are neither strong enough 
nor specific enough (i.e. reserved for kin only) to be effective in preventing this kind 
of relationship. This is a point supported famously by Freud (1952) who claimed that 
we would not need a moral taboo if there was already a biological inclination against 
incest. 29 Many risky or dangerous practices which are partially regulated by 
biological mechanisms that make them seem unappealing do not also require moral 
taboos to ensure their exclusion from the behavioural repertoire. People, for 
example, do not require a moral taboo to ensure that they do not eat obviously rotting 
food; our (biologically generated) sensitivity to the smell or sight will usually ensure 
that we do not do it. 30 Moreover, having an aversion to or disinterest in something 
29 Freud's own theory was that humans have an innate desire to behave incestuously. It is, in turn, 
because of this propensity that the cultural taboo is required, for the sake of the existence of the family 
and in the face of potentially explosive repressed incestuous urges (Freud, 1913/1952). 
3° I will suggest in Part Three, for example, that disgust is a biologically generated emotional reaction. 
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does not make it automatically a moral issue. I may have an aversion to the taste of 
raw oysters, but eating them does not thereby become a moral issue for me. There is 
more to morality than this. 
What I will argue, however, is that these mechanisms may contribute to the formation 
of moral rules by bolstering the belief that certain actions (including, even, the eating 
of oysters!), for example, are morally wrong.3I A rule (for example, one which states 
that incest is morally wrong) that is accompanied by a feeling of displeasure and 
disgust when contemplating the act itself, may possibly serve to reinforce the belief 
that it is wrong. This would require that either there be the moral taboo first, 
however, in order for the condemnation to be of a moral nature rather than the simple 
expression of distaste or disgust. Or, as will be argued in Part Three, the reaction 
would have to be stronger than mere aversion to give rise to the moral rule. A weak 
disinclination (or even an aversion) on its own is not enough on its own to account for 
the existence of the incest taboo in many moral codes. At best it contributes to the 
explanation. In the absence of a direct biological explanation of moral incest taboos, 
are we therefore entitled to conclude that cultural considerations explain the existence 
of the taboo better? This possibility will be explored and supported in Chapters 
Three, and again in Part Two. 
2:4 Kin altruism as a moral adaptation  
... much as we might wish to believe otherwise, universal love and the 
welfare of the species as a whole are concepts that simply do not make 
evolutionary sense (Dawkins, 1976: 2). 
In the previous section, I argued that moral incest taboos are not adequately explained 
as the formalisation of adaptive mechanisms. These mechanisms may contribute to a 
sense that there is something somehow "wrong" about incest but they are insufficient 
to either explain the universality of the taboo or the seriousness with which it is 
imbued. Another common component of cross-cultural moral codes is rules 
31 This argument will be taken up in Part Three. 
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prescribing altruistic behaviour. I will now turn to altruism to see if it can be 
explained in any sense as the direct product of biological adaptation. 
The first thing to note is that "altruism" is a somewhat vague term which, as Richard 
Joyce correctly points out, generates a lot of confusion (Joyce,2006: 13). What is, 
however, fairly uncontroversial is that key elements of an altruistic act include (A) 
that it bear positive consequences for somebody else and (B) its performance incurs 
some cost to the performer. Giving up time to help a colleague with their work; 
regularly giving blood donations; offering a proportion of one's salary to a given 
charity each week - these are fairly classic examples of altruistic acts that are 
reasonably familiar. 
What is particularly interesting about altruism (with regards to this thesis) is that it is 
not uniquely a human phenomenon. This suggests that altruism also warrants 
consideration as a possible biological adaptation since its cross-special incidence 
suggests that it is less cultural construct and more shared biological feature. For other 
animals — as I will argue in Part 2 — do not appear to either have cultures comparable 
to human cultures, nor do they appear able to shape or prescribe behaviour in a way 
comparable to that of humans. 
It seems likely then that altruism might in some way be the product of a specific 
biological adaptation. The problem, however, is that altruistic behaviour seems 
completely anomalous within a Darwinistic evolutionary framework since it is 
difficult to see how a trait that favours self sacrifice could actually evolve since self 
sacrifice is distinctly disadvantageous to the individual. Darwin himself was 
particularly puzzled by the incredible feats of both reproductive and individual 
sacrifice found amongst the eusocial insects, claiming, somewhat dramatically that it 
was "...one special difficulty which at first appeared ... insuperable, and actually 
fatal to ... [his]... whole theory" (1859, Ch.8). 
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Superficially, then, it seems unlikely that altruistic behaviour of any type could issue 
from a biological adaptation. Darwin's theory of natural selection, however, was 
based principally on the consideration of the individual (and at times even the 
group32 ), as the unit of selection. Mendelian genetics filled in at least some of the 
gaps in Darwin's theory, however, and while it is still not unreasonable to posit the 
individual or perhaps even the group as a possible unit of selection, it is now clear 
that the gene itself is one of the key players in natural selection. 
The discovery of the gene as a unit of selection paved the way for a highly plausible 
explanation for a form of altruism that can be found not only cross-culturally, but also 
cross-specially: kin altruism. The explanation (called "kin selection" or "inclusive 
fitness theory") departs from the observation that parents and offspring share the 
same genes.33 In promoting the survival chances of offspring, then, parents are also 
promoting the survival probabilities of their own genes. The probabilities increase, 
moreover, as the number of offspring increase, as each one brought to sexual 
maturation represents yet more of the parents' genes in the population. Both Jack 
Haldane and William Hamilton famously demonstrated that it was consequently 
highly likely that adaptations enabling self-sacrificial behaviour which benefits kin 
evolved via natural selection (Haldane, 1932, Hamilton, 1964). 
Evidence for adaptations favouring kin selection is abundant in the colonies of the 
eusocial insects. This is explained by the fact that the worker caste are clones, which 
means that siblings share more genes with each other than they do with their own 
offspring and therefore have a greater evolutionary interest in promoting each other's 
welfare and forgoing their own reproduction. Lee Dugatkin (2004: 464) cites Ratnieks 
32 Darwin seemed unsure as to how this could possibly occur, however. This claim has since been 
taken up by others, though most famously by V.C. Wynne-Edwards (1962), Eliot Sober (1998), & D.S. 
Wilson (1975, 1998). Darwin also specifically mentioned the idea in his 1871 The Descent of Man 
(166). While not discounting the group or individual as a possible unit of selection (and I do favour a 
pluralist approach), much of what is discussed in this thesis will focus more on the gene as the unit of 
selection, and the individual as the "vehicle" (Dawkins, 1976, 1982) or "interactor" (Hull, 1981). This 
is principally because any direct connection that morality is argued to have with specific adaptation 
(kin selection, for example) can be explained in terms of the gene as the unit of selection. 
33 What we inherit, of course, will not be exactly 50% from one parent and 50% from the other: the 
proportions may vary considerably case by case. 
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and Visscher's 1988 paper about honey bees as evidence that this phenomenon occurs. 
They found, for example, that workers in the hive take more active care of the queen's 
eggs than other workers' eggs, evidenced by the fact that at the end of a 24 hour period 
only 2% of the workers' eggs were still living as compared to 61% of the queen's eggs. 
This is explained by the fact that the queen's offspring are the workers' siblings, whereas 
the workers' offspring are merely nephews, and thus they share more genes with the 
former than the latter. Protecting the former, then, is in their genetic interests. Such 
behaviour is explained as being the product of adaptations selected to promote such 
behaviour (Ratnieks &Visscher,1988: 796-797). 
It is thus that Darwin's "insuperable difficulty" is partially solved in terms of a 
biologically based explanation for the existence of certain forms of kin altruism. 
Extending this to humans, in aiding my kin, I increase the survival prospects of my own 
genes since my kin share some of these same genes. As such, it seems likewise to make 
evolutionary sense that adaptations that encourage this type of relationship have evolved, 
and this is indeed what we find. Some of these adaptations, such as those that enable the 
identification of close kin, were discussed in the previous section as incest avoidance 
mechanisms. Others include bonding mechanisms that have their basis in the human 
affective system, which will be discussed more fully in Part Three. 
Such explanations make it tempting to conclude that a direct connection between 
biology and morality can be made with regards to kin altruism. This is not to be the 
case however, as I will now argue that adaptations promoting kin altruism do not 
contribute substantially to an account of moral altruism. 
To begin with, while biological adaptations appear to explain certain examples of 
puzzling self-sacrifice that are often witnessed in the animal kingdom, they do not 
seem to be able to explain other significant forms of altruism such as altruism 
extended towards non-kin. Rules encouraging a more generalized form of altruism 
(such as the giving of charity to the less fortunate) are ubiquitous cross-culturally. 
Michael Ruse suggests that the biological mechanisms involved in kin altruism are 
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general mechanisms whose application has been extended or "universalised" to 
include non-kin as non-kin increasingly came to be a part of our social groupings 
during our evolutionary history (Ruse, 1986). Mark Ridley however argues that this 
is unlikely since such a mechanism would almost certainly lead to completely 
maladaptive consequences (Ridley, 1989: 364). function of kin selective 
adaptations is to be able to identify kin from non-kin in the first place, so as to be able 
to favour them, thereby enhancing the survival prospects of your own genes. 
Consequently, he argues, "Where cannot be a simple rule to co-operate with all 
individuals you meet. The discrimination against some individuals is as fundamental 
to the selection of altruism as is the discrimination in favour of others" (Ridley, 1989: 
362). A biological mechanism which entails that we might be predisposed 
favourably towards complete strangers would make us extremely vulnerable to a 
whole range of people who, for the most part, probably do not have our best interests 
at heart. 
This, however, is perhaps not an entirely fair reply to Ruse. For while it seems clear 
that certain mechanisms (such as Ridley's hypothetical mechanism) would, if 
permitted too broad an application, be maladaptive, others that do exist appear to 
allow such generalisation without necessarily maladaptive consequences. In Part 
Three, for example, I will argue that emotions such as empathy and sympathy, which 
most certainly were selected for their role in promoting kin altruism, have now 
become centrally implicated in moral behaviour that extends far more generally: in 
Gouldian, terminology, they have been exapted to other purposes. I will argue, 
however, that we are able to discriminate between potentially risky recipients of our 
altruism, and "worthy" recipients using our ability to reason and reflect. In any case, 
these mechanisms alone are far from being sufficient to establish a direct connection 
between biological mechanism and moral altruism which is what is specifically being 
investigated here. They might, however, contribute to an indirect connection. 
34 Indeed Jesse Prinz suggests that in small groups (such as the earliest groups of humans) people 
probably do not need rules to ensure that they protect those to whom they are "near and dear" at all 
since "...it is enough that we like them and that we have an obvious interest in treating the well." He 
suggests that imposed moral rules encouraging altruism most probably arose when human groups 
became very large (Prinz, 2008:221). 
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Secondly, as concluded earlier with incest taboos, it seems unnecessary to prescribe 
something (via moral rules) that is already done "instinctively". We only tell 
somebody that they "ought" to do something if there appears to be a choice to make 
and hence the possibility that the "wrong" choice be made. Roger Trigg supports 
this view. 
...if human nature has evolved in such a way that we all 
naturally want to help whoever needs help, the function of 
morality as an institution seems somewhat obscure. The need 
for the urgings of morality seems marginal if we are all going 
to do right anyway because we want to. Even reasoning that 
we ought to act for the good of the community seems 
unnecessary if we are predisposed to do so anyway (Trigg, 
1986: 332). 
If there are moral prescriptions about parental care - or altruism more generally - in 
cross-cultural moral codes this suggests that either the biological adaptations are not 
strong enough to assure it always occurs and that even if they are, humans have the 
ability to occasionally override their influence. This in turn suggests that we might 
actually create moral rules to encourage the behaviour because we recognise the 
value of the behaviour ourselves. This idea does not totally eliminate a role for pre-
existing mechanisms: that we value kin altruism will almost certainly be influenced 
by pre-existing mechanisms that dispose us favourably towards them. Its inclusion in 
moral codes, however, rather suggests that humans have chosen it as such. In this 
sense then the moral prescription also serves to fill the gaps where biological pre-
disposition may not function efficiently to eradicate or encourage certain behaviour. 35 
An analogous example supports this hypothesis. It is widely accepted that there are 
biological mechanisms in place that make women with characteristics indicating both 
youth and fertility seem attractive to men. This makes evolutionary sense since it is 
35 It is interesting to note also that promotion of the welfare of kin is not always considered to be the 
morally correct path to take. Indeed moral injunctions against nepotism are a regular feature of moral 
systems. 
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in a man's interest to reproduce and reproducing with younger woman increases the 
chances of successful reproduction. 36 Biologically, a woman around the age of 18 is 
young and (generally) fertile, and yet in the Western world, sexual relations between 
young women of this age and much older men often elicit moral condemnation. This 
suggests that there is much more going on in moral decision making than response to 
biological predisposition. 
In sum, then, a plausible connection between biology and morality cannot be found in 
terms of a set of adaptations which on their own account for certain moral rules. This 
does not mean, however, that the mechanisms discussed so far are not at all 
implicated in the origins of certain moral rules; they are, however, only indirectly 
implicated. These connections will be elaborated in Parts Two and Three of this 
thesis. 
2:5 The question of intention 
Humans.. .are moral agents in the sense that they have free will 
and so are able to resist the pressures placed on them by their genetic 
tendencies. Their evolved motives influence their behaviour but do not 
determine it... (Woolcock, 2000: 52) 
In the last sections I suggested that while there are biological predispositions that may 
explain some examples of kin altruism, a moral rule which prescribes that we behave 
altruistically towards our kin seems to derive rather from human decision that it be a 
moral rule. This raises an important issue with regards to the way we perceive moral 
agency. In the previous section I made the point that the act of prescribing moral 
rules - which is what we do when we tell someone that they morally ought to do 
something - implies that the "someone" has some kind of choice as to how they are 
going to behave. There would be little point prescribing behaviour to an organism 
which did not have this behavioural flexibility. It is for this reason that we could not 
call the kin altruism of the eusocial insects "moral" altruism. In order for an action to 
36  According to Singh, for example, men almost universally find women with a specific waist/hip ratio 
attractive (Singh, 1993, Singh and Luis, 1995). 
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be labelled morally altruistic it needs to have been motivated, for example, by moral 
intentions - which in this case of altruism are benevolent, other-regarding intentions. 
This immediately differentiates it from the mechanical-like responses to given cues 
that characterise the altruism of the eusocial insects since (firstly) the insects do not 
appear to be able to behave otherwise and (secondly) they do not seem capable of 
having intentions in the first place; to do so requires, amongst other things, self 
awareness and from evidence garnered to date, insects do not have the neurological 
capacity to have such self-awareness (in spite of what Disney might have us believe). 
So even if the function of the eusocial insects' altruistic behaviour is (A) to protect 
members of the group and (B) it is performed sometimes at the expense of the 
organism (thereby satisfying the two criteria I gave in the previous section to define 
altruism), it is far from clear that we can call it morally motivated since it does not 
appear to have been intended as such. 
Motivation, intention and - by implication - the ability to form intentions and be 
motivated, are thus central in deciding whether or not an act is morally altruistic. 
Because of this, some have suggested that a useful distinction to make is between 
"evolutionary altruism" (the product of altruism-producing mechanisms that have 
evolved to enhance survival prospects) and "psychological altruism" (altruism which 
is motivated by what is believed to be a genuine concern for the good of others) 
(Sober, 1993: 206). In the case of psychological altruism, even if an act appears to 
have been performed with altruistic intent, if the act is driven by consciously selfish 
motives, then it is not usually classified as an act of altruism. Nor could the act be 
considered psychologically altruistic if it is not motivated at all, but is rather the 
direct product of a biologically "programmed" response. Psychological altruism 
accords, then, with what we would call "moral" altruism and evolutionary altruism 
does not. 
Moral altruism, then, requires that there be motivation to behave altruistically without 
conscious selfish intentions. This, in itself, presents new matters to consider, however. 
Firstly, there is the practical problem of discovering the nature of someone's intentions. 
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While in some cases it is fairly clear when behaviour is intended to serve a particular end, 
in others it is very difficult. When people choose to adopt children from poverty stricken 
countries it is sometimes for apparently altruistic reasons, particularly when a couple is 
able (and want) to have children themselves and forgo this possibility to save a child at 
risk in another country. Discovering this intention is often simply a matter of asking the 
people involved. This is not as straight forward as it might seem, however. The extent to 
which the "choice" itself is truly "free" needs to be considered. It may be (and indeed I 
will support this contention) that many human "intentions" are in fact shaped by fitness 
enhancing mechanisms (though in a circuitous manner) which renders them less "free" 
than we might think. For example, there is a lot of evidence to suggest the empathetic 
reaction that a poverty stricken child might trigger is itself the product of neurological 
mechanisms, a hypothesis that I will discuss in more detail in Part Three. This suggests 
that while we think we are choosing freely, our choices are in fact being influenced by the 
operation of innate mechanisms (of which we are unconscious). 
In spite of this, however, we can still maintain that we nonetheless have a degree of 
choice in the sense that we are conscious of having this choice (whether or not we are 
correct or not). This, in turn, allows us to still believe and claim that our actions have 
been morally motivated without being accused of deception. In the example provided 
above, my couple appears to actually have a choice in the matter of whether or not they 
adopt the child, and they also appear consciously motivated to perform the action for 
moral reasons. That there are underlying mechanisms which influence these choices - 
while relevant to the ultimate decision about the truth value of moral rules - does not 
detract from the fact that we believe that we have the choice: morality is partially the 
product of this belief. 
Secondly, there is the matter of explaining how it that we come to be motivated to behave 
morally or have, what I have called here "moral reasons" or "intentions". For example, 
the behaviour we call morally altruistic is generally labelled as such because we have 
consciously chosen it with intention to be benevolent and other regarding. More 
specifically, however, we are motivated to choose it because we believe that behaving 
49 
thus is the morally right thing to do (our "moral reason"). This, however, leads one to 
wonder how it is that we come to be motivated by these beliefs in the first place. One 
plausible response is that many of us are motivated because we think that our beliefs 
correspond to some kind of objective fact about which we can be right or wrong and, 
consequently, morally right or morally wrong. In this sense, then, we might be motivated 
to perform a particular act because we think it is the objectively right thing to do. This 
would suffice as an answer unless one was to argue that there are no moral facts of this 
type as I am attempting to do. As a result one is (or, rather, I am) left with the problem of 
explaining how it is that we come to believe that there are truths of this type: a third 
question, then. I will, however, reserve my answer for Part Three where it will be 
specifically addressed. For now I need to begin my consideration of the prosocial role of 
moral rules. 
Summary 
In concluding this chapter I propose that in explaining moral rules prescribing kin altruism 
as a direct product of biological adaptations we arrive at a place similar to where we 
arrived in the discussion of incest: that is, at the conclusion that while biological 
adaptations are implicated in the explanation, they cannot by themselves explain the 
existence of the moral rules. Even if we were to claim that the adaptations promoting kin 
altruism (or inhibiting incest) are more heavily involved in explaining the moral rules than 
they are in the hypothesis I have presented here, all we would still have, at best, is an 
explanation for what Philip Kitcher referred to as "minor maxims" (Kitcher, 1994: 447) 
which on their own do not tell us much about morality as a whole: kin altruism, for 
example, is a small subset of the variety of moral rules that target altruistic behaviour and 
moral altruism is itself just one of many different constituents of the variety of moral 
codes which exist cross-culturally. We are, as Richard Joyce concurs, very far from 
"explaining morality". In his own words, 
In kin selection we have a quick and easy, empirically 
supported, evolutionary explanation for why humans might 
have "prosocial emotions" (eg. love) toward certain others: 
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emotions that provide the motivation for helping behaviours. 
But what I really want to emphasize here is how far this 
answer falls short of explaining morality (2006: 49). 
Two important points have been made, however. Firstly, I have provided an account not 
of the direct source of certain moral rules, but rather of some of the capacities that are 
most likely implicated in their formation. For example, I have suggested that there are 
biological capacities in place that are implicated in the regulation of our relationships with 
others. In the next chapter, and again in Part Two, I will suggest that many of our moral 
rules are partially the product of the need to regulate relationships, and so these capacities 
will become even more significant. This will also contribute to my argument that 
morality is a product of a number of different adaptations, rather than one single 
adaptation, an argument that will resurface in Part Three where moral motivation is 
specifically addressed. 
Secondly, the importance of motivation and intention in moral matters has been 
emphasised. I argued, in turn, that these require that we have — or at least believe we have 
- some kind of a choice as to how to act. Motivation, for instance, implies that one has 
options from which to choose, options, moreover, which can be put into some kind of 
hierarchy of importance. That we have choices (or at least believe that we have choices) 
again suggests that there are many more capacities involved in moral decision making 
than reductive arguments such as Joyce's suggest. Choices require, for example, the 
ability to perceive oneself in a future context, to reflect, to communicate and to recall. 
Some of these capacities will be discussed more fully in Part Two. 
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To this war of every man, against every man, this also is consequent; 
that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and 
injustice, have no place. Where there is no common power, there is no 
law, where no law, no injustice.. .Justice and injustice are none of the 
faculties neither of the body nor mind. If they were, they might be in a 
man that were alone in the world, as well as his senses, and passions. 
They are qualities that relate to men in society, not in solitude. (Hobbes, 
1651: 32) 
It is not difficult to imagine the emergence of justice and honor out of 
the practices of cooperation. (Damasio 2003: 162) 
Introduction 
One of the conclusions that I arrived at in the previous chapter was that while there 
are adaptations which predispose humans to behave in certain ways that coincide with 
behaviour prescribed by morality, it is not the adaptation which directly explains the 
moral rule itself. The existence of these adaptations, however, does underline the 
evolutionary importance of kin relationships. In this chapter I will explore the role 
that morality plays in managing non-kin relationships in the larger groups which 
typify human sociality today. Indeed this has been one of the predominant roles 
ascribed to it by famous philosophers in the past (Hobbes, 1651; Rawls, 1971). In 
doing so, however, I will not be putting biological considerations aside; I will argue 
here that moral rules serve an adaptive-like (that is, they are fitness enhancing 
without being adaptations) role in both promoting and facilitating cooperation and 
harmony in groups. Before discussing how moral rules do this, however, it might 
well be asked both why larger groups formed in the first place and in which ways 
they might provide an advantageous way of life. 
3:1 The advantages of group living 
That our species lives and apparently thrives in social groups implies that it is 
ultimately an advantageous way of life for us; that this is the case is corroborated 
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both by the fact of the human population explosion and also the formation of very 
large, highly structured societies that now exist. Indeed, the advantages of group life 
must be important to outweigh disadvantages such as the need to share limited 
resources and the increase in the risk of disease and parasite transmission that group 
living entails (Alexander, 1974: 328). 
Firstly, an initial explanation for the persistence of group living can be found in the 
fact that for an extended period of time after the birth of children a small kin-based 
group around the parent is advantageous (Kaplan et al., 2000). Human babies remain 
dependent on their parents for long periods of time, and are totally incapable of 
surviving by themselves for at least several years. This has the effect of drastically 
inhibiting the parent's ability to acquire food sufficient for themselves, their baby and 
for any number of other offspring they might have. Pooling of resources would help 
to overcome such obstacles, ensuring a greater survival rate of one's self and one's 
kin. Having at least a small group of perhaps close kin around would thus be 
biologically advantageous. In fact if we return to the history of Homo sapiens, it does 
indeed seem highly likely that the earliest groups were partially, if not predominantly, 
kin-based (Paddock, 1978: 111). 
Richard Alexander builds upon this argument and offers suggestions as to why even 
larger groups may have developed. For example, he suggests that larger groups offer 
better protection against various predators (including, importantly, the other groups of 
people competing for limited resources). Also, in larger groups food is more readily 
accessed by both the pooling and division of labour, particularly in zones in which 
food is not abundant. Hunting in groups, for example would have allowed the 
procuration of larger game. In addition, food found by different subgroups at 
different times could be shared with those that were not so successful, or who were 
unable to hunt themselves. So instead of being disadvantageous in terms of 
necessitating the sharing of limited resources, group living in fact becomes 
advantageous in terms of acquiring those limited resources. 
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Group living, then, affords several important advantages to humans. But what does 
this entail? Does it mean for example, that we are biologically adapted to live with 
other people, and if so, how can this be explained? Firstly, it should be noted that 
human "sociality" cannot realistically be conceived of as a singular adaptive trait 
since to be social in the first place implicates such a broad range of different abilities, 
and characteristics. In Part Two and Three I will discuss some of these capacities. I 
will argue that (A) both morality and human social behaviour in general are the 
product of these capacities and that (B) some of these capacities are themselves 
biological adaptations or the product of biological adaptations that were almost 
certainly selected for their contribution to aspects of human social behaviour - 
notably, to what will be referred to as "social learning" - but not for their contribution 
to moral behaviour specifically. 
However, even if human sociality is the product of a series of biological adaptations 
this does not preclude us from describing it as fitness enhancing. This point will be 
argued for more thoroughly in Part Two. In the next section, however, I will develop 
an argument to show that morality could likewise be perceived as being fitness 
enhancing, and, importantly, how this is sometimes achieved. This is with the aim of 
explaining why morality may have developed in the first place, as well as how 
morality is related to human biology in its role as an indirect fitness enhancer. 
3:2 Morality as a social facilitator 
...although a society is a co-operative venture for mutual advantage, it is 
typically marked by a conflict as well as by an identity of interests. 
There is an identity of interests since social cooperation makes possible 
a better life for all than any would have if each were to live solely by his 
own efforts. There is a conflict of interests since persons are not 
indifferent as to how the greater benefits of their collaboration are 
distributed, for in order to pursue their ends they each prefer a larger to 
a lesser share (Rawls, 1971:4). 
Up to this point, I have made the following claims: 
+ Moral rules are not uniquely the product of discreet biological adaptations. 
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• Moral rules are also the product of humans deciding that they are important. 
• Group living is an evolutionary advantageous way of life for humans. 
In this section the following claims will be proposed: 
• In order to live in groups, selfish tendencies need to be managed to avoid 
constant dispute. 
• Morality promotes social cohesion in the absence of biological adaptations 
which secure this end. This is achieved by humans formulating and enforcing 
moral rules which manage human relationships. 
• Moral rules sometimes serve to increase our survival prospects. 
In the previous section I argued that humans thrive in groups. Our so called 
"sociality", however, does not entail that we are inclined to want to live with just 
anyone. In fact, humans manifest many "anti-social" traits (such as aggression) and 
living in groups provides ample opportunity for the provocation of such aggression 
(Flack & De Waal, 2005: 9-10; Wilson, 1978: 99). Living in groups, for example, 
presents disadvantages such as the need to share limited resources. The difficulty of 
doing this to the satisfaction of a group of largely self-orientated individuals is - and 
always has been - the source of much inter and intra group dispute; strife over limited 
resources has been and continues to be at the heart of many wars, for instance. 
Cooperation, and means of ensuring cooperation, is thus central to the success of 
human cohabitation. In the last section I suggested that human relationships are not 
regulated by the same level of genetic hardwiring as those of the eusocial insects. 
Consequently there needs to be another system in place to ensure that defection from 
cooperative ventures is not rife. In this section I will argue that part of morality's 
"story" can be told in terms of its role as a set of rules devised by humans and aimed 
at facilitating cooperative ventures. In particular, I will focus on the way that 
morality helps reduce the incidences of unnecessary physical and psychological harm 
and the threats to individual survival that such harm might occasion. It achieves this 
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by sanctioning behaviour which is perceived as threatening to groups and individuals, 
a sanctioning which for many people has more power than a simple social rule. 
Before commencing my argument, I must emphasise that the fact that I focus 
uniquely on a prosocial account of moral rules here is only because I wish to illustrate 
the point that morality can partially be accounted for in terms of its contribution to 
social harmony: it is not an acknowledgement that this is the only role morality has 
to play nor that the hypotheses explored here constitute complete explanations of the 
appearance of the rules in question. Nor am I providing this account as the unique 
explanation of how morality has developed. For while morality most probably 
emerged from prosocial rules — and indeed still maintains this role to a certain degree 
— it has become much more than this. (Indeed, I devote the remainder of this thesis to 
explaining how and why it is that morality actually differs to other social rules.) 
Relationships 
Morality is intimately concerned with facilitating human relationships. That they 
serve this role is borne out by observation of certain quasi-universals that can be 
found in moral systems across the world. 37 Amongst these are the incest taboo and 
altruism, a biological basis for which was considered in Chapter Two. Relationships, 
however, go beyond the familial in human social groups; there are work relationships, 
political relationships, friendships and specific interest based relationships. Here we 
are not talking about mere encounters, but enduring connections with other people. 
Consequently, one might expect that there are systems in place to ensure that these 
relationships run as smoothly as possible. Moral rules, I contend, constitute one such 
system. Moreover the fact that moral rules which are directly concerned with 
fostering positive human relationships are quasi-universal cross culturally suggests 
that the need to regulate these relationships might be one of the main reasons we 
37 They are called "quasi-universal" here in recognition that while they can be found cross-culturally, 
they may not necessarily appear in the individual moral codes that people develop. For while a 
particular culture or community might have a loose moral code, there can be variation in the moral 
codes of the individuals in the group that does not cohere with the code of the wider group. 
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implemented the moral rules in the first place. Richard Joyce outlines a series of 
broadly conceived moral universals to make a similar point: 
A number of cross cultural studies have unanimously found 
certain broad universals in moral systems: 1. negative 
appraises of certain acts of harming others, 2. values 
pertaining to reciprocity and fairness, 3. requirements 
concerning behaving in a manner befitting one's status 
relative to a social hierarchy, and 4. regulations clustering 
round bodily matters (such as menstruation, food, bathing, 
sex, and the handling of corpses) generally dominated by 
concepts of purity and pollution. The first three categories 
involve interpersonal relations, encouraging one to draw the 
conclusion that a large chunk of any moral system will be 
devoted to prescriptions and values that seem designed to 
protect and sustain social order, to resolve interpersonal 
conflicts, and to combat the rampant pursuit of individual 
welfare. In particular, a great deal of the moral domain is 
devoted to matters pertaining to how humans harm each other 
(Joyce, 2006: 65). 
I will now discuss some of these broad categories in greater detail with an end to 
emphasising the ways in which morality contributes to the facilitation of human 
relationships. 
Humans as aggressive 
Earlier in this chapter I discussed why group living is advantageous to humans. I also 
suggested that the rise and spread of large groups of Homo sapiens gave rise to a 
distinct disadvantage — the danger presented by other groups of Homo sapiens in 
competition for valuable resources. In the words of Richard Alexander, 
When man developed his weapons, culture, and population 
sizes to levels that essentially erased the signification of 
predators of other species, he simultaneously created a new 
predator: groups and coalitions within his own species. The 
fact of widespread and essentially continual intraspecific, 
intergroup human aggression, the closeness of the parallel to 
forces most readily postulated to account for group life in 
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other primates seem to me inescapable facts leading to the 
conclusion that much of man's evolution has been guided by 
the effects of intergroup aggression (Alexander,1974: 335). 
The idea that human beings have a strong tendency to be aggressive is one that is 
distasteful to many. Such distaste has perhaps led — amongst other things — to 
explanations of our sociality in terms of our capacities for altruism and cooperation 
(Peter ICropotkin's Mutual Aid for example). While there is not the space here - or 
the research available - to establish the precise nature of an aggressive tendency in 
humans, what does seem clear is that we are not the peace-loving, cooperative 
animals that many of us would like to believe. On the contrary, we seem unparalleled 
in the animal kingdom for our capacity for not only inter-special aggression but also 
intraspecial aggression. Dispute and war have been rife in our history and continues 
to be so today. In fact, Richard Alexander goes as far as suggesting that it is 
intergroup rivalry which actually explains the historical increase in group size, on the 
basis that bigger group sizes afforded more power, and more power assured greater 
chances of success in situations of dispute (Alexander, 1974: 335). 
One of the main ways that societies control aggression is to impose rules against the 
gratuitous harming of other people. For example, moral rules proscribing murder are 
ubiquitous cross culturally - indeed some of the most extreme forms of punishment 
(including death to the offender, somewhat ironically) are metered out for the crime 
of murder. Murder, of course, is only one example of the type of harm that moral 
rules seek to prohibit; there are many others. In fact, much of what we consider to be 
morally wrong is considered wrong because it involves some kind of harm, as 
Richard Joyce points out in the quote provided above. To illustrate, Turiel, 
Hildebrandt, and Wairtyb conducted a study amongst a group of young adults in 
order to discover why they thought that incest, homosexuality and abortion were 
often considered to be morally wrong. They found that those who judged these acts 
to be morally wrong explained their conclusions in terms of the harm that these acts 
could engender. On the other hand, those that had no objection to these acts did not 
mention harm at all (Turiel, Hildebrandt and Wainryb, 1991). It seems reasonable, 
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then, to conclude that one of the ways that moral rules might contribute to social 
harmony is by preventing certain types of harm. Prevention of harm, in turn, can 
contribute to social cohesion by also curtailing other forms of related dispute that 
might arise from people being harmed in the first place. For example, when people 
are harmed, or their loved ones are harmed, dispute often ensues in the form of 
retaliation or retribution; moral rules can nip this type of dispute in the bud by 
preventing it from arising in the first place. 38 
The examples I have briefly discussed above deal principally with physical harm. 
Physical harm is, of course, just one amongst many different forms of perceived harm 
that are prohibited by moral systems throughout the world. The loss of one's 
property or rights, for example, is also considered a morally objectionable form of 
harm, and one —moreover - that is also at the heart of many disputes. Consequently, 
the need to protect rights and properties has ushered in another significant type of 
moral rule; the moral rule which serves to promote fairness and justice. 
Fairness and justice 
It is fair to say that quite often war and other smaller scale forms of dispute are the 
product of the desire to acquire what one has not, or to protect what one has, in spite 
of whatever lofty rationale is given to them. On a lesser scale, the need or desire to 
protect or procure for oneself or one's own in an environment where resources are 
limited will require some kind of regulation to avoid constant conflict. In the words 
of John Rawls: 
...although society is cooperative venture for mutual 
advantage, it is typically marked by conflict as well as by an 
identity of interests. There is an identity of interests since 
social cooperation makes possible a better life for all than any 
would have if each were to live solely by his own efforts. 
38 This is not, of course, to say that all harm is going to lead to social disruption. What one person 
considers to be harmful may be at odds with what the majority in the social group thinks, for example. 
In this case, there is not likely to be major social upheaval should the harm occur. 
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There is a conflict of interests since persons are not indifferent 
as to how the greater benefits of their collaboration are 
distributed, for in order to pursue their ends they each prefer a 
larger to lesser share (Rawls, 1971: 4). 
Alongside altruism, then, the moral notions of both justice and fairness become 
central to the maintenance of cooperative human relationships in protecting the broad 
range of what are considered by all people to be their rights. These might be, for 
example, property related rights, privacy related rights, or work related rights. 
Without protection of these rights, it is unclear how a constant state of war and lesser 
social strife could be avoided for very long. That two of the greater constituents of 
cross-cultural moral codes - justice and fairness - relate directly to managing humans 
in social situations further supports the claim that morality is intricately linked to the 
facilitation of group relations; it seems absurd, for example, to talk about justice and 
fairness when there is only one person involved, as Hobbes points out in the quote 
that opens this chapter. It also suggests that humans might have created these rules 
for just this end, since by creating these rules, they contribute to the assurance that 
their own rights are protected. As Hume pointed out, "[t]he same self-love...which 
renders men so incommodious to each other, taking a new and more convenient 
direction, produces the rules of justice, and is the first motive of their 
observance"(Hume, 1978: 543). 
Sexual relationships 
Sexual relationships - and the children that issue from them - generate some of the 
more powerful ties that bind people together. They are also central to much social 
dispute. According to research conducted by Bruce Knauft, for example, homicide in 
hunter and gatherer groups is often the consequence of disputes between men about 
women (Knauft, 1991). It is not surprising then that regulating the relationships 
between men and women becomes important within human groups to not only ensure 
a degree of social harmony, but to also ensure adequate nurturing of our children. 
For example, it is reasonable to suggest that the family unit consisting of a lasting 
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male/female partnership(s) works well for the purposes of raising children 
considering the limitations that a woman is exposed to as a result of a prolonged 
period of child-bearing and rearing. A father that leaves shortly after the conception 
of a child may well reduce the child's chance of survival. 39 This might explain why 
some groups have moral rules promoting monogamy, for example. Infidelity, in turn, 
is often considered to be a fairly major moral transgression, which has even been 
punishable by death in some countries. 40 
This leads to the next point. There are many rules which target human sexuality; 
there are rules concerning when and between whom sexual relationships may take 
place, as well as how they might take place. Morality also regulates issues such as 
sexual modesty, contraception and sexual initiation. There is also a whole network of 
moral norms in place to deal with issues such as sexual jealousy (the promotion of 
"modesty" for example, or, as mentioned previously, moral rules prohibiting 
infidelity) and to protect against the psychological or physical harm that may occur if 
sexual relations are undertaken when one of the partners are not considered either 
physically or psychologically ready (paedophilia and rape are considered to be 
amongst some of the more grave moral infringements in many moral codes, for 
example). Earlier in this thesis, incest was discussed, with the conclusion that moral 
taboos against incest have a cultural rather than a biological explanation. As a further 
illustration of the link between morality and social cohesion, then, a social — and 
cultural — basis for the moral rules that proscribe incestuous relationships will now be 
explored. 
39  This of course is not to suggest that monogamous relationships are the only means of providing 
adequate care of our children; there are other alternatives that might - and indeed do — seem to work 
just as well (such as, for example, the communal care that takes place in the Israeli kibbutz system.) 
Polygamous relationships also have a long history which suggests likewise that they are a successful 
form of relationship. 
40  Christopher Boehm claims that adultery is at the heart of many serious disputes in hunter and 
gatherer, tribes, for example (Boehm, 2000: 86). 
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The incest taboo again 
In Chapter 2, I argued that while there might be a weak biological basis for incest 
avoidance in certain circumstances, the moral taboo itself required further 
explanation. By way of example, I will focus on how a moral incest taboo might be 
explained in Australia in terms of its role in promoting social cohesion. To begin 
with, it should be noted that while incest increases the risk of abnormalities in 
offspring — a fact which explains why we may have evolved a biological aversion to 
it — this does not seem to be at the heart of why we have a moral taboo which 
proscribes it. To illustrate via comparison, the numbers of women above forty having 
children has doubled in the last decade and this in spite of the fact that the risks of 
down syndrome increase to 1 in 30 for a woman over forty as compared to 1 in 1000 
for a woman in her twenties. And yet from a moral point of view, the public reaction 
to a 40 year old woman risking abnormalities in her child by falling pregnant (which 
is generally indifference) is very far removed from the public reaction to two closely 
related kin embarking on a potentially fertile sexual relationship (which is generally 
condemnation). This implies that there might be other reasons that account for the 
moral condemnation that incestuous relationships generally provoke. I will make a 
few suggestions here. 
Firstly, explaining why non-consensual sexual relations between parents and children 
might be considered morally wrong is fairly straightforward. Any sexual relationship 
which is undertaken against the wishes of one party will generally cause the abused 
party unnecessary physical and/or psychological harm. As we saw in the previous 
section, moral rules often serve to prevent the occurrence of unnecessary harm, and 
so this case falls under that explanatory umbrella. Incest, however, also occurs 
consensually — and not only between parents and offspring, but also between siblings; 
if the principal requirements for a sexual union are a loving relationship, sexual and 
mental maturity and mutual consent, why then shouldn't siblings or parents and their 
adult offspring partake in such a union if all of these criteria are satisfied? 
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In seeking out other reasons why incest might be considered a social danger, one 
might consider its potential interference with the social order at its most basic level; 
the family. Sandra Scarr, for example, claims that incestuous relationships violate the 
familial environment and the bonds created therein (Scan -, 1992). As these bonds are 
considered central to the normal development of a child, their violation increases the 
possibility of an insecure, unstable future for the child in question. In the words of 
Spiecker & Steutel: 
If incest is a perversion...it is a perversion, not of the sexual 
act, but of the familial relationship. In this violation of a 
domestic tie the moral nature of incest is revealed: in incest 
the existing filial relation is destroyed and another, which is 
incompatible with it, is superimposed upon its ruins (Spiecker 
& Steutel, 2000: 289). 
By way of illustration, in a significant proportion of Australian families, a 
monogamous sexual relationship is formed between two parents and children are the 
issue of this relationship. The family, in turn, becomes an important unit which 
serves, amongst other things, to ensure that these children are well cared for. An 
incestuous relationship between a parent and adult offspring is likely to cause 
disruption to the family unit on several levels. Firstly, it is a violation of a 
monogamous bond. More particularly, however, such a relationship confuses — and 
even abuses— the designated roles within the family since a filial relationship usually 
involves the parent as the authoritative figure, and the offspring as the dependent. As 
Spieker and Steutel argue, as emotional dependence may often last beyond childhood 
and adolescence, a sexual relationship could be seen as an abuse of authority or 
dependence much in the same way that a sexual relationship between doctor and 
patient is seen as an abuse of authority and trust. It is thus unclear whether consent to 
a sexual relationship can ever be fully free of the binds that these aspects of the 
relationship create (Archard, 1998). Moreover, a sexual bond between offspring and 
adult might prove difficult to break later on — because, for example, the filial 
relationship that precedes it cannot be broken — and thus might interfere with a child's 
ability to form relationships with others later on (Card, 2002: 174). 
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Of course whether or not incest will have these effects will often depend on the 
cultural boundaries that have been set up in a social group. One of course can 
imagine situations in which incestuous relationships do not cause the problems that 
have been outlined here. The fact that incest taboos exist in most societies, however, 
indicates that people recognise the potential dangers incestuous relationships might 
engender both in terms of born and unborn offspring and have sanctioned them 
accordingly. 
The "thou shafts" 
Thus far my discussion has been focused on moral prohibitions. Alongside the 
myriad of moral injunctions that exist cross-culturally are moral prescriptions which 
directly encourage the performance of peaceful, cooperative and kind actions, as well 
as beliefs and attitudes which are conducive to social cohesion. These include moral 
tenets such as altruism — and altruism, moreover, that is not performed with the 
expectation of reciprocation but is rather performed for the sake of doing something 
kind or helpful for somebody else. 
More particularly, there is a whole series of "virtues" that are promoted as part of 
moral codes; they regularly include traits such as kindness, trustworthiness, 
generosity, selflessness, diligence and temperance. In a social sense, these virtues 
serve to prevent potentially damaging behaviour by attempting to shape the character 
of moral agents in the first place. As will be discussed in Part Three, the formation of 
morally sound characters brings its own reward in the form of improved social 
relations; people are far often more likely to want to connect with people who are 
apparently virtuous, rather than those who are obviously morally suspect, for 
example. The encouragement of moral virtues, therefore, is a vital key to the 
facilitation of large scale cooperation and social harmony. 
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3:3 The transition from social to moral rule: The beginnings of an 
explanation 
Thus far, I have suggested ways in which moral rules might play a role in enhancing 
our survival chances by managing conflict, reducing the incidence of harm and 
encouraging cooperation. In doing this, they in turn contribute to the cohesion of 
social groups, which also makes evolutionary sense since social living is an optimal 
way of living for humans. What I did not do, however, is explain how the transition 
from social rule to moral rule actually occurred. In this thesis I will be arguing that 
the answer to this question is a complex one, involving a long period time (about 
which we know preciously little) and different elements of both human biology and 
the environment in which they live (about which we are only beginning to form an 
understanding). My answer will consequently require attention to these various 
details, and will also be highly speculative. What does seem clear is that morality is 
intimately linked with social coordination both in terms of origin and role. Indeed, 
even today the line between the two is somewhat hazy. 41 
So far I have suggested that much that is considered to be morally right or wrong 
largely serves an "instrumental" role. In the introduction of this thesis, however, I 
suggested that moral concepts are actually used to express non-instrumental 
categorical, rather than hypothetical imperatives (borrowing Kantian terminology). 
In arguing that what we take to be categorical imperatives are actually hypothetical 
imperatives, I am thus suggesting that we are obviously mistaken in believing that 
they are in fact categorically binding. How it is that we are able to be mistaken in 
this way, then, requires explanation. In Part Three I will provide a detailed 
explanation of how our capacity to feel emotions contributes to our belief that moral 
rules (attitudes and characteristics), such as the ones I have discussed in this chapter, 
are categorically binding. In this section, however, I will simply start with the 
observation that this is what is implied when we use moral concepts — that is, we 
41 In Part Three, for example, I will argue that we can even draw a (rather ill-defined) line between 
what I will call "public morality" (the moral code of the social group into which we are born) and 
"private morality" (the moral code we come to embrace ourselves). There is likely, of course, to be 
considerable overlap between the two. 
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consider that they are categorically binding. I will then suggest that the appearance 
of moral rules can be partially explained with reference to (A) the fact that the moral 
concepts we use to enforce them signal that we consider the rules to be of utmost 
importance and (B) (more divisively) the power and authority moral concepts 
themselves wield. 
I will consider option (B) first. It is conceivable that moral rules partially have their 
origin in the language of moral concepts which imply, or express the belief, that some 
actions, beliefs and attitudes are categorically right or wrong — as mentioned above. 
By way of illustration, in the previous chapter I suggested that incest taboos are an 
important means of protecting individuals from a number of harmful consequences. 
The seriousness with which we imbue these harmful consequences might lead us to 
not just explain them with reference to these consequences, but rather with reference 
to them being just "wrong". The word "wrong" itself implies for many people that 
there is some kind of objective truth about which we can be right or wrong in the first 
place, which is why morality is often taken to correspond to mind-independent moral 
facts about which we can be "right" or "wrong" in the first place. This is a point that 
Mackie also makes. In his words, 
...by suppressing any explicit reference to demands and 
making the imperatives categorical we facilitate conceptual 
moves from one such demand relation to another The moral 
uses of such words as "must" and "ought" and "should", all of 
which are used also to express hypothetical imperatives, are 
traces of this pattern of objectification (Mackie, 1977: 44). 
What I suggest, then, is that moral concepts might be actually used as a means of 
curtailing further argument, or, to borrow from Daniel Dennett's terminology, they 
might be used as "conversation stoppers" (Dennett, 1995: 506). The power that such 
language wields could be instrumental in ensuring that incest, for example, occurs as 
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infrequently as possible. 42 This of course implies that morality is used merely as a 
means of controlling the behaviour of its adherents,. and that the idea of moral right or 
wrong is - or has been - just a "useful fiction" imposed because it is so effective in 
ensuring that certain behaviour is embraced or rejected. 43 For what better way is 
there to ensure that people's behaviour is controlled than to insist that there are 
certain types of behaviour that are universally and objectively prescribed — not just by 
the ruling parties — but ultimately. 
While I maintain that the authority moral concepts wield might contribute to an 
explanation of how moral rules may have come to be distinguished from other rules — 
and, for how moral concepts such as right and wrong may have been (and almost 
certainly still are) used in the past — I acknowledge that it would be preposterous to 
take this to suggest either that our leaders and legislators have always been so 
deliberately divisive or that people have always and continue to be systematically 
misled by their leaders. Rather, much that is retained in the moral codes of different 
cultures does not seem to be the product of deliberate deception, but because people — 
including the people in power — have actually come to believe that there are attitudes, 
traits, values and behaviour which are extremely important, an idea expressed by (A) 
above. Moral concepts, then, may also have arisen as a means of simply representing 
the belief that some rules are of fundamental importance whereas others are not. For 
example, John Mackie suggests that religion might help in part to explain the 
objectification of moral concepts. He argues that it would have been important 
historically to differentiate God's "Divine Law" from human law; couching it in 
terms of categorically binding imperatives - such as the moral "ought" - would have 
served such a purpose well (1977: 45). Peter Singer makes a similar point with 
regards to why we might consider certain actions morally wrong: 
42 This is only part of an explanation for how we might come to see incest is wrong. I have not totally 
discounted the contention that biological mechanisms which produce repulsion to the idea of incest 
also contribute to our belief that incest should be avoided. I will take this up again in Part Three. 
43 I have borrowed the term "useful fiction" from Richard Joyce. It is taken from a paper about 
Michael Ruse and the moral error theory. In this paper he argues that instead of abolishing morality 
because it is based on erroneous premises we should retain it because it is a "useful fiction" and as 
such "... it can still have a practical role in our I ives"(Joyce, 2000: 729). 
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On abortion, suicide, and voluntary euthanasia, for instance, 
we may think as we do because we have grown up in a 
society that was, for nearly 2000 years, dominated by the 
Christian religion. We may no longer believe in Christianity 
as a moral authority, but we may find it difficult to rid 
ourselves of moral intuitions shaped by our parents and our 
teachers, who were either themselves believers, or were 
shaped by others who were (Singer, 2005: 345). 
Of course, while there is most certainly a link between religion and morality, it too is 
unsatisfactory as a blanket explanation for why we have come to see some rules as 
moral rules. This is evidenced by the simple fact that there are many people who do 
not believe in God, and yet still consider themselves to be deeply moral people. An 
explanation of moral concepts as expressions of Divine Law contributes nonetheless 
to my explanation of how morality may have developed from ordinary rules. In the 
sections to come, I will build upon the explanations I have given here. I will now 
move on to Part Two where I attempt to address some of the other explanatory gaps a 
purely prosocial of morality leaves open. 
Summary 
This chapter has briefly explored some of the ways in which moral rules might serve 
the fitness enhancing end of assuring cooperation and social cohesion. In fact, the 
very existence of certain rules can plausibly be traced to their contribution to this end, 
suggesting that humans introduced them for this reason. Exploring their role in 
regulating social groups also emphasises the contributory role that morality plays in 
enhancing individual survival prospects, since social groups themselves are an 
advantageous way of life for humans. A plausible link between moral rules and 
biology has thus been made. 
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In Part One, I have argued that there is not a direct link between certain adaptations and 
the fact that we see the behaviour which they influence as morally right or wrong. The 
little evidence that has been offered up in the past that suggests that there might be such a 
direct correlation either does not accord with what is understood by moral behaviour (kin 
altruism), or else seems to merely coincide with behaviour that is considered moral (incest 
taboos). 
This conclusion does not, however, entail the further conclusion that biology and human 
evolution have nothing at all to do with morality. In discussing the link between human 
biology and morality we arrive at the second major conclusion of Part One; that morality 
serves human survival requirements by fostering human cooperation and both 
encouraging and protecting certain social relationships. Cooperation, in turn, helps 
promote human survival inasmuch as living in groups is a fitness enhancing way of life 
for humans. Moral rules could thus be perceived as being fitness enhancing in certain 
circumstances. Indeed, in some cases, moral rules even serve to fill the gaps that our 
biological inclinations might leave open. In the words of David Lahti, morality operates 
as a "...cultural surrogate for genetic adaptation" (Lahti, 2003: 650). In this chapter I 
have offered examples of the way in which this might occur via certain moral rules we 
create to manage human behaviour. I also provided several preliminary hypotheses about 
the way in which these social rules may have made the transfer to moral rules. 
The prosocial role of morality, however, is not the only connection that exists between 
biology and morality. In Part Two, biology will appear centrally in my explanation of 
why we have morality, but in a more indirect way; that is, via its provision of the 
biological traits required to not only formulate morals, but to also become motivated to 
uphold them. I will also argue that while morality serves fitness enhancing purposes — 
indeed may have originated to serve this role - it has developed into something quite 
different. This development will be the traced throughout the remainder of this thesis. 
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Morality is ... closely related to politics: it is an attempt to bring the 
collective desires of a group to bear upon individuals; or, conversely, it is 
an attempt by an individual to cause his desires to become those of his 
group (Russell, 199911935]). 
Compared with other animals, behaviour in the human species is 
extremely varied. Individuals belonging to different human groups 
exploit a wide range of habitats using a variety of disparate subsistence 
techniques; they utilize widely different kinds of clothing and shelter, 
perform different rituals, depend on different kinds of social and 
political organization, and speak different languages. Although it could 
be argued that the social organization and adaptive strategy of most 
human groups are similar to those found in some other species, there is 
no other single animal species which exhibits the range of behaviours 
that characterise the human species (Boyd & Richerson, 1985: 158). 
In the introduction of this thesis I outlined different ways that one might feasibly 
establish a causal connection between biology and morality. In Part One, the 
possibility that moral behaviour might be genetically determined was briefly 
explored. This was mainly to highlight the fact that human traits - such as 
behavioural traits, for example - are not the product of genes alone but rather the 
interplay of genetics, general physiology and environment, with contributory bias 
fluctuating according to the particular trait in question. 
The next step in the search for a plausible link between biology and morality was to 
consider whether and in what sense moral rules could be explained in terms of 
biological adaptation. To this end, specific moral rules were isolated to see whether 
or not they could be considered formalisations of specific biological adaptations. For 
two types of "universal" moral rules - the incest taboo and rules promoting kin 
altruism - such an explanation was shown to be drastically incomplete. This is 
because the adaptations producing aversions to incest and inclinations to help kin are 
not substantial enough to account for either the existence of moral rules which pro 
and prescribe the same behaviour, or, in particular, the belief that they are 
categorically binding. What were called "cultural explanations" were offered as 
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complements to the biological explanations, with the conclusion that it is unlikely 
that there are "moral adaptations" to explain our moral rules. 
I then suggested that moral rules while not the direct product of adaptations 
themselves may still be considered fitness enhancing. This was based on the 
argument that group living is an advantageous way of life for human beings, 
providing as it does important fitness benefits to individuals. Living in a group, 
however, requires a structure and regulation: without it, the group and its 
constituents would be under constant threat from the clash of disparate individual 
needs and wants arising from within the group. In the absence of biological traits that 
adequately regulate relationships in the group, they will need to be regulated by rules 
devised by humans themselves. Morality is - in at least one important sense - a 
subset of these rules, and as such has a fitness enhancing role to play. This was one 
of the principal claims to surface at the end of Part One and is one which has been 
embraced by a number of famous philosophers in the past, such as Thomas Hobbes 
(1651) and John Rawls (1971). 
But while this argument seems plausible - and when applied to a certain subset of 
moral rules is highly plausible - I will nonetheless conclude that a prosocial 
explanation of morality is in fact inadequate if taken to be the sole explanation for 
why and how morality developed. The following "issues" encapsulate why this is so: 
• Issue 1. Firstly, a purely prosocial account of morality is not adequately 
representative of morality because it does not explain why there is so much 
cross cultural variety in moral rules throughout human groups, when the goals 
— according to a prosocial account - are ostensibly the same; i.e., to facilitate 
cooperation in groups. 
• Issue 2. Secondly, it also does not account for moral rules that seem to have 
little, if anything, to do with socially cohesive behaviour. 
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• Issue 3.  Thirdly, it does not explain how it is that we come to form moral 
rules. If we are not genetically programmed to behave thus, how is it that we 
learn or decide what is appropriate moral behaviour? 
• Issue 4. Fourthly, it does not adequately explain how we become motivated 
to behave in accordance with these moral rules. 
• Issue 5. Finally, and most importantly, it does not adequately explain how we 
come to believe in the moral concepts of "right" and "wrong" (as described in 
the introduction of this thesis) which are the key features of morality that 
separate it from other human rules. " 
So while a social contract like theory like the one I sketched in Part One might help 
explain certain aspects of morality - and indeed one of the important roles morality 
has always and continues to play - on its own, it is insufficient as an explanation of 
key features of morality. As a partial response to some of these issues, I will focus on 
environmental considerations in the first half of Part Two to determine the extent to 
which these are able to fill in some of these gaps. 
Firstly, I will discuss social environment in the form of human culture. To 
commence this discussion, I will provide a definition of "culture" in which I describe 
it as a phenomenon which - amongst other things - differentiates human social groups 
not only from each other, but from other social groups in the animal kingdom. I will 
also define it as a collective term for particularities that different environments have 
wrought in human groups. Some of these particularities also issue from different 
beliefs about the world and our place in the world (captured in the various religions, 
for example), and include the norms and traditions to which these beliefs give rise. 
As morality is shaped by these different sets of beliefs, norms and traditions, in 
discussing how cultures have developed I will come part way towards an explanation 
44 This is the feature of morality that both Ruse and Joyce seek to "explain" in terms of adaptations. 
72 
of cross-cultural variety of moral rules, thereby partially addressing Issue 1 above. I 
will also have presented one of the major shapers of moral rules and beliefs. 
Issue 2 will be addressed via a discussion of the extent to which apparently different 
moral codes really differ. I will briefly examine cultural determinism with a view to 
revealing errors that a "nurture only" view of morality generates. This will also pave 
the way for a discussion of whether varying moral tenets can be reduced to common 
values and to what extent they can realistically be considered means of promoting 
cross-culturally common prosocial ends. That such a reduction is not possible will 
further highlight the conclusion that morality is something more than "prosocial 
glue". 
This section will conclude with the view that although there is a series of common 
values that span human social groups, there is also significant, irreducible variation 
which is partially the product of questions about life, its meaning and the beliefs to 
which these questions and their proposed answers give rise. These beliefs, in turn, 
are heavily influenced by the collective beliefs of the cultures in which we are raised. 
Moral tenets which appear to have nothing to do with fostering social cohesion often 
arise from these differing answers about what is and is not of value in life. 
Underlying these observations is the question of how morality, human culture and the 
rules, beliefs and practices they represent, have been able to develop. Part of the 
answer I propose will refer to my definition of culture as a term which groups - 
amongst other things - features of human society that are learned and/or developed by 
its members during their lifetimes in response to the needs or wants of the given 
group. These features are then taught to other members of the group who may, in 
turn, change or reject them in accordance with their perceived needs and wants. 
Included in this class of learned features are beliefs, traditions and the rules that 
regulate the group. Some of these rules are moral rules. In sum, these are features 
which are learned as opposed to being features with which we are born. 
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The discussion up to this point will seem to have wandered far from biological 
adaptation — and deliberately so. For in highlighting the role that culture and 
environment play in shaping moral rules and beliefs, Joyce's contention that morality 
is an adaptation seems even less likely. In the last chapter of Part Two, however, 
adaptations will reappear in the discussion. Here I will argue that while we may not 
be born with beliefs, traditions and rules, we are able to develop them because 
humans have evolved a set of biological capacities which have enabled us to develop 
them. To explore this connection, a discussion of capacities which appear central to 
the formation of culture and morality will be made. These will include, notably, the 
abilities to imitate, learn, communicate, and reflect. I will argue that while these 
capacities are themselves the product of heritable biological traits, some of the 
cultural constituents to which they give rise — including morality - are not heritable in 
a biological sense; they are, however, heritable in a social sense since many of them 
are passed on to us by previous generations via a process of teaching and learning. 
This section will thus contribute importantly to my argument that morality is a bi-
product of biological adaptation. It will also contribute to an understanding of "Issue 
3"; that is, how we come to determine and/or learn what is appropriate moral 
behaviour. While it is not a complete answer to Issue 3 (as will be discovered in Part 
3 where moral motivation is specifically addressed), it does account for some of what 
we acquire in terms of moral rules. 
Finally, this section will also include a comparison of skills and capacities - or lack 
thereof — of other animals. Such a comparison will serve to demonstrate why 
morality seems to be a human phenomenon and when it is likely to have arisen in the 
lives of our ancestors. This will also strengthen the argument that morality is the 
product of human evolution, rather than an independently existing code that we 
somehow "intuit". 
The cultural and social aspect of morality, however, is only part of an adequate 
discussion of the nature of morality. Still missing is an explanation of the 
motivational force morality wields via belief in the moral "right" and "wrong." 
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These aspects of morality - captured in Issues "4" and "5" of this introduction - will 
be addressed in Part Three. Indeed the entire of Part Three will be devoted to these 
issues, since they are central to an understanding of what it is to think and behave in 
what is considered a moral way. All that is presented in this Part, however, will be 
relevant to the question in providing the background required for addressing these 
specific aspects of morality. 
In this part of the thesis, then, I will consolidate my argument that morality is the 
product of the interplay of environment and biology. This will serve as evidence that 
morality is not as simple as adaptation-based explanations might suggest. Rather, I 
suggest that morality is like a mosaic composed of different aspects that derive from 
varied sources. What should be noted here, though, is that in this part of the thesis I 
will talk mainly about moral rules in a way that does not significantly distinguish 
them from other rules. This is because I maintain that the origins of morality lie in 
the historical emergence of rules that manage humans in social situations, and as such 
the ability to make moral rules involves some of the same abilities we employ to 
make other rules. I also maintain that morality still serves this social-management 
role and that moral rules are sometimes even used specifically for the force that they 
wield. Issues 4 and 5 above, however, are recognition that morality is actually 
considered significantly different to other types of rules. This aspect of morality, as 
mentioned, will be treated in detail in Part Three. 
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Given the range of adaptive problems that humans face, there is not 
reason to expect a single principle that governs interactions between the 
mind and the environment. In some domains, developmental malleability 
makes sense; in others, it does not. Sometimes adults should hate the 
new, when a loved one dies, for example; sometimes we should embrace 
it, such as when starting a promising relationship. The relationship 
between the mind and the environment is too complex for a one-line 
theory (Bloom, 2006: 28). 
Introduction 
I have identified five problems associated with an explanation of morality uniquely in 
terms of social utility. In this section I will address the first of these: the issue of why 
there is so much variety in moral codes if the prosocial goals are essentially the same. 
This discussion will contribute to the addressing of Issue 2 — the observation that not 
all moral rules can be explained in terms of their contribution to social cohesion. It 
will also feed into Issue 3, which questions how moral rules come to be formed, 
understood and obeyed by humans. 
This chapter will also contribute importantly to the argument that morality is not an 
adaptation, since I will argue that much of the content of moral codes is the issue of 
human decision that it will be so. That this is the case is evidenced by the relative 
rapidity with which moral rules change, suggesting that they are sometimes selected 
by humans in response to perceived wants and needs: it would be difficult to explain 
how an evolved adaptation could track such need so precisely. 
4:1 The impact of the environment on behavioural diversity 
In Part One I suggested that group living is a fitness enhancing way of life for 
humans and that morality, when concerned with facilitating cooperation within these 
groups, becomes fitness enhancing itself. But while it is true that morality is often 
concerned with facilitating cooperation, there is nonetheless considerable cross- 
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cultural variation in moral rules. Here I will argue that this is partially the 
consequence of environmental variation. I will propose, for example, that different 
physical environments present different needs and wants to which humans respond by 
creating structures and rules to adequately meet them. Some of these rules will be 
moral rules. 
To illustrate, one might consider similar hypotheses that Jared Diamond forwards in 
his epic Guns, Germs and Steel (Diamond, 1997). For Diamond, something as 
seemingly basic as availability of food and shelter can dramatically alter cultural 
practice. In fact, he goes as far as attributing many major cross-cultural differences to 
physical environment. His book is framed as being an explanation of how it is that 
people like some of those in certain New Guinean tribes remain so technologically 
behind the Western world. His answer is that differences in what he calls the "long 
term histories of people" are "... due not to innate differences in the peoples 
themselves but to differences in their environment" (Diamond, 1997: 405). 
By way of elaboration, Diamond isolates a handful of major environmental features 
that he considers to be the primary sources of cultural variability. For example, he 
discusses the historic availability of domesticable plant and animal species. 
According to Diamond, high availability of both in certain areas enabled their 
populations to not only produce enough food to sustain larger numbers, but to also 
create food surpluses which could be used to liberate people from duties associated 
with food procuration. This allowed a greater section of the populace to partake in 
other fields of specialization, such as concentration on technological advance, for 
example. The increase in technology in turn facilitated many aspects of certain 
lifestyles which meant that people could afford to raise and care for larger families. 
Another major contributing factor to cross cultural variation Diamond discusses is the 
access different populations themselves have had to each other. Ability to access 
other cultures enables not only exchange of goods, but also ideas. For example, 
countries such as Australia have historically had very limited access to other major 
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cultures because of the water barrier, whereas the sheer size of the Eurasian landmass 
enabled a much more rapid spread of both goods and ideas, enabling these areas 
again to advance much more quickly than the early indigenous Australians in terms 
of food production and technology. 
Whether or not one accepts the entirety of Diamond's claims - and his reductionism 
does seem somewhat excessive at times - he nevertheless convincingly demonstrates 
via rich and varied examples the considerable effects environment has on human 
organisation, development and behaviour (further corroborating the conclusions from 
Part 1). Importantly, his examples also suggest an impressive behavioural plasticity 
in humans that seems to enable them to adapt themselves so readily to new 
environments. This in itself is an excellent example of the interplay of biology and 
environment in the matter of the determination of human behaviour. 
Environmental diversity has also contributed to variation in another type of 
environment — the social environment. I will now discuss the way this environment — 
particularly those aspects of social environment captured by the term "culture" - 
shapes the behaviour and beliefs of its population. For while physical environment 
may produce different needs, it is usually the social group which will determine how 
exactly these needs will be met. Part of the way they do this is via moral rules, which 
themselves will vary in accordance with these different needs. 
4:2 Culture 
[Culture is] that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, 
morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by 
man as a member of a society (Tylor, 1920:1). 
It seems reasonable to suggest that humans have always lived in groups. These 
groups, however, have become extremely diverse. Today human social groupings 
range from smallish tribes to huge cities comprising millions of people. Some of 
these groups have been maintained over generations, developing and accumulating 
rules, hierarchies, rituals, beliefs and traditions that are passed on, modified and 
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added to by future generations. These elements are referred to collectively as human 
"culture". 
Throughout Part Two, I will explore human cultures along side morality since they 
constitute an essential part of the explanation of the origin, function and nature of 
morality. This is largely because they are interconnected in the following ways: 
1. Culture is a major shaping force of morality. In particular, culture, as 
representative of the beliefs and goals of different groups of people, will 
shape the type of values and rules that are required to adequately represent 
them. Some of these values and rules will be moral values and rules. 
2. The constituents of culture - including a contingent of our moral codes - are 
acquired by social learning. This type of learning enables humans to adapt 
themselves to their environment. 
3. The capacities that enable social learning - such as the capacity for language 
and imitation - have thus been instrumental in the development of both 
cultures and morality, though indirectly. Many of these capacities are widely 
considered to be adaptations selected because they facilitate aspects of social 
learning, thereby enabling humans to partake of fitness advantages social 
living affords. They are not, however, adaptations selected for the generation 
of either morality or culture directly. Rather, morality and culture emerged as 
bi-product of these capacities. 
Culture, then, adds to the mosaic of morality that this thesis seeks to construct by 
being a central explanatory motif. Before discussing these points, however, the term 
"culture" needs to be more carefully defined. 
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What is Culture? 
Culture has many facets, rather than one defining characteristic. Firstly, it serves as a 
means of amalgamating the characteristics that differentiate one human group from 
another. There is, for example, a certain range of universal human - indeed animal - 
behaviour: we all spend time securing food and shelter, reproducing, and caring for 
our young, for instance. Over and above this, however, there is significant 
behavioural variation: we might all seek shelter, but the type of shelter may vary; we 
might eat different kinds of food, and raise our young in completely different ways. 
Moral rules are also among the list of variable features of social groups. The word 
"culture" serves as a collective word that represents these differences. 
Culture is thus borne of diversity. It is the extent of cultural diversity, moreover, that 
is one of the definitive differences between human and non-human social animals. 
This is not to say that other species do not exhibit intra-special variation in group 
behaviour: they are usually not, however, considered either frequent enough or 
sufficiently different to warrant calling them "cultural" differences. The fact that 
chimpanzees undertake different eating practices according to where they live (even 
if similar food is available in both areas) is not generally considered a cultural 
difference, for example. 45 For some, it is not clear why this is the case, however. 46 I 
contend that it is because the term culture is used to group behaviour which goes 
beyond the practices required to ensure basic organismic survival and perpetuation. 
For example, humans spend a lot of time entertaining themselves via a whole plethora 
of activities including sports, music, and art. Many of these pastimes are practiced 
45  For example, chimpanzees in Tai undertake the practice of picking marrow out of the bones of their 
prey whereas in Gombe this does not occur in spite of the fact that chimps in Gombe eat the same prey 
as those in Tai (Boesch & Tomasello, 1998: 594). 
46  The question as to whether this could be considered "cultural variation" is a topic which has 
generated a lot of debate which this thesis has insufficient space to present. For an interesting 
discussion of this question, see Kevin Laland and William Hoppitt's article "Do Animals Have 
Culture?" (2003). 
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for the simple pleasures that they bring, rather than for any survival benefits that they 
might afford.47 
It might yet be argued, however, that these characteristics can be found in groups of 
people that we might be reluctant to call cultures. It would seem, for example, 
somewhat exaggerated to refer to regular participation in a Wednesday afternoon 
squash tournament as being part of a "culture". While this points to the flimsiness of 
the line between culture and group — and it does sometimes seem to be a fine line — it 
still suggests that there is something perhaps missing from the definition. 
And so we arrive at a third characteristic. The word "culture" seems to represent 
something more than intragroup behavioural difference. In fact it represents what 
could be considered the heart of many of these characteristics: that is, the beliefs a 
particular group maintains about the world which may in turn create behavioural 
differences. For example, one would be more likely to talk about a "surf" culture 
than a "parents and friends" culture, on the basis that the former includes a set of 
beliefs about the world, and a series of behavioural norms and values based on these 
beliefs. As these beliefs are often inspired by speculation about the world and our 
place in the world, they are .bound to be different since definitive, uncontroversial 
answers to these questions do not as yet exist. Someone who is part of a surfing 
culture, for example, may believe that surfing gives their life some kind of "purpose" 
or "meaning" and might thus allow it to influence their daily activities, their values 
and priorities, the friends that they make and the clothes that they wear. For instance, 
they may believe that protecting the coastal environment is of utmost importance and 
might undertake practices which contribute to this protection. As such their moral 
code might include the belief that it is morally wrong to damage the environment. 
Lifestyle choices might include decisions to live close to the beach or jobs that allow 
flexibility to surf. 
47 In fact, many pastimes people choose can be detrimental to their health; risky sports, over 
consumption of fatty or salty foods, alcohol and drug consumption, excessive sedentary activities such 
as television watching and computer games. 
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Belonging to a Parents and Friends group, on the other hand, does not seem have 
such far reaching effects on one's lifestyle. Likewise belonging to a gardening club 
is unlikely to infiltrate one's life in ways other than one's choice of a pleasant 
pastime. For both of these groups are not so much about leading a certain type of 
lifestyle based on a set of beliefs about that life, as they are about focusing on a 
certain aspect of life." In sum, culture tends to be more pervasive, permeating one's 
lifestyle in a more comprehensive way. As such it constitutes a social environment 
which is a major shaper of human behavioural choices including the moral rules we 
enforce to shape this behaviour. 
Finally, another important aspect of human culture is the way it develops. For culture 
as a collective of differences is also representative of the human ability to change or 
add to existing behaviour, beliefs and norms not only from generation to generation, 
but also within single lifetimes. This process has been called the "ratchet effect" 
(Boesch & Tomasello,1998: 602) and is enabled in particular by our capacity for 
"social learning", a capacity which enables us to effect changes ourselves, rather than 
being reliant on the long slow process of biological selection to produce the changes. 
It is a capacity which explains why differences between cultures have become so 
significant in such a short period of evolutionary time, particularly when added to the 
fact that physical contact with other cultures is limited — which helps explain, for 
example, why Yali's Papuan culture may seem so different from Diamond's 
American culture. Indeed, some even define culture as the product of the 
accumulated changes acquired in this way. 49 If moral rules are so divergent from 
culture to culture — which I will argue in the next section — this suggests that they too 
might be the product of social learning and the ratchet effect it produces. This further 
lengthens the leash that Wilson proposes between culture — and in my version, 
morality — and genes. 
48 They might become cultures, of course: it depends on how seriously one's participation extends to 
one's life. 
49 Joseph Henrich and Richard McElreath define culture in such a way, for example (Henrich & 
McElreath, 2003: 124). 
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Including social learning as a defining feature of culture broadens the gap between 
humans and other animals. The transmission of learned skills is rare in other animal 
groups; in fact evidence of new skills being developed and passed on even within the 
current generation is so rare that the same examples appear time and time again in 
discussing the possibility of animal culture. One oft-cited example involves a group 
of Japanese Macaques who were witnessed washing sand off sweet potatoes in a 
nearby river, behaviour which alone already seemed somewhat innovative for non-
human primates (Kawai, 1965). What was even more interesting was that the 
practice was then "passed on" to other members of the troop. Another well-known 
example of "cultural transmission" in non-human groups is the opening of milk bottle 
tops by blue tits (Hinde and Fisher, 1951). 
The rarity of such examples suggests that the capacities in place for the development 
of sophisticated cultures and their moral codes are either not there or if they are, that 
they are so rudimentary that their expression is considered an occasional anomaly; 
they do not compare, for example, to the vastness of the behavioural repertoire learnt 
by a child growing up in a human group. It suggests a point of departure in the 
evolution of cognitive ability which also — if we are to view morality as a partial 
product of social learning, as I am arguing — explains why morality seems to be a 
feature of human life only. This, however, is jumping the gun somewhat: these 
capacities will be discussed in greater detail in the sections to come. 
Summary 
To conclude, the word "culture" can be defined as a collective term for the different 
ways human lead their lives and the activities they undertake that go above and 
beyond those that ensure basic survival. In particular, it represents the different 
beliefs various groups of people have about this life, and the behaviour to which these 
give rise. It also serves as a differentiating tool, not only between other human 
groups, but also between other animal groups that do not manifest either the extent or 
the nature of behavioural variation. I suggested that this is because they do not have 
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the capacities required for social learning which are central to an explanation of why 
cultures and their constituents — most notably moral rules 7 arose in the first place. 
That culture and morality are bi-products of these capacities will be argued in 
Chapter 6. 
In the introduction to this chapter, three principal links between culture and morality 
were outlined. I will now consider the first of these — that is, the contention that 
moral rules are often deliberately chosen and or shaped by humans to represent the 
cultural beliefs we have formed. 
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Darius, after he had got the kingdom, called into his presence certain 
Greeks who were at hand, and asked— "what he should pay them to eat 
the bodies of their fathers when they died?" To which they answered, 
that there is no sum that would tempt them to do such a thing. He then 
sent for certain Indians, of the race called Callations, men who eat their 
fathers, and asked them, while the Greeks stood by and know by the help 
of an interpreter at what was said — "What he should give them to burn 
the bodies of their fathers at their decease?" The Indians exclaimed 
aloud and bade him forbear such language. Such is man's wont herein 
and Pindar was right, in my judgement, when he said, "custom is the 
King of all (Herodotus)." 
Introduction 
In Part One, I suggested that humans devise rules — including moral rules - to manage 
human relationships in non-kin based groups. So far in Part Two, I have suggested 
that part of the reason why these rules might vary is because of environmental 
differences and the way in which humans respond to these differences. In particular I 
have focused on human culture because it represents not only the different responses 
to environment (including beliefs about our environment), but also the fact that we 
are able to both have these responses — and, importantly — change them when 
required. It also represents the fact that human life is not all about survival and 
reproduction: as such, while moral rules (which are shaped by cultural beliefs) might 
be principally concerned with fitness enhancing ends there will also be moral rules 
which reflect considerations that we have developed above and beyond survival 
matters, as represented in Herodotus's famous quote above. 
In this chapter, I will focus more directly on cross cultural variety of moral rules. I 
will start by considering the extent to which it truly exists. For example, while many 
moral rules appear to be quite different, it has been common practice in Ethics to 
argue that many differences in moral principles are often superficial and that there are 
50 This quote is taken from Herodotus' History. I came across it in Egbeke Aha's 
"Changing moral values in Africa: An essay in ethical relativism (1997: 531). 
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core universals underlying many of them. 51 Establishing where I stand with regards to 
this issue will help me consolidate a point central to this thesis which hinges on these 
conclusions. This is the argument that morality, while instrumental in promoting 
social cohesion, has also gone far beyond such concerns to areas which have little or 
nothing directly to do with survival and perpetuation. That it has done so, however, 
does not mean that it cannot be accounted for by human biology. The account I will 
provide, however, links the two back together in a rather circuitous fashion. 
5:1 Moral diversity 
As an interesting illustration of the interplay between environment, culture and 
morality Peter Wilson considers two different lifestyles; a nomadic hunter/gatherer 
versus a sedentary "domesticated" lifestyle (1988). He explains how these different 
lifestyles appear to (A) impact on the moral rules adopted in each culture (B) 
contribute to cross cultural variety of moral rules. For example, Wilson examines 
how the acquisition of material possessions might influence the moral rules adopted. 
Sedentary groups, for example, might invest substantial resources into setting up a 
home and perhaps a farm, whereas the hunter gatherer barely wastes resources on 
housing and artefacts because of the need to move around in pursuit of seasonal food. 
The sedentary farmer — being sedentary - also has the opportunity to accumulate more 
material goods and property. This, in turn, gives rise to the need to both control the 
accumulating process and protect the products once they have been acquired. The 
risk of theft, for instance, increases with the accumulation of objects. Also, if one is 
in a confined area, resources will become limited so deciding who has access to 
which resource becomes an issue of great importance. One can imagine then how 
moral rules promoting justice and fairness might become more important or at least 
of a different nature in these two types of social grouping. 
5 1 In Herodotus' example, for instance, the different funeral procedures could be interpreted as being 
different means of showing respect to the deceased: the same value, but different procedures. 
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Secondly, when people are settled more permanently together population dynamics 
become quite different to those of a nomadic lifestyle. For example, it becomes much 
more difficult to just walk away from conflicts that arise with one's closest 
neighbours. This might entail the need for more stringent regulation of human 
relationships. In the words of Wilson: 
Settlement compresses people together more intensively and 
for longer periods than living in a temporary open camp. 
Frictions between people that might otherwise be defused by 
a simple parting may smoulder ignition in the domestic 
situation. The development of property in goods and land 
provides a new and major source of contention and wariness 
between people (1988: 146). 
Living in a single area for a lengthy period of time also permits greater 'regularity. 
Regularity, in turn, enables rules to be fixed more readily, since circumstances have 
limited variability and thus lend themselves to a generalization process that is more 
appropriate to fixed rules. A nomadic lifestyle, on the other hand, must incorporate 
much more flexibility in keeping with the changing environment through which they 
travel. According to Wilson, hunter gatherers often do not have the tight rules and 
structures of the sedentary because of "...a way of life that rides with the 
environment instead of attempting to control it" (Wilson, 1988: 34). Moreover, 
because the emphasis on developing and maintaining independence in a hunter 
gatherer milieu is so important, rules that regulate cooperation and competition may 
not be as important as in a domesticated society (Wilson, 1988: 52). In a culture such 
as our own in Tasmania, for example, we are far more dependent on the work of 
others to ensure our survival; we are a culture of specialization in which each 
individual usually focuses on a specific trade and mostly relies on others' work to 
satisfy needs and wants that arise outside of this specialization. If there are not 
appropriate rules for cooperation, particular needs may not be met. 
Jared Diamond also comments on the effect that each type of lifestyle might have on 
the reproductive tendencies of people and the implication this has for the social 
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structure, rules (both moral and otherwise) within the society. He remarks that a 
nomadic woman is limited in her capacity to bear many children successively due to 
the difficulty of moving around whilst heavily pregnant, nursing, or recovering from 
childbirth. Moreover, many small children can also be burdensome in that they risk 
slowing down the migratory speed. Ensuring that numbers are kept low may mean 
that commonly morally condemnable practices such as infanticide and abortion 
become more acceptable in these cultures. Sedentary women, on the other hand, have 
no need to move around from place to place, and hence can usually afford to have 
more children. Consequently, sedentary groups tend to be far more populous 
(Diamond, 1997: 89). . 
These are broad, somewhat generalized examples but they are nonetheless plausible 
illustrations of the way different lifestyles might give rise to different moral rules. 
The physical or social environment produces the need — in the above case, the need to 
be unencumbered by too many children — and the social group creates the means of 
ensuring this does not occur. This may be by way of imposing moral rules. 
5:2 Cultural determinism 
It seems plausible, then, that cross-cultural variety in moral rules can be partially 
accounted for as a consequence of humans actively responding to their environment 
and adapting their moral rules to suit these environments. But can all moral rules be 
explained in such a way? One means of investigating this question might be to 
examine how far such an explanation can plausibly be extended in order to see if the 
conclusions are tenable at this point. For example, there have been (and no doubt still 
are) those that maintain that environment is the principal shaper of human behaviour, 
a view that is often referred to as "cultural determinism". A particularly extreme 
version of this view might maintain that humans are born with minds that are "clean 
slates" (tabulae rasae) ready to be inscribed with the knowledge and example of the 
social group into which they are born. Behaviour, including moral behaviour, will 
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thus be irreducibly different cross-culturally because social groups are themselves so 
different. 
The relatively recent ability to quickly and efficiently pass from one culture to 
another has led to recorded observations of abundant cultural divergence. This, in 
turn, has provided a certain amount of evidence supporting such views as cultural 
determinism. It is no surprise, then, that the cult of cultural determinism flourished 
particularly during the last century - when travel became particularly easy - carrying a 
lot of weight throughout the annals of anthropology. Anthropologists such as 
Margaret Mead contributed much to its perpetuation. Between 1925-26, Mead 
studied a group of adolescent girls in three different villages in Samoa in order to 
discover whether Samoan adolescents experience the same type of puberty problems 
that adolescents in the United States appeared to almost universally experience. 
What she allegedly discovered, was that in Samoa, this period of time passes by 
almost unnoticed psychologically. Mead attributed this factor to a number of features 
of the Samoan culture that she observed, including a certain sexual liberty which she 
felt explained a lack of sexual frustration that young adults experienced there (Mead, 
1961).52 
Mead's findings were very influential, and were often considered to be a decisive tool 
in settling the nature/nurture debate in favour of nurture. As her mentor Franz Boas 
claimed in the foreword of Mead's Coming of age in Samoa (1961). "...much of what 
we ascribe to human nature is no more than a reaction to the restraints put upon us by 
our civilisation" (Boas, 1961). The authority - and hence influence - of Mead's work 
was severely undermined, however, when an anthropologist called Derek Freeman 
contested Mead's findings, revealing that some of them were not only misleading, but 
also just plain wrong (Freeman, 1983). For example, where Mead claimed that rape 
was virtually non-existent in Samoa, Freeman found that it in fact constituted the 
52 I have drawn this information from Donald Brown's discussion of Margaret Mead and Derek 
Freeman in his book Human Universals (1991: 14-20). 
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third most frequently committed crime in a country in which crime levels were 
comparable with our own (Freeman, 1983). 
5:3 The convergence of nature and nurture 
Margaret Mead's example is one of the more famous unsuccessful attempts to explain 
human behaviour uniquely as the product of environment, and has been used to warn 
about the dangers of affording culture and environment too much power in explaining 
phenomena such as morality. Again, the appeal of such extreme views can be traced 
to the popularity of the misleading nature/nurture dichotomy. For while it is a 
theoretical separation which has been defunct for some time, its legacy lies in the 
perception of culture and morality as being disconnected from human biology, and, 
moreover, something which disconnects humans from the rest of the animal world. 
Donald Brown, for one, argues that there is too much emphasis placed on the role of 
culture - or environment - as a generator of individual differences, and the role of 
"nature" as responsible for any similarities that humans manifest (Brown, 1991: 147). 
These are inappropriate conclusions for as I have suggested, and will argue more 
thoroughly at various points throughout this thesis, many of the different traits that 
humans manifest — both behavioural and otherwise - can be traced (either directly or 
indirectly) back to biological adaptations that humans have evolved. For example, in 
discussing cultural differences I emphasised that they are sometimes the product of 
"social learning": that we can learn in such a way, however, is due to a number of 
biological traits that the human lineage has evolved. Conversely, cultures, whilst 
often manifestly different, also include many common features; almost all cultures 
spend time devising and undertaking entertainment of one form or another, for 
example. George Murdock's famous list of cross-cultural universals serves to further 
emphasise this point. 53 
53 This is the impressive list that he compiled to demonstrate the extent of cross-cultural behavioural 
universality. 
Age-grading, athletic sports, bodily adornment, calendar, cleanliness 
training, community organization, cooking, cooperative labor, cosmology, 
courtship, dancing, decorative art, divination, division of labor, dream 
interpretation, education„ eschatology, ethics, ethno botany, etiquette, 
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More importantly, however, a "nature or nurture" view also overlooks the 
interdependence of nature and nurture, a problem highlighted in Part One. A major 
convergence of nature and nurture, for example, centres on their contribution to 
human survival and perpetuation. While human social behaviour varies cross-
culturally, much of it nonetheless contributes either directly or indirectly to our 
survival prospects. In Part One, for example, I argued that there is a body of quasi-
universal moral rules which serve to bolster our survival prospects (and hence our 
genes' survival prospects) within a group. There are, for instance, universally present 
rules aimed at fostering altruism, others which control aggression and some that 
regulate sexuality. Sometimes moral rules even serve to fill gaps that our biological 
adaptations leave open in terms of enhancing human survival prospects (as I also 
argued in Part One). In fact, more generally, we spend significant time and effort 
actually devising means of combating imperfections or deterioration of our biological 
constitution. For example, in a rich Western country with an over-abundance of 
unhealthy food, we might try to avoid too many fatty, sugary foods to improve our 
survival chances, even though we instinctively crave these types of food (Levy, 2004: 
106). In places where food is scarce such an idea would most likely seem ludicrous: 
in fact it has been suggested that such cravings were actually biologically selected in 
an ancestral climate in which food was scarce (Lachapelle, 2000: 337). 
Such claims might, however, invite the conclusion that we can reduce all we do to 
survival matters. 54 There are several obvious problems with such conclusions, 
faith healing, family, feasting, fire making, folklore, food taboos, funeral 
rites, games, gestures, gift giving, govenunent, greetings, hair styles, 
hospitality, housing, hygiene, incest taboos, inheritance rules, joking, kin-
groups, kinship nomenclature, language, law, luck superstitions, magic, 
marriage, mourning, music, mythology, numerals, obstetrics, penal 
sanctions, personal names, population policy, postnatal care, pregnancy 
usages, property rights, propitiation of supernatural beings, puberty 
customs, religious ritual, residence rules, sexual restrictions, soul 
concepts, status differentiation, surgery, tool making, trade, visiting, 
weaning, and weather control (Murdock, 1945). 
54 Or as Spencer and Huxley famously did on the heels of Darwin's Origin, claim that moral "good" is 
what aids evolutionary progress and what is "bad" is that which hinders evolutionary progress, a 
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however. Firstly, it is simply not true that we all that we do is motivated solely by the 
desire to improve our survival prospects; there are far too many cases of people who 
have preferred to die rather than live to counter such a sweeping generalisation about 
behavioural motivation. More pertinently to this thesis topic, many people have 
actually chosen to forgo their own lives for the sake of a particular moral stance, as 
evidenced by a long history of moral martyrism. While these are rather extreme 
examples, they do suggest that human motivation to act involves far more than 
survival considerations. This issue will be taken up more fully in Part Three. 
Even if we were to concede that most people are principally motivated by survival 
considerations this does not entail that it is the unique goal of all our actions and 
pursuits. For instance, many types of individual activity that we regularly undertake 
seem completely divorced from any obvious focus on survival or fitness 
enhancement. Painting, poetry, dance and theatre — many activities that we undertake 
have nothing at all to do with the projection of our genes into the future. Indeed, 
some activities we undertake are positively maladaptive - extreme sports and alcohol 
consumption, for example. 
Likewise moral rules are not always directly or even indirectly aimed at fitness 
enhancement. For example, in Chapter Three I made the point that morality is often 
intimately linked to the collective beliefs particular cultures have about the world or 
the beliefs individuals themselves have. These beliefs might arise from metaphysical 
speculation, for example. They might arise from our beliefs concerning life's 
"meaning" or "purpose". Often these will stray far from considerations of how we 
might survive and pass on our genes, but will be focused more on how we might live 
our lives "meaningfully". 55 In fact it seems fair to suggest that while morality most 
likely emerged as a tool to encourage cooperation, the point at which it became 
"morality" as opposed to ordinary rules signifies the point at which humans were able 
to speculate about the world and develop values based on these speculations. Of 
proposition which would have ghastly implications if followed through. (Spencer, 1893, Huxley and 
Huxley, 1947). 
55  I will discuss this point more fully with respect to vegetarianism in Part Three. 
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course, the fact that most these values and the morals representing values are not 
often detrimental to individual survival seems to make sense as well; humans 
generally do value life. Moreover, a moral principle which is systematically 
detrimental to its adherents is not likely to either spread or endure because of this 
(and of course because it would most likely eliminate its proponents). 
This leads to the second point; while it is true that moral tenets often can be reduced 
to common goals and values — and some of these are survival-orientated goals - this 
does not mean that all goals and values are essentially the same or that they are 
universally shared. As a brief illustration, if one were to compare the values of a 
communist system to a capitalist system, one would find an example of not only 
different moral principles, but differing values underlying these principles. In this 
case, the value of sharing wealth in a communist system is pitted against the 
rewarding of talent and hard work. 56 In the chapter to come, I will elaborate not only 
on how it is that such cross-cultural variation has been able to flourish, but also why 
it can be considered irreducible variation rather than a variation borne of misguided, 
erroneous beliefs. 
Summary 
Human social groups seem not only to require moral rules but also that there be 
variety in moral rules. This variability is spawned and shaped by differences in both 
physical and social environment, and is expressed via cultural norms, beliefs and 
56  Another useful example can be found in Herodotus' opening quote in which he describes the 
horror his Greeks expressed at the idea of eating the bodies of their dead, a practice undertaken by the 
Callatians. As I pointed out above (footnote 51) while these examples of varying funeral procedures 
may seem vastly different, the underlying moral values could be considered the same: they could, for 
example, be reduced to different means of expressing one's respect for one's deceased. On the other 
hand, however, the act of eating a human body is considered a moral taboo of considerable gravity in 
the Western world, and hence it is reasonable to also conclude that there is, in this case, a good 
example of genuine moral diversity. In the words of Jared Diamond, with respect to his Guinean 
experience of reported cannibalism, (which echoes Herodotus' own words), "...because Westerners 
abhor cannibalism, some of us cannot believe that other societies practise (or still practise) it." 
(Diamond, 2000: 26). But, as he points out, the lack of moral consensus works both ways: "The horror 
of my New Guinea friends when I described circumcision, US treatment of the elderly and US funeral 
customs matched Westerners' horror at cannibalism." (Diamond, 2000: 26). 
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traditions. As E.O. Wilson points out, the leash joining culture to genes is long, but it 
is perhaps much longer than he envisaged: it is, moreover, upon this length that we 
find cultural and moral variety. 
The ideas expressed in these chapters form a partial response to the question of moral 
variety posed at the beginning of this chapter (and captured in "Issue 1"). They also 
partially explain why some moral rules have little to do with matters which could be 
considered strictly prosocial (Issue 2). These explanations are partial because they 
remain strictly observational. For while it seems plausible to suggest that cross-
cultural variation in moral codes is the product of human response to differing 
environment, in order to understand it one needs to know how it is that the 
environment — both social and physical - is able to have such an impact in such a way 
on our behaviour and beliefs (Issue 3). This will be the subject of the next chapter. 
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The human behavioural repertoire is not an aggregation of independent 
units. Our behaviour is produced by mental mechanisms that play a role 
in many different behaviours. Some of the mental mechanisms used in 
hunting are used in storytelling... Such behaviours might be alterable 
only be altering the underlying mental mechanisms, and since these 
mechanisms are used for many different purposes, any change in them 
would have many other consequences. Hence individual behaviours are 
unlikely to have histories to call their own, or to have independent 
adaptive significance (Sterelny and Griffiths, 1999: 321). 
A genetically fixed capacity to acquire only a certain culture, or only a 
certain role within a culture, or only a certain role within a culture, 
would, however, be perilous; cultures and roles change too rapidly. 
This plasticity is adaptive because culture is acquired, not transmitted 
through genes. Human genes insure that a culture can be acquired, 
they do not ordain which particular culture this will be (Dobzhansky, 
1963: 146). 5' 
Introduction 
In Part One I suggested that moral rules are generally learned rather than acquired via 
biological transmission; that is to say, there do not seem to be such things as "gene 
complexes" that code for certain moral norms. In Part Two, this claim has been 
supported by observation not only of cross-cultural (and interpersonal) diversity of 
moral norms, but - more importantly - the relative rapidity with which this diversity 
has occurred and continues to occur; because such changes can and often do occur 
within single lifetimes, they cannot be attributed to genetic change, a process which is 
too slow to account for such rapid diversification (Alvard, 2003: 139). For example, 
during the last 40 or 50 years in Tasmania, increasing concerns for the environment 
have led to the development of a whole plethora of new, widely held moral rules 
aimed specifically at protecting this environment. Many people in Tasmania, for 
example, consider the destruction of old-growth forests to be a moral issue. Littering 
is also another good example of a practice that has only recently become morally 
condemnable in Tasmania. 
57 As quoted in Holmes Rolston's "Genes and the adapted mind" (1999). 
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This suggests that many moral rules are the product of human decision that they are 
morally relevant. In Part Three, I will (of course) argue that the story is far from 
being as straightforward as this. In particular, I will contend that emotional 
predispositions not only heavily influence these choices and decisions, they also play 
a central role in producing the moral concepts which differentiate the moral rule from 
the ordinary rule. However, for the purpose of emphasising the point that morality is 
nonetheless partially a social construct, this consideration will be delayed for the 
moment. 
It also seems fair to conclude that we acquire substantial portions of our moral 
principles — along with other norms and traditions - directly from the culture into 
which we are born. In other words, people are not born with their culture; they are 
born into the culture. We are not born, for example, with an inclination to eat food 
with particular utensils, or to perform particular rites; we are taught these things by 
other members of our culture. These, in turn, we pass on to others intact, or modified 
as required by circumstance, accounting for the ratchet like effect referred to in the 
last chapter. As stated, it is likewise plausible to extend this process to certain of the 
_ moral rules we acquire. For example, we are not born knowing that littering is 
wrong; it is something that we are generally taught. 
This process has led some to refer to the development of cultures and their moral 
rules as being Lamarckian in nature 58 ; that is, they are the product of a process 
whereby we inherit characteristics (in this case traditions skills, practices, beliefs, for 
example) that have been acquired in response to perceived requirements. 59 These 
characteristics are then passed on from generation to generation, being in turn 
modified within as required. So while Lamarckianism has long since been 
discredited when applied biological evolutionary processes, it seems apt for 
describing the way humans shape aspects of cultural constituents. 
58 Martin Stuart Fox suggests this, for example. (2002:35-36) 
59  This is a theory of evolution which was put forth by Jean Baptiste de Lamarck in the eighteenth 
century. 
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Up to this point, however, these claims have been merely theoretical. What is 
missing is an explanation of how (empirically speaking) it is possible that both 
cultures and their moral codes have been able to develop. In this chapter I will 
briefly discuss some of the biological capacities that have contributed to their 
development. This will be done with reference to comparable capacities — or the lack 
thereof — in other animals, for both culture and morality seem to be specific to 
humans only. Observing that other animals (A) do not seem to have moral rules and 
(B) do not have (or only manifest nascent forms of) the capacities which seem 
obviously linked to the ability to form, communicate and follow moral rules, 
strengthens the plausibility of culture and morality being the products of having these 
capacities.° 
While some of these capacities almost certainly evolved to facilitate kin relationships, 
others —such as communication using language - seem to have been selected for their 
role in enabling social learning. In looking at some of these capacities, then, we go 
somewhere towards answering the question of "how" morality came to be developed 
(the question encapsulated by "Issue 3"), as well as contributing to the overall portrait 
of what morality has become and what role it performs. It will achieve this in the 
following ways: 
• Firstly, I have sketched a picture in which morality emerged in response to a 
need for "pro-social glue" alongside other aspects of culture. An exploration 
of the capacities which enable this function to occur will contribute to the 
plausibility of this explanation. For in showing that these capacities have 
allowed us to make the rules ourselves, it becomes less likely that they derive 
from some kind of human-independent source. 
60 I of course note here that it does not prove that this is the case. These capacities could also be 
conceived as being means by which we are able to access mind-independent moral facts. I will 
address this point further in Part Four. 
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• Secondly, in a like manner it will help explain the development of morality 
from its initial role of "pro-social" glue to rules which seem far removed from 
this goal. It will also provide evidence that suggests a biologically-based 
explanation for moral concepts which, I will argue, distinguish moral rules 
from other social rules. This is because some of the capacities I discuss here 
are implicated in the generation of this fundamental aspect of morality as 
well. This explanation will be consolidated in Part Three. 
• Thirdly, it will strengthen the case against those who would claim that there is 
such thing as a "morality adaptation." In this section I will argue that the 
formation of moral rules relies on a whole range of different capacities (none 
of which seem to have been selected for their role in generating morality), and 
cannot be attributed to one alone. Consequently, it seems less likely that 
morality can be adequately explained as a trait which itself evolved as an 
adaptation. 
+ Fourthly, looking at these capacities may also help explain why it is that both 
culture and morality seem to be specific to humans. 
+ Finally, it will serve as a reminder of Wilson's leash since these capacities are 
biological in origin. 
Before commencing a brief discussion of these capacities, I must emphasise two 
things. Firstly, many of the evolutionary stories provided here for each of the 
targeted capacities are mostly speculative: this is because it is very difficult to know 
the precise evolutionary function(s) — if indeed there is even one — of every trait we 
have (as I mentioned in Part One). There are, nonetheless, many highly plausible 
hypotheses which explain the emergence of the various capacities, and these will be 
given here. While few of them are completely uncontroversial, I contend that the 
ones cited here are not merely fanciful "just-so" stories. 
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Secondly, I will not go into enormous detail about the about the specific adaptive 
mechanisms responsible for the emergence of the capacities. This is because (A) 
again, there is little of a precise nature that is known about them and (B) pinpointing 
the exact mechanisms is not necessary to make the general point that morality 
emerged as a bi-product of numerous capacities. Establishing this only requires 
demonstrating the more general point that there appear to be many capacities called 
upon in moral decision making, rather than one only. 
6:1 Capacities required for social learning, culture and morality 
...genes are... likely to have contributed to the increased brain size and 
complexity that support the vast cultural superstructure created by the 
interaction of our neurons and their environments. They may also 
contribute to the wonderful flexibility and plasticity of human behavior - 
the very attributes that make our behavior less rather than more 
genetically determined. But to understand the development of and 
variation in specific human behaviors such as creating charities and 
cheesecakes, we must invoke culture, its evolution, and its potential 
interaction with biology (Ehrlich & Feldman, 2003: 92). 
...Many of the key building blocks of morality are not themselves moral. 
Language, memory, perception, causal inference, earned adjustment, 
acquiescence, deliberation, choice, self-control, etc. All are essential to 
morality without themselves being "dedicated" to moral tasks (Railton, 
2000: 59). 
Imitation 
The capacity to imitate is a key element in acquiring the cultural traits (moral rules 
included) particular to a given society - at least initially. A lot of behaviour that small 
children adopt during their early developmental stages, for instance, is acquired 
through imitation of the acts of those around them. They learn words by repeating 
those that their parents or others repeat to them, they learn how to eat by imitating the 
eating actions of others. Indeed, much of children's early play consists of imitating 
the adult world that they witness around them. It is also a skill which is important, 
not only for learning basic survival skills, but also for fostering group cohesion. For 
instance, the perpetuation of rules and norms that coordinate the behaviour of people 
in groups rely in part on the capacity to imitate. 
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The ability to imitate is not limited to human beings; chimpanzees have been prized 
for their ability to imitate and many a zoo or circus has banked upon this ability to 
ensure clientele. Somewhat ironically, one of the most frequent abuses of this ability 
in particular has been to have them imitate features of our own cultures. The 
chimpanzee tea parties were a noteworthy feature of the earliest zoological displays 
of chimps. 61 Parrots also have proven themselves very adept at reproducing human 
sounds. 
As the animals which seem particularly adept at imitation are generally social 
animals, it seems plausible to conclude that it is an adaptation selected for the social 
learning benefits it bestowed. Amongst other things, as Scott Woodcock points out, 
imitation avoids the costly process of trial and error learning and as such is a valuable 
learning tool (Woodcock, 2006: 221). It seems fairly clear, however, that it is social 
learning that is the function of the adaptation and not the generation of moral rules 
specifically. For one thing, it is a capacity common to animals — like parrots, for 
example — which show no evidence of having even rudimentary morality. If the 
capacity to imitate was selected for a role in the generation of morality, one would 
expect to find moral codes in other animals that have this ability. It is far more 
plausible to make the connection between imitation and morality via the social 
learning that imitation facilitates — a skill that enables offspring to integrate into their 
social group, and, importantly, to learn valuable survival skills. In humans, this 
integration includes — but does not uniquely constitute - the acquisition of moral 
rules. So while imitation of actions is centrally implicated in the transmission of 
moral rules, this function is better explained as a bi-product of the adaptation, and not 
the function of the adaptation. 
61 In the words of Matt Ridley, "...from the very first arrival of chimpanzees in Europe, there seems to have 
been an obsession with serving them tea. The great French naturalist, Georges Leclerc, Comte de Buffon, was one 
of the first 'scientists' to see a captive chimp in about 1790. What did he find worth remarking? That he watched 
it 'take a cup and saucer and lay them on the table, put in sugar, pour out its tea, leave it to cool without drinking' 
(Buffon's Natural History, (abridged), 1792, London).. .the tradition of the chimpanzee tea party was born." ( 
Matt Ridley, 2003: 11-12) 
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Learning and teaching 
Imitation alone is only a superficial form of learning. It is one thing to reproduce a 
particular action, but it is quite another to understand what an action is intended to 
produce; the chimpanzee may well be able to wash dishes in imitation of a human 
being, but the dishes will not often be clean (Pinker, 2001). Steven Pinker gives an 
account of such behaviour: 
A friend of mine lived and worked with a chimpanzee for 
several years, and tells the story of how the chimp loved to 
imitate things that she did. For example, after she washed the 
dishes the chimp would wash the dishes, but the chimp's idea 
of washing the dishes was very different from ours. It went 
through the same muscle movements; it would pick up the 
sponge, let the warm water roll over his hands, would rub the 
sponge on the plate, but didn't get the idea that the point of 
washing the dishes was to get the dishes clean. It just liked the 
feel of rubbing a sponge over the plate. It could wash the 
same dish over and over again, it could rub some of the dirt 
off and not get all of it off, because what it was imitating was 
the particular physical sequence. What it didn't think about 
was what the goal of the human performing the action was. 
And the ability to guess what other people's goals are a key 
part of human intelligence, and it makes us very different 
from our primate cousins (Pinker, 2001). 
Without comprehension of intention, certain acts may eventually seem less useful to 
the perpetrator and therefore not worth reproducing (unless, of course, there is some 
other kind of reward or punishment involved). Human cultures include a vast number 
of norms, traditions and customs that require that they not only be imitated faithfully, 
but that they be imitated appropriately; that is, applied in the appropriate 
circumstances, with a view to attaining a particular end. For example, one might 
initially learn to brush one's teeth through imitation, but without the concept of why 
this is important it is unlikely that one will want to continue doing it, as anyone with 
young children might attest. 
101 
Both the application and formation of moral rules, in particular, requires such 
understanding. As I argued in Chapter 2, it does not seem appropriate to talk of 
behaviour being altruistic if it was not intended as such. It seems strange to talk 
about the self-sacrifice of the bee for the hive as the same type of altruism displayed 
by the person who makes the choice to sacrifice something of value to themselves for 
the sake of aiding another; there is an intentionality and understanding in the latter, 
that there is not in the former. Moreover, the bee will not have to be taught that it is 
appropriate to use its sting to deter potential threats to the hive; it is born with this 
ability. A human child, on the other hand, will often be taught that it is appropriate to 
aid members of their community on occasion, even should it involve some form of 
self-sacrifice. Continuing to subscribe to this moral rule will thus partially hinge 
upon an understanding of why helping is the right thing to do; otherwise the sacrifice 
will not make sense. This, of course, does not mean that everything we do is thus 
acquired — I have emphasised this in Chapter 1. Much that we do as cultural 
organisms — including the adoption of certain moral rules — does however require that 
we learn about both their application and relevance. 
One of the advantages of being able to learn is that it affords us a great deal of 
behavioural plasticity. This, in turn, enables us to use more of our environment more 
efficiently and effectively. Instead of requiring a set amount of environmental 
triggers for behaviour to occur, we can shape our behaviour to suit the environment, 
thereby increasing our survival chances. Considering that we are an organism that 
does not reproduce prolifically, and, moreover, gives birth to relatively helpless 
offspring, being able to manipulate our environment more readily helps ensure the 
best care for our offspring. It allows us, for example, to skip the potentially costly 
process of learning "the hard way" via personal experience alone, as pointed out 
above. Learning how to look after the hygiene of our offspring from someone else 
will enable us to potentially avoid losing our children to ill health consequent to poor 
hygiene. Instead of dying from the cold because our biology has not provided us with 
the fur that enables other species to survive in cold conditions, we use the 
environment (and change it) to make our own warmth via clothing and various forms 
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of heating. These skills - developed in our own lifetimes - we then pass on to our 
offspring during these same lifetimes. Some of the skills will be modified in 
accordance with new knowledge or new circumstances which arise (the ratchet effect, 
described in Chapter 4). With time, the accumulation, augmentation and refining of 
knowledge and skills has contributed to some of the vast differences in lifestyles 
captured by the term "culture". It also means that we have, to a certain degree, taken 
our survival into our own hands. In terms of morality in its role as social regulator 
and facilitator, the ability to learn, and transmit what is learned, is key to ensuring a 
system which is appropriate to a large scale, constantly changing society. 
Certain studies have suggested that other animals demonstrate the ability to learn 
from others as well as well. There is Kanzi, the bonobo, who became quite adept at 
sign language, for example (Savage-Rumbaugh, 1986). However, while it is true that 
in captivity some animals demonstrate the capacity to learn, it is also true that in their 
own environment learned skills appear much rarer. Behaviour that is acquired, for 
example, is usually behaviour that would have been acquired whether demonstrated 
or not (Galef, 1998: 606). In fact, Jane Goodall herself, often apparently so eager to 
lessen the gap between humans and chimpanzees, maintains that the repertoire of 
chimp behaviour does not include behaviour that they would not naturally pick up by 
themselves (Goodall, 1970). 62 In captivity, however, we can more actively coerce 
and reward certain behaviours more consistently and thereby lead them to perform 
actions that they would otherwise not perform. This suggests, however, that some 
primates have dormant abilities which emerge only when teased out by those with the 
ability to do so. Much in the same way as an adult will attempt to form the latent 
abilities of a child that might otherwise emerge more slowly (if at all), teaching a 
bonobo sign language draws out language skills that may not otherwise be employed. 
The rarity of behaviour learned through active teaching in the animal kingdom might 
also be ascribed to the lack of active teaching that occurs in the first place. Instances 
of active, intentional teaching have been very difficult to find in animal groups. 
62  As quoted in Galef (1998: 60). 
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Christophe Boesch, during his extensive observations of chimpanzee behaviour, only 
witnessed such forms of teaching twice (Boesch and Tomasello, 1998: 601). The 
paucity of examples of active teaching marks a significant gap between human 
behaviour and that of our closest living relatives. It is a biological gap, moreover, 
which most likely explains why there are not complex moral codes in primate groups 
— if there is morality at all, which is unlikely. 63 
Such a discussion requires some sort of brief comment about why there might be 
what appears to be such a significant cognitive gap — after all, chimpanzees and 
bonobos are our closest living relatives and share roughly 96% of our genes. Albert 
Naccache (1999: 21) attributes the emergence of learning mechanisms to the advent 
of neocorticalisation in the mammalian brain, which he maintains (basing his findings 
on Terence Deacon's work [1997]) took place as the result of an overall trend toward 
physical growth. Evidence shows, for example, that around 30 million years ago, 
primates, along with cetaceans and proboscides, appeared to have a higher ratio of 
brain to body size than other mammals (Deacon, 1997: 342). It is during the 
Palaeolithic era, however (from roughly 2.5 million to 12 000 years ago) when 
differences in the behaviour of the genus Homo really begin to surface. For example, 
evidence of co-operative hunting from this time suggests that language and perhaps 
the development of a theory of mind may have evolved during this time. Evidence of 
basic tool use during this time is significant also in terms of what it tells us about the 
evolution of these capacities, as I will presently discuss. During the period between 
40 000-60 000 BC, however, more significant changes start to appear in the fossil 
record; stylized stone tools, basic clothing, boats and even the first glimmerings of 
symbolic art all date back to this period (Leary and Buttermore, 2003: 385-389). This 
represents a major leap in cognition, perhaps even the point at which thought 
processes in humans broke away from equivalent processes in other primates. For 
Leary and Buttermore, this period signifies the emergence of the 'modern human 
self', and, more significantly, the cognitive changes that enabled humans to reason, 
reflect and learn. They refer to this period of time as the 'cultural big bang'; a time 
631 will address this question specifically in Part Four. 
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from which a series of biological changes in the Homo genus culminated in the 
phenomena of culture, the evolutionary path of which was to magnify changes in 
lifestyles in a tiny space of evolutionary time (Leary and Buttermore, 2003: 392). 
There are different hypotheses about why these changes took place. One particularly 
noteworthy suggestion is that many of these changes went hand in hand with 
increasing group sizes in the Homo genus. Robin Dunbar and Leslie Aiello (Aiello 
and Dunbar, 1993) have argued that there is a connection between the ratio of social 
group size to the neocortex in social primates, observing that the bigger the 
neocortex, the bigger the group size. 64 This suggests, in turn, that there is a 
correlation between the two. Dunbar and Aiello hypothesise that the neocortex is 
almost certainly centrally involved in the organisation and processing of information 
relevant to living in these groups. The steady increase in the size of the neocortex of 
our ancestors, coupled with the dramatic changes that I have outlined above 
(epitomized by the "cultural big-bang"), corroborates this point. While there is not 
the space to go into detail about the exact nature of the neural mechanisms required 
for learning in general, some of the skills to which they have given rise in our species 
are worth discussing briefly. 
Use of tools 
Considering the emergence of tools in the fossil record may seem an odd inclusion in 
a consideration of cultural and moral behaviour, and yet the capacity to manipulate 
one's environment using a range of different instruments adapted for differing 
circumstances represents a significant leap in human cognition. For instance, it 
signifies the emergence of the ability to consider problems and to devise the means 
for overcoming them via a process of reasoning. In terms of morality, the cognitive 
ability required to make such decisions is the same as that which enables us to decide 
how we might apply a particular moral principle, or whether a particular set of 
circumstances requires moral consideration. Again, that they were selected for this 
64 I came across this information in Richard Joyce's The evolution of morality (2006: 89-90). 
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purpose is highly unlikely, however; it is far more likely that they were selected for 
more generalized purposes, such as, for example, the ability to solve problems arising 
from a challenging and changing environment. This claim is supported, moreover by 
the observation that other animals also manifest some of these characteristics. 
Charles Darwin, for example, claimed that other animals are endowed with problem 
solving skills, including, surprisingly, the apparently not so lowly worm. In fact, one 
of Darwin's last pieces of work was a study of worms in which he concluded (after 
extensive observation) that worms were capable of making intelligent decisions when 
confronted with challenging alterations to their surroundings. 65 What he did not find, 
however, was that worms show evidence of having either complex social or moral 
rules. 
Nowhere else in the animal kingdom have we yet to encounter the advanced level of 
problem solving skills that human beings manifest, however. Evidence for this can 
be found in comparing tool use between our species and others. One significant 
difference between the tool use of humans and other primates, for example, is that 
humans use them in a way that indicates both a sense of time and also a sense of 
one's place in time (Leary and Buttermore, 2003). For example, while chimpanzees 
do use basic tools (such as sticks to prise out marrow from bones) they do not 
transport them around with them (Savage-Rumbaugh, 1994). Homo habilis, widely 
considered to be the earliest of our genus, are thought to have both made and carried 
tools around with them (Potts, 1984). For certain scientists, this indicates a 
development in self awareness which includes both the ability to consider future 
needs, and the ability to recall past events (Leary and Buttermore, 2003: 376).66 In 
order to be able to do this, one needs a sense of one's self (self consciousness) in 
order to be able to envisage or "conjure up" the idea of oneself as a future or past self. 
65 I drew this infomation from James Rachels (1990) in which he specifically discusses Darwin's 
attribution of reason and intelligence to other animals (133-137). In Darwin's words," If worms have 
the power of acquiring some notion, however rude, of the shape of an object and of their burrows, as 
seems to be the case, they deserve to be called intelligent; for they then act in nearly the same manner 
as would a man under similar circumstances."(Darwin, 1881: 97 as quoted in Rachels [1990: 1361). 
66 I have used Leary and Buttermore (2003) as a reference for much of this paragraph. 
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The ability to project oneself into the past and future is central to not only learning, 
but also to applying what one has learned in the relevant situations to the appropriate 
ends. Moral decision making, for example, revolves around the ability to imagine the 
effects of one's choices before one actually performs them. Being able to "see 
oneself' in the future as the result of having behaved in one way or another may 
substantially affect the decisions one ultimately makes. Many decisions will also call 
upon the knowledge gleaned from past experiences. Memory is thus also central to 
learning and reasoning in general. If I cannot recall what I have just learnt, then I 
will have to learn it over and over again. 67 
Again, it is highly unlikely that capacities such as those which enable us to retain and 
recall information were selected for the purposes of making moral decisions. Rather, 
moral decisions seem to be amongst the vast pool of decisions humans make each day 
which these capacities facilitate. While I have not been specific about the biological 
particularities of these abilities, it seems reasonable to suggest that general learning is 
the adaptive trait for which they were selected. It is, for example, far more 
fundamental to a child's survival that they be able to learn about a whole range of 
more generalized dangers than those few which are the subject of moral rules. 
Language and language learning 
Fully developed language is believed to date back to around 100 000 years ago 
which, evolutionarily speaking, is not very long ago (Lieberman, 1998). There are 
varied hypotheses about why complex language skills might have been selected. 
Again, while these theories are not conclusive, what they have in common is that the 
conclusion that language is intimately linked with social coordination and cohesion. 
Grover Krantz, for example, points to the advantages it provides in terms of 
organizing group life. He argues that language facilitates cooperation by enabling 
and facilitating the precise communication of ends and needs, the organisation of 
67 Albert Naccache takes this idea a little further. He uses what he refers to as "social memory" - the 
ability to transmit information from one generation to the next - to explain the rapidity of cultural 
development and change. This "social memory" comprises the accumulated history of one's culture 
passed on to future generations via both the spoken and later, the written word. (Naccache, 1999:16) 
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labour, the transmission of important information and the organisation of cooperative 
ventures such as hunting and gathering of resources (Kranz, 1980: 776). 
Language also greatly facilitates the learning process, and is central to the kind of 
"social learning" referred to earlier. It permits the transmission of information in a 
quick, efficient manner, thereby eliminating the time consuming activity of individual 
learning through personal experience, as discussed above (Castro et al., 2004: 725). 
It also enables rules, including moral rules, to be easily discussed, codified and 
transmitted. This becomes particularly relevant in large-scale societies where 
numbers are so great that rules and regulations become essential in avoiding 
significant confusion and dispute. 
Language has also enabled humans to guide the learning process of their offspring, 
and indeed other members of the group, via the expression of approval and 
disapproval of certain behaviours (Castro et al. 2004: 725). This is a capacity that is 
directly relevant to moral behaviour. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, moral rules 
are often instilled in young children via not only explanation, but also via systems of 
reward and punishment. With language, consequences for actions can be 
communicated quickly and clearly. Some have also suggested that language has its 
roots in the role it plays in the bonding process between mother and child (Jonas, 
1980:782). 
These points all highlight the fundamental role that language plays in human social 
life. Indeed, it seems fair to suggest that without language human social groups could 
not have become what they are today. In terms of its adaptive significance, however, 
it seems fairly clear that it predates morality having been selected rather for the 
cooperation it enabled between humans — and, perhaps, other animals as well: while 
complex language skills are often taken to be unique to humans, the example of 
Kanzi, mentioned earlier, challenges this assumption.68 As pointed out earlier 
68 Kanzi was an infant of 6 months old when his foster mother was used in a series of experiments 
aimed at determining the potential language capacities of non-human primates. As he was still young, 
he was present during the experiments conducted with his mother, which consisted largely of attempts 
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though, what is particularly interesting to note again is that while Kanzi and other 
primates have shown limited linguistic skills, these have occurred only in captivity 
and not in the wild, a fact which underlines the differences, rather than similarities 
between humans and their chimpanzee cousins. As Pinker points out, the main 
ability this highlights is the imitative capacities of the chimpanzee and the bullying 
capacities of the human being. 
What an irony it is, that the supposed attempt to bring Homo 
sapiens down a few notches in the natural order has taken the 
form of us humans hectoring another species into emulating 
our instinctive form of communication, or some artificial 
form we have invented, as if that were the measure of 
biological worth. The chimpanzee's resistance is no shame on 
them; a human would surely do no better if trained to hoot 
and shriek like a chimp, a symmetrical project that makes 
about as much scientific sense.(Pinker, 1994: 352) 69 
The question of the uniqueness of these capacities is not really central to the topic at 
hand, however. These kinds of experiments do serve, amongst other things of course, 
as an often well needed reminder of our animal status. It should not be surprising that 
other primates exhibit behaviour that is similar to our own; we share a highly 
significant proportion of our genes, after all. What is of particular interest here is that 
we use the capacity to tremendous advantage, where as other primates, if indeed they 
do have the same potential, do not use it. 70 Considering why this is the case can 
to gauge her ability to understand symbolic representation using a keyboard expressing such symbols. 
While the experimenters were unable to teach his mother any such representations, Kanzi had, during 
his time of proximity with the experimenters, learnt much of what they had unsuccessfully tried to 
teach the older bonobo; without having been explicitly taught, moreover. It was found that not only 
was Kanzi apparently able to understand the concept of an abstract symbol being used to represent a 
word, or an idea, he was also able to understand spoken words as well. It was found, for example, that 
out of 660 statements made in which he was requested to perform various actions, he performed 74% 
of them accurately. This was a success rate higher by 9% than a child of 2 1/2 years old. ( See Savage-
Rumbaugh [19861). 
69 As quoted in Lloyd (2004: 578.) 
70 In fact, even Noam Chomsky was suspicious of the results drawn from experiments with Kanzi, as 
while they do indeed suggest that the mechanisms for speech are in place, the fact that they are not 
used effectively remains mysterious. As he claims "...if an animal had a capacity as biologically 
sophisticated as language but somehow hadn't used it until now, it would be an evolutionary miracle, 
like finding an island of humans who could be taught to fly".(1991:20, as quoted in Lloyd, 2004: 585) 
For Chomsky, the capacity to use language is a uniquely human capacity. While Kanzi's example 
suggests otherwise, it also suggests, amongst other things, that something might be lacking in other 
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contribute importantly to an understanding of the evolutionary history of the 
capacities that we have. One might conclude from the above data, or example, that 
both humans and bonobos share an ancestor who had certain linguistic capacities in 
place that manifested themselves differently in both lineages. 
Self Consciousness and the symbolic self 
Finally, the capacity for language has been importantly linked to the development of 
self consciousness. As mentioned earlier, while this is not the place to explain all of 
the mechanics of human intellect, a few things can be mentioned by way of 
explanation of self consciousness. Leary and Buttermore argue, for instance, that 
being able to use complex language indicates the existence of the ability to represent 
things —including ourselves - symbolically in our minds. They further suggest that 
this latter ability may have even emerged as a consequence of the evolution of the 
former (Leary and Buttermore, 2003: 381). 
In terms of their relevance to morality, self — and indeed other — consciousness can 
firstly be positioned as central to moral deliberation, as well as to the formation of 
moral rules based on this deliberation. For example, if one is unable to conceive of 
oneself as a person whose actions have consequences, then one cannot be said to be 
able to form the type of morally relevant intentions, as I discussed in Chapter 2. Here 
I argued that being able to form intentions required that one be able to consider 
possibilities and the outcomes of these possibilities. This requires that one be able to 
conceive of oneself as a subject of these possibilities in the first place. I will discuss 
this again in Chapter 9. 
Of even greater significance, however, is the suggestion that the ability to represent 
things symbolically in our minds is pivotal to the development of reason and 
reflection. In the words of Leary and Buttermore: 
primates that does not allow a fruitful exploitation of this ability. (This information was taken from 
Elizabeth Lloyd's paper "Karizi, evolution, and language"[2004]) 
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Because they can manipulate thoughts and images about 
themselves in their minds, human beings are able to anticipate 
outcomes of their actions, consider their options, prepare in 
advance for events that might occur, and develop plans and 
contingencies. They may experience emotions in response to 
remembering events from their pasts or imagining themselves 
in the future. The ability to think consciously about oneself 
also underlies introspection, self-evaluation, and the 
development of the self-concept. People are able to form 
ideas and images of what they are like, consciously compare 
themselves to their own standards and to other peoples, and 
experience emotions such as pride and shame as a result. 
Self-awareness also offers the possibility of deliberately 
controlling one's behaviour and, when necessary, acting 
contrary to one's automatic inclinations (Leary and 
B uttermore, 2003: 393) 
It does not require much discussion to realise the significance of the emergence of the 
"symbolic self" and the ability to reason and reflect. In Chapter 9 I will focus 
extensively on the role that our ability to reason and reflect plays in morality, for 
example. I will argue, amongst other things, that it is central not only in the 
formation and application of other rules, but also in generating moral motivation. But 
as with other capacities discussed in this chapter, it is fair to suggest that our ability to 
reason and reflect emerged as one of a long list of other advantageous bi-products 
that are consequential to increasing social complexity, rather than the development of 
morality. Moral rules, while important tools in the regulation of groups of people, are 
less important than the general learning that these mechanisms enable. 
6.2 Animals and culture 
This has been somewhat of a gloss (considering the enormity of the literature) over 
some of the capacities that have contributed to the emergence of culture and morality. 
It is nonetheless sufficient to demonstrate the connection between these capacities 
and the advent of both culture and morality. I maintain, however, that the 
mechanisms which are responsible for producing these capacities were not selected 
for their contribution to either of these phenomena, but rather because their 
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contribution to social learning and coordination. At this point, the question may well 
be asked, as Henrich and McElreath have recently asked, why it is only Homo 
sapiens who developed the capacities that enabled the development, accumulation 
and dissemination of cultural constituents? (Henrich and McElreath, 2003: 126). 
One response is that Homo sapiens are in fact not the only animals which have 
cultures. Some of the capacities central to the development of culture are present in 
other animals, albeit at times in rudimentary form. For example, while instances of 
active teaching are rare, they are still existent. Not only primates, but dolphins too 
have been observed not only to use tools (sponges), but to also pass on this skill to 
other dolphins (Krutzen et al., 2005). 
Moreover, not only do some non-human animals exhibit the capacities I have argued 
are central to the development of culture, but some of their social groups appear to 
manifest certain cultural elements. In chimpanzee societies, for example, there is 
evidence of hierarchical rules, punishments and cooperative ventures. Some of these, 
as Boesch and Tomasello point out, also differ from group to group. 
...to a degree unknown in any other species of nonhuman animal, 
primate or otherwise, different populations of chimpanzees seem 
to have their own unique behavioural repertoires, including such 
things as food preferences, tool use, gestural signals and other 
behaviours and these group differences often persist across 
generations(Boesch &Tomasello, 1998: 591). 
While this might be the case, the word "culture" as I have defined it serves to group 
considerable instances of difference between groups. Other species simply do not 
seem to manifest the remarkable range of behavioural differences that charactise 
human culture. In short, to call just anything that looks like intra-species behavioural 
difference cultural is to demonstrate a clear lack of understanding of the term, as 
Laland and Hoppitt succinctly point out: 
To confuse such matters as oyster catchers' learning one of 
two ways to open mussels by calling this cultural is the 
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equivalent of saying that reptiles are in the class of birds 
because feathers are but elaborated scales and wings but the 
modified bone structure of reptilian forelimbs (Laland and 
Hoppitt, 1981: 709). 
More importantly, however, culture not only represents differences between groups, 
it also represents the sources of these differences. Highlighted in particular was the 
development of beliefs arising from speculation about existential and metaphysical 
matters which shape the behaviour of the groups to which they belong. The fact that 
the generation of these belief s requires certain capacities which do not appear to have 
equivalents in the rest of the animal kingdom (such as, for example, the ability to use 
complex language) may explain why this is the case. 
On the other hand, that other animals, particularly primates, exhibit what could be 
considered the rudiments of cultural behaviour should not be all that surprising, as 
mentioned earlier. What is clear, however, is that human cultures appear to be vastly 
different from those that are claimed for other animals, and that these differences are 
importantly linked to the emergence of capacities that enabled social 
complexification and expansion. A precise answer to Henrich and McElreath's 
question "why" is nonetheless, elusive. This is not a problem, however: for whether 
or not animals can be said to have cultures is not the topic of this thesis. Discussion 
of the possibility here has been useful rather in highlighting important constituents of 
the term "culture" and the capacities which contribute its formation. As such, what 
does appear plausible is that (A) many of the changes that occurred during the 
cultural "big-bang" were advantageous to human beings, aiding them to proliferate 
and prosper and that (B) our species alone manifests many of these capacities in a 
more advanced form than other animals, a fact which explains the vast chasm that 
exists between our mode of existence and those of our closest genetic relatives, for 
example. These conclusions in turn enable us to suggest, then, that morality and 
culture are the products of a series of biological adaptations that evolved in the Homo 
genus. 
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6:3 Morality and adaptation: a recapitulation 
In this chapter I have argued that the adaptations responsible for the capacities I have 
briefly discussed were selected because of the advantages they provided in terms of 
enabling social learning and cooperation. This is in keeping with my argument that 
group living itself is fitness enhancing for humans. As such the adaptations which 
have facilitated this way of life have also contributed substantially to the evolutionary 
success of our species. Acceptance of these arguments renders the suggestion that 
morality is an adaptation implausible, for while the capacities briefly discussed here 
do play fundamental roles in generating aspects of morality (whether it be in forming 
the rules, communicating the rules or obeying the rules), it seems highly unlikely that 
they were selected for this specific purpose. As Christopher Boehm suggests, at the 
most, some of these adaptations could be considered "preadaptations" for morality 
(Boehm, 2000: 94). Equally important, is the observation that there is not one of 
these capacities in particular which seems ultimately responsible for or central to the 
generation of moral rules: this also severely undermines the hypothesis that morality 
is an adaptation. An adaptation is a heritable trait, as I pointed out in Chapter 2. 
Morality, however, is a composite phenomenon which calls upon a whole series of 
different adaptations, as I have argued here with reference to moral rules alone. 
Consequently, it seems more plausible to consider morality as a fitness enhancing bi-
product or "epiphenomenon" of a number of different adaptations, rather than an 
adaptation itself. 
This, however, is not the end of the story as far as attempts to explain morality as an 
adaptation is concerned. For in this part of the thesis I have been more concerned 
with explaining and exploring the ways in which humans have been able to create 
moral rules themselves. In doing so, I have not significantly distinguished them from 
any other rule that we create. As I consider morality to be largely concerned with 
"rules" (in particular, the rules that regulate social cooperation and coordination) this 
discussion has made an important contribution to my consideration of a connection 
between morality and biology. In Part Three, however, I will focus on how moral 
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rules can be differentiated from other rules, a discussion which in turn will introduce 
a different approach to considering morality as an adaptation. In particular I will 
consider Richard Joyce's (rather tempting) argument that what he terms the "moral 
sense" (A) can explain this difference and (B) is itself most probably an adaptation. 
While much of what Richard Joyce has to say about morality accords importantly 
with arguments of my own, where we differ is with respect to this contention. 
Amongst other things, I will argue that while Joyce's suggestion is an intriguing 
option, it is not only implausible, but also unnecessary. 
Summary 
Exploring various human capacities in this section has helped explain how humans 
have developed both cultures as well as aspects of the moral rules within them. For 
example, I have contended that we are able to manage our lives by reflecting upon the 
best ways of using resources to produce the most optimal outcome. We are also able 
to communicate these reflections to others, who in turn may choose to adopt, ignore 
or ameliorate them. That we are also able to change and adapt so readily to differing 
circumstances is central to the development of intercultural behavioural differences. 
More importantly, however, it has significantly contributed to the evolutionary 
success of human beings. While I have suggested that the mechanisms involved in 
these capacities were not specifically selected because of their relevance to morality, 
they are nonetheless central to tour ability to form and apply moral rules. The ability 
to make moral rules, then, is best conceived as being the bi- products of these 
capacities. 
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In this part of the thesis, I outlined some of the major problems arising from the 
representation of morality as being uniquely concerned with bolstering social 
cooperation. They were as follows: 
• Issue 1. Firstly, a purely prosocial account of morality is not adequately 
representative of morality because it does not explain why there is so much 
cross cultural variety in moral rules throughout human groups, when the goals 
— according to a prosocial account - are ostensibly the same; i.e., to facilitate 
cooperation in groups. 
• Issue 2. Secondly, it also does not account for moral rules that seem to have 
little, if anything, to do with socially cohesive behaviour. 
• Issue 3.  Thirdly, it does not explain how it is that we come to form moral 
rules. If we are not genetically programmed to behave thus, how is it that we 
learn or decide what is appropriate moral behaviour? 
•:• Issue 4. Fourthly, it does not adequately explain how we become motivated 
to behave in accordance with these moral rules. 
•:. Issue 5. Finally, and most importantly, it does not adequately explain how we 
come to believe in the moral concepts of "right" and "wrong" (as described in 
the introduction of this thesis) which are the key features of morality that 
separate it from other human rules. 
In answer to Issue 1, I explored the relationships between culture and morality. I 
suggested that culture - comprising traditions, beliefs, skills, and (of course) morality 
- dramatically shapes aspects of its members' behaviour. The cultures themselves are 
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in part the fruit of differing environments and are shaped by the needs and 
requirements that these environments impose. The human ability to not only adapt 
their lives to these environments, but to also change or improve on these adaptations 
has contributed to both the dynamism of culture and the behavioural gulf that has 
arisen between social groups. This gulf partially accounts for the variety of moral 
rules that can be found across the globe. I have claimed that this is because moral 
rules and beliefs are shaped by cultural needs and beliefs. As these needs and beliefs 
vary cross culturally, the moral rules will most likely vary as well. For example, the 
moral rules which express our beliefs about delicate issues such as the death penalty 
and abortion are often derived from cultural beliefs regarding life and death and vary 
accordingly. Moreover, as collective and individual beliefs change, so too will some 
of the moral rules; the death penalty was, until recently, a form of punishment in 
Australia, but it has since been abolished in part because it was considered immoral. 
In providing an explanation of this process, I have provided a partial response to 
Issue 2. 
I did not, however, deny that there is also universality with respect to a number of 
cross-cultural moral rules. As human beings share a common suite of basic survival 
needs (which they do by virtue of all being organisms with a similar physiology), 
cross cultural moral codes will also have a kernel of similarity in the rules devised to 
ensure these common needs are met. Survival requirements, however, are not the 
only requirements with which morality is concerned. 
So much for Issues 1 and 2. The final sections of Part Two dealt primarily with Issue 
3; how it is that humans have been able to develop cultures in the first place. Here I 
argued that the development of cultures and — particularly - the social learning 
integral to the development of cultures - was largely due to the evolution of a number 
of capacities in the human line. These are capacities which have enabled us to not 
only adapt to our environment, but also to adapt our environment to ourselves, and 
this without waiting for millennia of genetic changes we might otherwise need to 
effect such changes. Principal amongst these capacities is the ability to rationally 
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reflect about one's circumstances, and to formulate ideas about how to respond 
appropriately to them. Coupled with the advent of complex language skills, the 
human cognitive centre subsequently became central to the existence of culture and 
the moral codes within these cultures. 
An important product of this discussion was the conclusion that the adaptations 
responsible for these capacities were almost certainly not selected for their 
contribution to morality. While it is true that the exact adaptive function of each 
capacity — or, more precisely, the adaptive function of the biological adaptations that 
produce the capacity — remain hypothetical, it is highly plausible that many of them 
were selected for their contribution to social learning, coordination and kin bonding. 
Another major conclusion that I have drawn is that the ability to form, transmit and 
act upon moral rules calls upon many of these different capacities, rather than one in 
particular. If this conclusion is accepted, then I further suggest that it is implausible 
to suggest that morality itself is an adaptation, and that it is better conceived as a bi-
product of a number of other adaptations. 
These explanations account for certain aspects of morality insufficiently dealt with in 
Part One, and captured in Issues 1-3 outlined in the introduction. We are still, 
however, far from an account of the whole of what morality represents. For while it 
seems reasonable to suggest that morality emerged as a type of social rule which 
varies and changes in response to differing social and physical environments, it is 
nonetheless something which is often and readily differentiated from a social rule by 
most people. What is missing, then, is an explanation of how it is that we have come 
to care about certain situations, actions, thoughts, people, and organisms enough to 
make categorical moral judgements about how we ought to respond to them: for it is, 
I will argue, partially because we are able to care deeply about certain issues that we 
have come to form moral concepts. A tenable explanation of the origins and nature 
of morality has to account for these concepts, and — most importantly -how we come 
to be motivated by them in the first place. I will now discuss these matters. 
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...it may be that as a matter of fact morality is just a matter of human 
convention; the point is that this is not how we think of it (when we are 
"within it," so to speak); we think of it as having a convention-
transcendent practical clout. How exactly this clout is ultimately to be 
cashed out is a philosophical problem stretching back to Plato, and no 
doubt beyond (Joyce, 2006: 63). 
Thus far I have suggested that morality emerged partially from the need for social 
regulation. This was one of the principal conclusions of Part One. In Part Two, I 
outlined five problematic issues that emerge from an explanation for morality given 
uniquely in terms of social utility. Part Two accordingly addressed one of these 
issues in particular; the issue of explaining cross-cultural variability of moral rules. 
This discussion entailed an excursion into some of the capacities that are required to 
make, teach and follow moral rules, thereby revealing the biological basis of some of 
the machinery that are central to the generation of these rules. As such, it also 
addressed another of the major issues (Issue 3) headlining Part Two. 
In Part Two, I also provided a partial response to the question of why we have moral 
rules that seem to have little to do with promoting socially cohesive behaviour (Issue 
Two). This, I argued, could be (again, partially) attributed to the way we use moral 
rules to also protect and promote beliefs and values which arise from reflection about 
the world, its origins and its meaning. These beliefs and values, while often not 
totally at odds with encouraging human cooperation, nevertheless have strayed into 
domains which are not obviously (if at all) connected to these ends. That we feel that 
they are of utmost importance - and that we believe that others should consider them 
as such - has led us to express them as moral rules or principles. This response, 
however, remains "partial" because I have as yet to explain why these matters entail 
moral rules in particular. 
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The principal issues which remained at the end of Parts One and Two, however, were 
related to how motivation to behave morally might be explained. In this part of the 
thesis I will argue that we are often motivated to uphold moral principles because we 
see them as categorically binding. As such, then, I will need to explain how we come 
to believe that certain rules (that we call "moral rules") are categorically binding 
(these are the matters captured by Issues 4 and 5 in Part Two). In particular an 
explanation must be provided of how we might account for these two issues if (A) 
one assumes that there is no such thing as objective mind-independent moral facts 
which entail that moral rules are categorically binding, (B) there does not seem to be 
anything obviously "in it" for us (after all, moral rules sometimes proscribe what 
otherwise might seem tempting) (C) we are not biologically programmed to 
specifically believe that these moral rules are categorically binding and yet (D) one 
nonetheless seeks to explain morality as the product of human biological evolution. 
Part Three, then, will be concerned with these issues. 
To begin the discussion, I will consider the role that social punishment and reward 
might play in addressing Issues 4 and 5. I will argue that moral rules that are upheld 
or "obeyed" in response to the coercive tools of social punishment and reward are not 
generally considered to be morally motivated. This, I contend, is because morality 
involves much more than the mere performance of a series of actions; it is also 
concerned with reasons for action. But not just any reasons; these reasons for action 
involve the concepts of moral "right" and "wrong". Behaving morally simply to 
avoid punishment or reap reward is instrumental — in this case self serving — 
motivation; we are doing it not because we think it is morally right or wrong, but 
because we want to avoid punishment, or reap reward. 
It will also be noted, however, that while behaviour performed in response to 
punishment and reward is generally not considered to be motivated in a truly moral 
way, the fact that such coercive methods are often used to enforce rules may 
nonetheless explain how we might come to consider the moral rules we are taught to 
be categorically binding. For example, constant negative or positive reinforcement of 
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a principle from childhood may lead us to eventually believe that a particular act is 
morally right or wrong. 
The most important aspect of this discussion, however, will be the (re)emergence of 
the moral "ought", a concept which I will argue is at the heart of the difference 
between a social rule and a moral rule. The moral ought expresses the conviction that 
some beliefs, traits and/or action are intrinsically right or wrong and that as such we 
"ought" to believe, possess or perform them, not for any instrumental reason, but 
because they are categorically binding. In the introduction of this thesis I suggested 
that this justification itself is commonly (although, of course, not always) based on an 
assumed moral realism, which for many people transposes conviction to a type of 
"knowledge". In this case, the knowledge is of a series of objective moral facts 
which express the truth about how we ought to think, act or simply "be". Because I 
am maintaining that there are no such things as moral facts which justify moral 
realism of this type, the onus of explaining the origins of belief in them, and the 
motivational power that they engender, is shifted to me. More generally, though, the 
onus is on me to explain why we consider moral principles to be categorically 
binding, whether or not we do so with reference to existence of moral facts. 
Firstly, I will explain the fact that people accept moral rules as categorically binding 
with reference to a history of our being actually told that they are categorically 
binding. When this is combined with the observation that much of the content of our 
own culture's morality seems uncontroversial — indeed, is quite obviously useful to us 
— then this augments our belief that what we have been told is correct. We are then 
motivated to uphold the moral principles, because we believe they are right. 
While this point contributes to an explanation for moral motivation, however, it is 
rather limited in what it can tell us about morality itself. What we need is an 
explanation which accounts for the strength of the moral rules, a strength which in 
turn accounts for the fact that people are willing to accept them even though they 
often proscribe things which we otherwise might like to do. More than this, however, 
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it will help to explain why many people do not merely accept the moral rules with 
which they have been raised as being yet another type of instrumental rule, but rather 
come to consider them as inviolable injunctions ostensibly tied to some kind of 
objective truth about the world. 
In response, one might be tempted, like Richard Joyce, to suggest that we have 
something like a "moral sense" - an adaptation which predisposes us to make moral 
judgements - which can account for all of this (Joyce 2006: 107-142). Joyce is not 
alone in projecting such a possibility; talk of an adaptive moral sense is not 
uncommon in sociobiological literature. It has been mooted, for example, by Michael 
Ruse (Ruse, 1986: 253)), E.O. Wilson (Ruse & Wilson, 1989: 51) and Jonathon Haidt 
(Haidt, 2001: 827). 71 Joyce hypothesises that the "moral sense" is a naturally 
selected trait. That this is the case, however, seems unlikely and this part of the thesis 
will illustrate why this is so. In particular, I will argue that our tendency to make 
moral judgements that we consider to be categorically binding derives rather from a 
varied range of environmental (notably social environment) factors and biological 
capacities. Many of the biological capacities involved in moral decision making, 
moreover, are more plausibly explained as capacities evolved for other "non-moral" 
adaptive features that they have. Consequently, pinpointing one particular adaptation 
that constitutes the "moral sense" and can adequately explain both the existence of 
morality and how it is commonly perceived would be very difficult. Furthermore, 
since these aspects of morality can be adequately explained without reference to a 
moral sense, I argue that we don't even need to try to find such an adaptation in the 
first place. 
For example, in Chapter 8, I will examine the human capacity for experiencing 
emotions. I will argue that the mechanisms involved in generating these emotions 
(which I also argue were selected for functions other than their contribution to 
morality) later became instrumental in cultivating our desire to think and care for 
71 Darwin himself posited the existence of a moral sense, claiming moreover that "...of all the 
differences between man and the lower animals, the moral sense or conscience is by far the most 
important" (Darwin 1871: 70). 
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others. More importantly to the issue of moral motivation, they can contribute to the 
belief that certain actions, beliefs and attitudes are categorically morally right or 
wrong by leading us to experience them as being right or wrong, a process I will 
explain in more detail in Chapter 8. In underlining the central role of emotions in 
generating moral concepts I concur with Humean arguments and, more recently, with 
the arguments of Neil Levy (2004). 72 
I will also discuss the contribution of reason to moral motivation. Here I will 
conclude that our ability to think and reason about our lives provides the impetus in 
many cases to choose certain courses of action based on a reasoned conclusion that 
they are irreducibly right or wrong. This may occur irrespective - or even in spite - of 
our emotional attachments. More often, however, the capacities appear to work in 
tandem, whether or not we are aware of this. 
As I will have completed my elaboration of the different capacities which contribute 
to both the formulation of moral rules and our subscription to these rules at the end of 
this part, I will provide a response Richard Joyce's suggestion that morality itself is 
an adaptation in a final section. 
In this part of the thesis, then, I will show how it is possible that morality was able to 
develop from rules created and enforced to ensure effective co-operation amongst 
individuals in a group, to the complex, multifarious moral systems that characterise 
human social groups and their individual constituents today. In doing so, I will 
achieve the following central goals: 
• I will complete my explanation for how we come to differentiate the social 
rule from the moral rule. 
• I will provide an explanation for how it is that we might develop the 
conviction that morality has something to do with categorically binding moral 
72 This view is also famously attributed to Edward Westermarck (1912) and Adam Smith (1759). 
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facts, and how these convictions motivate us to embrace certain moral 
principles. 
• I will show why morality is best conceived as the product of a number of 
biological adaptations, rather than the product of one "special" adaptation. 
• I will expose the ultimately instrumental role of morality in both ensuring 
social cohesion as well as satisfying our emotional and rational convictions 
that something ought to or ought not to be the case. 
• I will support my contention that morality has no existence independently of 
US. 
• Finally, and importantly, I will have completed my presentation of a plausible 
link between human biology and morality. 
124 
Ohapter From 	 mill punishment th)Cer; moral 'ought" 
    
We do not call anything wrong unless we mean to imply that a person 
ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it — if not by law, by 
the opinion of his fellow creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches 
of his own conscience. This seems the real turning point of the 
distinction between morality and simple expedience (Mill, 1979 [1863]: 
47). " 
Introduction 
This chapter will clarify what it might mean to say that something has been "morally 
motivated". It will begin with a discussion of adherence to moral rules in response to 
threats of punishment and promises of reward. I will argue that while such adherence 
is indeed motivated, it is not morally motivated. Reintroduced here will be the 
contention (briefly discussed in Chapter) that behaviour only becomes morally 
motivated when this motivation is inspired by the belief that some courses of action 
are intrinsically right or wrong and that actions are performed on this basis. I will 
nonetheless maintain that punishment and reward are importantly involved in the 
generation of moral motivation in that they might lead us to eventually believe in the 
moral significance of certain attitudes, beliefs and actions. 
In this chapter I will also make a distinction between what I will call "public" and 
"personal" morality based on the observation that the moral code of our social group 
may not cohere with what we come to adopt as our own personal moral code. I 
attribute this mainly to the fact that sometimes we reject the beliefs upon which our 
society's moral code might be based once we are able to reflect and choose for 
ourselves. This distinction, while somewhat imperfect, will nonetheless open up the 
way to roughly establishing the point at which morality actually becomes morality 
rather than a series of socially useful rules. The point itself can be partially traced to 
the time when humans evolved a series of traits which allowed them not only to 
73 As quoted in D'arms (2000: 297). 
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experience an array of complex emotions, but to also understand that others 
experience these emotions as well. This will be the topic of Chapter 8. 
7:1 Reward and punishment 
Morality is based heavily on social pressure, punishment, and other 
kinds of direct social manipulation by which the hostilely aroused 
majority use their power over individuals in a band (Boehm, 2000:82). 
In Part One I concluded that biological predispositions to perform (or desist from 
performing) certain acts are not sufficient by themselves to explain why we have 
particular moral rules. In Part Two, I offered an explanation for how it is that humans 
have come to able to create, follow and build upon rules governing large scale social 
interactions using, amongst other things, their ability to communicate, reflect, and 
learn. Some of these rules, I maintained, are moral rules. So while morality is still 
connected to capacities which are biological in origin — since the abilities to 
communicate, reflect and learn are the product of biological adaptations — it is 
connected indirectly. I also suggested that some moral rules are the product of 
employing these capacities in accordance with the requirements and influence of a 
particular environment (notably, the social environment). 
While such considerations are complementary to an emerging explanation of how 
humans have come to reflect about moral issues, make moral judgements and behave 
in accordance with them, the explanation itself is incomplete. Firstly, morality is not 
uniquely concerned with cooperation between human beings. This was one of the 
main points I made in Part Two. Nevertheless, seeing as many of our moral rules do 
revolve around encouraging cooperation and helping behaviour, it is a reasonable 
point of focus in a discussion of morality. Indeed, it is fair to say that this subset of 
moral rules can be found cross-culturally in one form or another. 74 
74 Moreover, if one accepts the plausibility of the account I have thus far provided for the development 
of morality, it seems likely that morality as we identify it today was principally concerned with 
facilitating cooperation at its origin. 
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With the acknowledgement of these points, what now seems obviously lacking is a 
plausible account of what it is that actually motivates us to curb a propensity to, for 
example, behave in a self-centred way and to cooperate with and/ or provide aid to 
others. 
My first point is based on the observation that our adherence to many of the rules that 
govern our interactions within social groupings is motivated by some kind of system 
of reward or punishment, whether formalized or tacit. In our home, school and work 
environments this is especially true. For example, a common process of socializing a 
child is to use both tangible and intangible forms of reward and punishment. 75 The 
question now concerns the extent to which - if any - moral behaviour is motivated by 
reward and punishment. A preliminary point to make is that seeing as certain moral 
principles are formally legislated, adherence to them will be enforced via threat of 
punishment for non-compliance. For example, in some places abortion is illegal, so 
regardless of whether or not one believes that abortion is immoral or not, the threat of 
punishment for breaking this law will be a deterrent for some. The law likewise 
punishes thieves, murderers, rapists and child abusers, amongst other moral 
offenders. While it's true that this does not always deter potential offenders, it seems 
clear that without such laws the incidences of these crimes would be much higher. 
Much that is considered to be morally good behaviour, on the other hand, is socially 
rewarded. Acts of altruism and bravery are often publicly celebrated or 
acknowledged for example. It is not unreasonable then to imagine that some people 
are motivated to subscribe to certain moral tenets by the reward they may receive for 
doing so. 76 This reward might even be something as superficial as the cementing of 
75 Interestingly, other animals also allegedly punish each other for non-compliance. Dugatkin cites 
Hauser's observation that Rhesus monkeys will punish those who do not alert others on finding food 
sources (Hauser [1992], in Dugatkin [2002: 472]). Punishment for sexual misconduct amongst 
chimpanzees appears frequently in the findings of ethologists as well (Okamoto and Matsumara 
[2001], in Bekoff [2004: 501]). 
76 This is an important source of motivation since there are many advantages to being considered a 
worthy member of a given society, and - more particularly - many disadvantages to being considered 
someone of dubious character. (People will less likely, for example, to trust any of their affairs to 
somebody who has proved themselves untrustworthy in the past). Considering the interdependence of 
127 
their reputation as being morally commendable people. While I am not of course 
suggesting that people are often motivated in such a blatantly self-orientated way, I 
contend that reward and punishment can nevertheless be feasibly implicated in an 
account of how we might become motivated to uphold moral principles. The 
question, however, is whether such motivation can be considered the appropriate (i.e. 
moral) motivation; I will address this question in the next section. Before doing so, 
however, I will briefly discuss the role of guilt as a form of self-punishment. 
So far I have concentrated on the way that others might punish us for our moral 
transgressions (or reward us for our compliance), but not on the way we might punish 
or reward our-selves. Forms of self-punishment, such as those that issue from feelings 
of guilt and shame, for example, should be mentioned here since it seems clear that 
that at times we might become motivated to uphold moral rules in response to a past 
feeling of guilt at having transgressed them, or in anticipation of experiencing guilt if 
we continue to. While I will argue in Chapter 8 that these emotions are not 
necessarily connected to moral matters (and, moreover, were not selected for the role 
they might play in moral matters) the experience of them seems to nonetheless 
contribute significantly to both our motivation to adhere to moral rules and, 
importantly, our belief that some moral rules are categorically binding (as I will also 
argue more thoroughly in Chapter 8). 
Up to this point in the thesis, then, I have suggested that morality arose out of more 
general social rules that govern the behaviour of people within groups. For while the 
groups themselves afford survival advantages to humans, they are also the breeding 
ground for strife and conflict due — amongst other things — to the difficulty of sharing 
limited resources; hence the need for rules and regulations. That we are able to 
create these rules is because we evolved traits which enable us to reason, recall and 
communicate. These also gave rise to other characteristics grouped by the word 
people in social groups — particularly in some of the extensive communities of today - the need to "toe 
the line" and establish one's positive reputation becomes particularly important as it is difficult to 
survive alone, as established in Part One . I will discuss this point more in Chapter 9 with respect to the 
question of moral identity. 
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"culture" and include not only rules, but also certain beliefs, rituals and traditions 
which vary from social group to social group. This, in turn, explains why moral rules 
vary throughout the world. These "moral rules" are then sanctioned in part by 
systems of tangible and non tangible punishment or reward. End of story. 
7:2 The "right type" of motivation 
Human morality is defined by intention, not by behaviour (Kagan, 2000: 47). 
But this is, of course, far from the end of the story. While the account given so far 
provides the framework for morality and perhaps explains the existence of social 
rules, we are still far from providing an adequate explanation for the transition from 
these rules to moral rules. 
To begin with, while it is true that moral rules are at times obeyed in order to avoid 
punishment or reap reward, this evidently cannot be posited as the only source of 
motivation. Indeed, moral rules are often obeyed at great personal cost to individuals, 
including incurrence of punishment itself. History is riddled with moral martyrs who 
have maintained and defended moral positions literally to the death, as mentioned in 
Part Two.'" Today we are in the midst of some of the most painful reminders of the 
extent some will go to in order to uphold and enforce their own moral positions; the 
recent spate of suicide bombings in particular testifies to the strength of belief in 
certain moral rules, rather than to a desire to avoid punishment or receive reward. 78 
This leads to the central problem of explaining moral motivation in terms of 
punishment and reward; being thus motivated detracts from the purported moral 
nature of the act itself. Outwardly, an act so inspired may appear to be morally 
sound, but if it is motivated only by the hope of receiving a reward or avoiding 
77 People such as Gandhi, Martin Luther King and even Jesus Christ could, in some respects, be 
considered "moral martyrs" who died because of their beliefs. 
78 One might argue of course that in some of the cases of religious martyrdom the promise of reward 
lays in the social status it receives or the promise of reward in heaven. It is fairly clear, however, that 
they are almost certainly also moved to act by belief in the "moral rightness" of their actions. 
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punishment then it is not usually considered to be morally motivated but is rather 
selfishly motivated: that is we are behaving so as to gain something for oneself, or to 
avoid personal loss. Moral motivation, as I argued in Chapter 2, requires that one's 
intention is to do the right thing because one considers it to be the right thing to do. 
For example, let's imagine a 14 year old boy has helped a physically disabled old 
lady across the road. It is possible that in doing so he was motivated by any of a 
number of different reasons. He may have been told to do it by his mother, with the 
threat of no dessert in the case of non-compliance. The old lady may have paid him 
$20 to help her. He may have been motivated by an overall vision of the moral 
importance of helping others. He may have been brainwashed by visiting aliens 
resulting in him being compelled to always help old ladies across the road. He may 
have been merely using the opportunity to steal her purse while helping her across the 
road. All of these scenarios are possible. We could find out which one is the correct 
scenario by asking the child in question, who would then presumably explain his 
reasoning in any of these ways, or perhaps others. Because the adolescent boy has 
the capacities not only to reflect, reason, and communicate (and assuming he is a 
trustworthy lad) we are thus able to discover the particular intention which motivated 
the action. 79 When we then try to decide whether he has been morally altruistic or 
not we would usually consider his intentions as our gauge. For while the act of 
helping a less able person across the road may seem on the surface to be a morally 
praiseworthy act, if you were to find out that it was done with the intention of robbing 
the less able person, the act would typically be considered to be morally wrong. If 
you found out that the boy was moved to help the 'woman out of a feeling of 
benevolence towards her, you would perhaps marvel at his moral halo. If you were 
told that the child had been brainwashed, you would not call the act morally relevant 
at all, since there is no longer any conscious intention involved. 
A consideration of intention and motivation rather than a consideration of the action 
performed itself, then, is crucial to our decision as to whether it is a moral or immoral 
79 Except, perhaps, if he had been brainwashed, in which case he may not really know why he is so 
compelled. 
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action. The presence of intention itself requires that we have some kind of conscious 
choice as to how to act and choice implies that we have options from which to choose. In 
the case of altruism, an act that is motivated by the desire to provide a benefit to someone 
else, rather than oneself, is usually considered morally altruistic. If, however, there has 
been no conscious choice made between alternative options, we would be reluctant to call 
it moral at all. There is a vast moral difference between performing a function because 
one has no other choice and performing a function because one is motivated to do so. It is 
in this chasm that one finds the difference between moral altruism and evolutionary 
altruism, as I also argued in Chapter 2 in regards to the altruistic actions of the eusocial 
insects. 
As we will see further on, however, this issue is not as clear cut as it seems here either. 
For sometimes our actions are guided by biological predispositions or social conditioning 
of which we are often unaware. In the chapters to come, for example, I will argue that 
moral motivation can be largely explained in terms of emotional responses to situations 
which lead us to act not because the rightness or wrongness is intrinsic to the act, but 
rather because the nature of the emotional reaction leads us to believe that it is right or 
wrong. Consequently, while we might believe that we are acting in accordance with a set 
of intentions (to uphold a moral rule, for example), we are in fact responding to biological 
or social conditioning. For the moment, however, this is not a concern; the difference 
between the ant and the human is that the human can actually have moral and non-moral 
intentions in the first place and appears capable of being motivated by either. In sum, the 
human has what we could reasonably consider to be a conscious choice. In this, I am in 
agreement with Francisco Ayala. In his own words: 
Whether or not there is free will has been much discussed by 
philosophers.. .1 will only advance two considerations based 
on our commonsense experience. One is our profound 
personal conviction that the possibility of choosing between 
alternatives is genuine rather than only apparent. The second 
consideration is that when we confront a given situation that 
requires action ...we are able mentally to explore alternative 
courses of action (Ayala, 1998: 520). 
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Regardless of whether this "freedom" is ultimately illusory, it is the belief and the ability 
to act upon the belief which is pertinent here. The illusion itself is relevant in terms of 
deciding upon the metaethical status of morality which I will discuss in Chapter 10. 
7:3 The moral right and wrong 
What is the connection between the natural fact that an action is a piece 
of deliberate cruelty - say causing pain just for fun — and the moral fact 
that it is wrong? (Mackie, 1977: 41). 
I have suggested that while the threat of punishment or the promise of reward might 
be a source of motivation for behaving in accordance with moral rules, behaviour so 
inspired is not considered to be morally motivated since it has not been inspired by 
moral reasons. Rather, one is acting for consciously selfish reasons; the desire to 
avoid unpleasant consequences, or the desire to experience some kind of reward. 
This is the type of motivation relevant rather to adherence to more general rules. 
Richard Joyce concurs; 
I would be astounded to hear of a culture whose members' 
practices revealed that they generally conceive of 
transgressions as wrong because they are punished rather than 
punishable because they are wrong (Joyce, 2006: 59). 
The appropriate intention central to considering something as being morally 
motivated is rather the intention to do something because it is morally good or right. 
In this section I will reiterate what it means to say that something is morally "good" 
or "right". In the introduction to this thesis I suggested that when we describe an 
action as being morally right or wrong, we generally mean that it is intrinsically right 
or wrong and that as such it is categorically binding. It is this sense that there are 
some principles which are categorically binding that provides the power or authority 
of morality, a feature of morality that Richard Joyce calls "clout" or "oomph" (Joyce, 
2006: 62, 170). But what does it mean to say that something is "intrinsically" right 
or wrong? As this concept is central to the arguments provided in this section, I will 
recall my earlier explanations here. 
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When we say that something is intrinsically right (or wrong) we generally wish to 
claim (as Kant expressed with his categorical imperative) that no further reason for its 
performance (or resistance) be sought; it just is the right or wrong thing to do. For 
example, for most of the things I do I can offer an explanation in terms of the reasons 
why I chose to do these things: I chopped my hair off because it was getting in my 
eyes and interfering with my sight; I went to the shop because I needed some milk for 
my cereal. I chose to do these things because they were instrumental in bringing 
about something else that I wanted; in other words, they were means to ends. 
In the case of moral principles, however, the reasons given for why we should uphold 
them usually ultimately end with the explanation that certain moral principles simply 
are right. For example, one might explain that the reason that one should not steal 
from another is because it is unfair to the victim of the theft. The idea of something 
being fair or just, however, is in turn explicable in terms of its being morally "right"; 
beyond that, no further explanation is deemed necessary. It just is-right and as such it 
is binding for everybody. I have further suggested that it is commonly held that the 
truth of these judgements of right and wrong derives from a set of mind-independent 
moral facts. 
7:4 Why we believe that we morally "ought to": the beginnings of an 
explanation 
A satisfactory moral philosophy will not leave concern with morality as a 
simple special preference, like a fetish or a special taste, which some 
people just happen to have. It must make it understandable why moral 
reasons are ones that people can take seriously, and why they strike 
those who are moved by them as reasons of special stringency and 
inescapability (Scanlon, 2003: 127). 
In Part One I suggested that part of the explanation for how certain instrumental 
social rules transformed into categorical moral rules could be given with reference to 
the power and authority that moral rules wield. I proposed that morality has its 
origins in attempts to imbue certain rules with authority both deliberately but - 
133 
perhaps more often - as an expression of the belief that certain rules simply are of 
utmost importance. What I did not explain, however, is how it is that we come to 
believe that some attitudes, characteristics and behaviour are of utmost importance in 
the first place. 
Firstly (and leastly), it is plausible to suggest that part of a belief in moral concepts 
such as categorically "right" and "wrong" can be attributed to having been taught 
from childhood that certain moral tenets are categorically binding; as such, we 
inherit these beliefs along with the other aspects of the culture into which we are 
born. This was one of the main points to arise from Part Two. These beliefs are 
relatively easy to instil when we are young for two reasons. Firstly, we have little 
reason not to believe that those who have taught us are right since they are generally 
people whose opinion we trust and respect - our parents or our teachers, for example. 
Secondly, and more pertinently, these people are those that guide and teach us when 
we are not in a position to reason and judge properly for ourselves. Consequently, we 
often grow up believing what we have been told to be true, sometimes 
unquestioningly. Some of the beliefs that we form as children, in turn, are often very 
hard to shake off as we get older since we have accepted them for so long. 
According to this argument, then, a belief in the categorical nature of moral 
judgements can be partially attributed to the fact that we might be told that they are 
categorically binding by those that help form some our primary beliefs as children — 
and not just "told", moreover: the process often involves a fairly consistent 
"drumming in" of certain information. According to Martin Hoffman, for example, 
children under the age of ten experience some form of instruction as to how to behave 
"correctly" every six to nine minutes (Hoffman, 2000). Later, what we are taught 
might be bolstered by the observation that many of the moral rules to which people 
subscribe (and which we have been taught) are maintained because they do actually 
play a useful role in society. For as discussed in Part One, much that is considered 
morally correct (almost universally, moreover) are actions which specifically target 
the well being of others in one way or another, and, of course, ourselves as part of the 
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cooperative, cohesive societies morality helps to create. We don't, for example, want 
to be physically harmed, stolen from or cheated. Witnessing the evidence that rules 
against these practices are so important might help to cement our pre-formed belief 
that such acts are in fact irreducibly wrong. Furthermore, the moral rules which guide 
our behaviour often have long histories because the deeper issues which affect human 
cooperation and general well-being do not vary substantially and hence the moral 
rules which regulate them are also not likely to vary. The longer the rule has 
remained in place, the more solid it seems as a contender for being something that 
might have absolute rather than relative value. 
In sum, then, it is reasonable to suggest that people are often motivated to uphold 
certain moral rules simply because they have come to believe - through having been 
told, or having witnessed themselves the "goodness" or "badness" of the rules - that 
they are categorically binding; that is, that there are thoughts, attitudes, characteristics 
and behaviours which just are good or bad and as such ought to be encouraged or 
avoided respectively. Once moral rules are accepted as categorically binding, people 
perhaps do not require much more argument to become motivated to behave in 
accordance with them. Briefly, Joyce's moral clout arises simply from the fact that 
the morals have been prescribed full stop. 
While this explanation most certainly accounts for a portion of our belief in the moral 
right and wrong, it nonetheless seems too facile as an explanation for the entirety of 
moral motivation. Firstly, there are too many exceptions to this as a general rule. 
Many people for instance make moral judgments which have little to do with what 
the local morality dictates. For example, one might live in a society in which the 
majority of people believe that it is morally acceptable to eat meat - indeed where one 
has grown up being actively encouraged to eat meat - and yet still judge that it is 
wrong to do so. This suggests that we do not always embrace certain moral rules 
because we have simply come to accept the local moral code, but rather because we 
have independently come to the conclusion that they are the right moral rules to 
embrace. 
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This leads to a new question: how is it that we come to develop tour own personal 
moral rules, particularly those which are at odds with the moral norms of our social 
group (that is, presuming that we do). For it is the development of these personal 
moral rules which suggests that there is much more to morality than a series of 
socially useful rules that have gained moral status either through religious or social 
imposition. It appears rather that they relate to something about us which makes us 
amenable to differentiating a social from a moral rule in the first place. The 
"something", I shall argue in the chapter to come, can be partially sourced in both our 
capacity for experiencing emotions and our capacity to rationalise these emotional 
experiences. 
7:5 "Public" and "personal" morality 
The beliefs and customs we were brought up with may exercise great 
influence on us, but once we start to reflect upon them we can decide 
whether to act in accordance with them, or to go against them. (Singer, 
1993:6) 
Before exploring moral motivation any further, it may help at this point to make a 
division between two different .types of moral code that seem relevant to our lives: 
public morality and personal morality. While these are imperfect, and — as will be 
seen - occasionally misleading appellations, they will nonetheless serve here to make 
a useful, explanatory distinction. 
According to this distinction I wish to make, public morality refers to the moral codes 
of our culture - or social group - and represents what these particular collectives 
(and/or their governing bodies) consider in the majority to be morally right or wrong 
behaviour. I have argued so far that these rules will be largely concerned with 
promoting and enforcing "prosocial behaviour" in the group, in ways outlined in Part 
One. They might also represent the collective religious or existential beliefs a culture 
might have. Some of these rules, I have suggested, may have emerged from social 
rules whose importance was underlined by endowing them — either deliberately, or 
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not — with the status of being categorical, rather than hypothetical imperatives (again, 
borrowing this useful terminology from Kant). 
Alongside these moral codes, however, there are more personal moral codes. These 
are the moral tenets we might adopt individually based on personal decisions about 
whether certain acts, principles and/or attitudes are morally fight or wrong. Some of 
these — indeed perhaps most of them, depending on political circumstances - will 
most likely accord with "public morality". Others may not, although we may uphold 
the tenets prescribed by public morality to avoid punishment or to reap the reward of 
being seen to uphold them: this, however, would imply that they are simply social 
rules to us. In Australia, for example, the consumption of illicit drugs is publicly 
considered a moral taboo, and yet statistics show that there is a large percentage of 
individuals who use illicit drugs privately. The Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare in Australia, for example, released statistics in 2007 based on a survey 
conducted in 2004 in which it was revealed that "...38% of Australians aged 14 years 
and over had used an illicit drug in their lifetime and 15% in the last 12 months." 
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare in Australia, 2007: 92). This suggests that 
for many people the moral rule is merely a social rule that people uphold publicly in 
order to avoid punishment." 
The common element of both moral systems, then, is the notion of certain actions, 
beliefs or attitudes being considered (by somebody) to be irreducibly right or wrong 
and hence things that we morally ought or ought not to do. The difference is that in 
personal moral codes the door is often left more widely open to considerations which 
are not always pro-socially orientated and, also, that they may include moral 
principles adopted not solely on the basis of their having been imposed. In an 
important sense, then, the acceptance of public morality is dependent on personal 
morality. 
A word of caution here regarding this distinction, however; the term "personal 
morality" is being used here as a means of differentiating the prevailing morality of a 
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particular culture from the morality to which one might subscribe individually. For 
as mentioned, the two may and do often differ. It is not, however, being used to 
suggest that we might perceive this personal morality as binding upon ourselves only. 
Regardless of whether we are the only people to subscribe to a particular moral 
belief, when we do so it is usually with the conviction that it is not only right or 
wrong for us, but that it is also right or wrong for everybody. This is the prescriptive 
nature of morality that was identified in the introduction to this thesis as being one of 
the key elements of morality. It is also, as shall be seen, one of the more complex 
features of morality to explain, as Bertrand Russell contended: 
The wish [that everybody desire what I consider good in 
itself], as an occurrence, is personal but what it desires is 
universal. It is, I think, this curious interlocking of the 
particular and the universal which has caused so much 
confusion in ethics (Russell (1999 [1935[): 141). 
We have two different aspects of morality, then, which require further attention. To 
begin with there is the question of explaining our belief in moral concepts, such as the 
moral right and wrong. Secondly, we need to complete the explanation of how it is 
that rules that serve mainly to ensure group cohesion developed into the multifaceted, 
complex system that morality is today — a system, in particular, which often seems to 
escape E.O.Wilson's famous biological leash. For even if it is true that a large 
amount of what people count as being morally relevant does indeed involve assuring 
the welfare of themselves and other humans (thereby enhancing our survival 
prospects), this is not exclusively the case. In Part Two I offered part of an 
explanation for this (in terms of moral principles expressing the collective 
metaphysical beliefs of a culture); however the shift was not made from cultural 
beliefs to individual beliefs. In order to explore these two aspects of morality, 
vegetarianism as a moral stance will now be briefly considered. 
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7:6 Vegetarianism: the dogma which escaped the leash? 
Vegetarianism is often the expression of a moral stance against the killing or harming 
of other animals for food, accessories or clothing. One of vegetarianism's most well-
known advocates is Peter Singer whose own vegetarianism is an extension of his 
Utilitarianism, a position which maintains that the goal of moral behaviour should be 
to maximise utility or pleasure and to minimise suffering. Singer's extension of 
moral considerations to other animals derives from recognition of sentience in other 
animals — that is, the capacity of an organism to feel pleasure or pain. According to 
Singer, any animal that is sentient has an interest to not suffer. Furthermore, killing 
an animal, even if done in a painless way, is against an animal's interest to live and 
experience the pleasures that life has to offer; it is thus immoral, in the same way that 
we consider the needless killing or harming of humans to be inunora1. 8° 
What is particularly interesting when considering vegetarianism in the light of a 
biologically based account of morality is that while it makes evolutionary sense to 
want to avoid pain and suffering for oneself, one's family or even members of one's 
social group (if one is to take a group selective view) protecting members of an 
entirely different species does not seem to make evolutionary sense at all. As such it 
does not conform to an explanation of morality which focuses uniquely on its 
contribution to one's survival, since the moral concern is not even for human beings 
in the first place. In fact, what is particularly interesting about this moral position is 
that in depriving themselves of animal products, vegetarians sometimes put their own 
health at risk. This is because assuring the necessary intake of protein and essential 
vitamins and minerals can become more difficult when meat and other animal 
products - a rich source of these - are eliminated from the diet. 
Secondly, not only does it make little sense in terms of personal fitness enhancement, 
it is also difficult to explain vegetarianism in terms of its social importance or its 
contribution to social cohesion. In fact it often leads to social stigmatization rather 
80 See Tom Regan and Peter Singer's (1989) Animal Rights and human obligations. 
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than social facilitation. In the Western world, vegetarians, if anything, are more often 
met with disapproval rather than approval for their non-conformist dietary choices. 
Why, then, might some humans seek to avoid causing pain to not only humans but to 
other animals, particularly when the cost to themselves is not insignificant? Because, 
amongst other things, they think that it is the morally correct thing to do. Beyond 
this, no further explanation is deemed necessary. 81 
One of the things that vegetarianism (such as it has been described here) illustrates is 
that explaining each and every individual moral rule in terms of its direct contribution 
to the survival or fitness of oneself, one's kin or even one's social group is simply not 
possible. What it suggest, however, is that there are things that we deeply care about 
as individuals. In Part Two some of the capacities that contribute to the formation of 
cultures and their traditions, beliefs, and moral rules were described. What was not 
explored were the possible origins of human sentiments and the feelings of care and 
concern for others (including members of other species) to which they give rise. In 
the chapter to come, I will argue in concurrence with David Hume (and with others 
since) that it is the capacity for human emotion which accounts for this important 
aspect of morality (Hume, 1739-40). I will conclude that emotions play a central - 
though not necessary - role not only in motivating us to uphold moral principles, but 
also in generating the moral rules themselves. I will also suggest that the human 
affective system is largely responsible for producing the belief that these moral rules 
are categorically binding. 
Summary 
In this chapter the idea of moral motivation has been explored. To begin with, 
punishment and reward systems were examined to see if they have a role to play as 
moral motivators. I concluded that while such systems may contribute to the belief 
people might later have that certain types of behaviour (for example) is morally right 
81 Other examples of moral rules that have no obvious social or biological significance might include 
moral stances against the destruction of the environment on the grounds of its aesthetic beauty. Moral 
stances for or against homosexuality are also not obviously linked to matters of social cohesion 
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and wrong (via conditioning they may have received as children, for example), 
behaviour that is performed merely to escape punishment or receive reward is not 
considered on its own to be morally motivated. This is because such behaviour is 
consciously devoid of the intention to do something morally right or to be morally 
good, but is rather performed with the specific intention of achieving some kind of 
good (or avoiding some kind of bad) for oneself. 
In the next sections, the concept of the "moral ought" was broached. Here I 
contended that it involves the notion of something being prescribed (or proscribed) on 
account of it being irreducibly right (or wrong) or good (or bad). Judgements that 
some actions (states, attitudes etc.) are morally right or wrong, moreover, were 
defined as expressing our belief that these judgements do not need any further 
justification. This, I maintained, is what differentiates moral rules from other rules 
which are more overtly concerned with achieving instrumental ends. 
This discussion then gave way to a consideration of what it is that gives rise to our 
belief that some things are irreducibly (or, to use the other term I have employed, 
"categorically") right and wrong, if there are no such things as moral facts. Here I 
argued that people sometimes come to believe that some things are categorically right 
or wrong because they are taught this as children by people who they trust and who 
also believe that they are categorically right or wrong. While I argued that this source 
can perhaps account for a portion of what we accept as morally right or wrong, I 
concluded that it is not adequate by itself to explain the entirety of our moral beliefs. 
The idea that there might be such a thing as "public" and "private" morality was then 
explored. This was to further emphasise the deviation morality seems to have taken 
from the goal of ensuring cooperation amongst people. Vegetarianism was examined 
with an end to providing an example of the type of gap that can open up between the 
two systems. I concluded that there had to be something else at the heart of moral 
motivation which drives people to perform actions that sometimes are not only in 
opposition to the beliefs of their peers, but are also potentially risky to themselves. I 
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suggested the answer might be found in our emotional capacity. I will now explore 
this avenue. 
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'Tis a common observation, that the mind has a great propensity to 
spread itself on external objects (Hume, 1740/1978). 
Introduction 
In Part Two, some of the capacities which enable humans to learn, teach and even 
formulate moral rules were discussed. These included capacities such as the ability to 
reason, communicate and innovate. In this chapter, the capacities which I maintain 
are central to — if not at the heart of - belief that these rules are morally relevant will 
be explored. These are the emotions. 
In the first part of this chapter I will present some of these emotions. Chief amongst 
these emotions (in terms of the role it plays in generating moral concepts) is empathy, 
and accordingly empathy will be discussed in the greatest detail. In sum, what I aim 
to establish is that belief in - and also the motivational force of - the moral right and 
wrong arises partly from the positive or negative emotional experiences that our 
encounters with others engender. For example, our capacity for empathy leads us to 
become concerned about the welfare of others. Consequently, our belief that we are 
categorically bound to avoid causing unnecessary harm to innocent people, for 
example, may be bolstered by our experience of distress at the very thought of such 
harm being caused. Or, alternatively, our empathetic distress might lead us to 
actually form the rule that it is morally wrong to cause unnecessary harm to innocent 
people. 
Not all moral beliefs, of course, are so empathetically orientated and this too is 
reflected in moral rules. I will suggest, for example, that the feeling that something is 
categorically right or wrong may stem from violent emotional reactions such as 
disgust, and our attempts to rationalise these reactions (Haidt, 2001). Some 
vegetarians, for example, may have come to morally object to eating meat because 
they were initially disgusted by the idea of eating meat, rather than because they were 
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concerned for the welfare of the animal (Fessler et al. 2003). Likewise certain moral 
objections to homosexuality between consenting adults might perhaps be explained as 
an expression of disgust that arises from the thought of the act itself. 
The development of this argument will be followed by a brief discussion of the 
neurological basis of the ability to feel emotions, with the aim of confirming that it 
the product of evolved adaptations. This will be fleshed out with discussion of why 
certain emotions might have evolved and some hypotheses about the trajectory from 
their selection to their implication in morality. While this may seem to be a 
somewhat major digression, its purpose is in fact central not only to the establishment 
of a causal connection between morality and human biology, but also to a 
determination of where this might then place morality in terms of a metaethical 
framework. For if I can plausibly illustrate that the belief in moral "right" and 
"wrong" is bi-product of a series of evolutionary adaptations (which were neither 
selected because they enable us to perceive moral facts, or, indeed, for nothing 
directly to do with moral concepts at all) rather than the "intuition" or 
"understanding" of objective moral facts, then, I argue, we no longer need to posit the 
existence of these facts in the first place (In this I agree with similar arguments put 
forth by Mackie (1977), Ruse (1986,1995) and Joyce.(2006).) The appearance of 
morality, according to this suggestion, seems (evolutionarily speaking) accidental — 
although "usefully" accidental in that it has been commandeered in part for the 
purpose of "keeping people nice". 
If my arguments succeed, and it can be plausibly concluded that (A) the human 
affective system is centrally implicated in our belief that moral rules are categorically 
binding and (B) these emotions are the product of mechanisms that were not selected 
for their role in generating moral concepts, beliefs or perceiving moral truths then it 
becomes clear that (C) morality cannot, in any sense, be considered an adaptation 
itself, contrary to what Richard Joyce has suggested. Rather, it is a bi-product of a 
number of other adaptations. 
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Finally, I should also emphasise that although I will focus on emotions here, I am not 
discounting the role that human rationality has to play in generating moral rules that 
we consider to be categorically binding. In the next chapter, I will consider and 
accept the argument that motivation to uphold certain moral rules can plausibly arise 
from rationally based decisions about what is morally right or wrong, drawing, for 
example, on arguments made by Peter Singer (1981). Demonstrating that our ability 
to reason is also a source of belief in the "moral ought" will further support my 
argument that morality is a bi-product of biological adaptation, rather than an 
adaptation itself. 
Before commencing my arguments it should be noted - as I have in each section 
where biological adaptations are discussed - that much of the argument that follows is 
based on premises which are as yet hypothetical. Much of the discussion of the 
human affective system, for example, is not 100% conclusive because the science 
itself is still very much in its infancy. That is not to say that the hypotheses are weak, 
however; there is good evidence for them and this section devotes time to presenting 
this evidence in order to bolster the main arguments of this part of the thesis. The 
result is an account of the origin and nature of morality which accords very well with 
what is taken here to be fact of our being evolved organisms. 
8:1 Empathy 
Social animals achieve the goals of survival and reproduction in the 
context of relationships. Thus forming and maintaining strong social 
bonds throughout the life-span is critical to attaining these fundamental 
goals. The primary function of empathy is to help individuals form and 
maintain lasting social bonds (Anderson & Kellner, 2002: 21). 
...abstract moral principles, learned in "cool" didactic contexts 
(lectures, sermons), lack motive force. Empathy's contribution to moral 
principles is to transform them into prosocial hot cognitions — cognitive 
representations charged with empathic affect, thus giving them motive 
force (Hoffman, 2000: 239). 
Empathy is a word which comes from the German word "einfiihlung" (Titchener, 
1909; Wisp& 1991:78) meaning "feeling into" (Wisp& 1986). Nancy Eisenberg 
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defines empathy as "...an affective response that stems from the apprehension or 
comprehension of another's emotional state or condition, and which is similar to what 
the other person is feeling or would be expected to feel"(Eisenberg, 2002: 34). 
Empathy as such goes beyond just being able to identify others' feelings; it refers also 
to the ability to share these feelings with them. Indeed, what is of particular 
relevance to the forthcoming discussion is the ability to not only feel the emotion that 
one is empathising with, but to feel it at the same time that we are experiencing 
empathy for somebody as a form of "emotional contagion". 82 
Tangney, Stuewig and Mashek identify the following reasons as to why empathy is 
relevant to the "moral affective system" (Tangney, Stuewig and Mashek, 2007: 
363). 83 Firstly, an empathetic response to somebody else's pain or difficulty often 
sparks off a feeling of concern for the person in distress. This experience, in turn, 
will most likely lead to the empathetic agent attempting to help alleviate the problems 
the other may be experiencing, thereby acting in what most would consider an 
altruistic manner, and as such, a morally praiseworthy manner (Batson 1991, 
Feshbach 1987). Jeanette Kennett supplements the connection in suggesting that the 
empathetic experience might lead to a form of suffering - or "emotional contagion" — 
that might also provide the impetus to act in a way that stops the suffering (Kennett, 
2002: 345). The moral vegetarian, for example, might not only infer how other 
animals are feeling in their suffering, he or she might also experience suffering at the 
thought of their suffering. This will most likely increase motivation to stop the 
suffering, and perhaps (as I will argue) to the subsequent claim that that such 
suffering is morally wrong. In sum, these empathetic experiences may serve to 
prevent a person from behaving aggressively or in harmful way towards others on the 
basis of awareness of the negative results such behaviour will have for the other 
person (Feshbach & Feshbach, 1969; Miller and Eisenberg, 1988). More 
importantly, it may lead people to truly believe that such activities are fundamentally 
82  Franz de Waal and Stephanie Preston claim that emotional contagion is "...the first stage of 
empathic responding in humans" (2002: 7) and discuss some interesting evidence of its manifestation 
in the behaviour of other animals as well. 
83 They draw these reasons from the work of Eisenberg et al. (2004, 2006). 
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wrong, a belief, I have suggested, is expressed using various moral concepts such 
"right" and "wrong", "good" and "bad". I will argue this point more fully in the 
sections to come. 
Empathy, then, appears to contribute importantly to the motivational force that moral 
principles such as "be kind to others" have for many people. Before such claims are 
investigated more fully, however, a better understanding of empathy would be 
helpful, as it is somewhat more complex than it might initially seem. According to 
ND Feshbach, for example, the ability to empathise requires that an agent have 
possession of the following three abilities (Feshbach ND, 1975 in Tangney et al. 
2007: 362): 
1. The ability to see things from the point of view of another. 
2. The ability to identify the particular emotional experience of another. 
3. The ability to actually experience emotions oneself. 
It would be useful to investigate these aspects a little more in a bid to gain a better 
understanding not only of the role empathy has to play in generating belief that moral 
principles are categorically binding but also via what means it is able to accomplish 
this role. This will strengthen my claim that morality is not the product of a single 
adaptation. 
To begin with, the ability to conceive of how another might be feeling or what they 
might be feeling (points 1 and 2 above) is to have what is referred to as a "theory of 
mind". In the case of suffering, for example, to have a "theory of mind" is to be able 
to appreciate that not only do we suffer ourselves but that others suffer as well. This 
capacity — consequently - is central to guiding our behaviour towards each other in a 
morally relevant way. For instance, one needs to have an idea of how an action is 
likely to affect another person in order to decide, in the first place, how we morally 
ought to treat them. It is also central to considerations of moral agency. For if 
someone is not considered capable of understanding that a particular action will have 
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certain consequences for another, then it becomes more difficult to hold them morally 
responsible for these consequences. Indeed, much time is spent in courts trying to 
establish whether certain criminal offenders are even eligible for prosecution; mental 
illness, substance abuse and age are often considered mitigating factors in judging 
offenders on the basis that they may impair people's ability to adequately predict or 
understand the consequences of their actions. 84 
The third element identified as constitutive of empathy above was the ability to 
experience emotions. This appears to be a rather odd inclusion, since the ability to 
feel emotions seems to be such an integral part of what it is to be human that it 
doesn't even really warrant mention. As shall be seen, however, conditions such as 
psychopathy are partially explained with reference to damaged parts of the brain 
identified as being responsible for the generation of certain emotions. The people 
affected are consequently unable to experience or express certain emotions. The 
effects this seems to have on their moral agency are considerable, as will be discussed 
more fully in the following section. 
So far, I have focused principally on empathy, since it is what I consider to be one of 
the core emotions relevant to the generation of moral principles: there are, however, 
many others. They include - on the more negative side - shame, contempt, 
embarrassment and guilt; and on the positive side, compassion, sympathy, pride and 
gratitude (and, of course, empathy). Jonathon Haidt further divides these emotions 
into four different subgroups. While this list is not exhaustive, it gives a sense of the 
range of emotions covered by the term "moral emotions" (Haidt, 2003b). 85 
84 This will be discussed again in Chapter 9. 
85 The term "moral emotion" is a phrase commonly used to refer to emotions which are implicated in 
moral matters. I will avoid this expression since it seems to beg the question. Jonathon Haidt, who 
has written extensively about emotions, for example, defines moral emotions those which . 
specifically give rise to, or result from, a consideration of "... the interests or welfare either of society 
as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent"( Haidt, 2003a: 275). As this does not 
specifically capture all of the aspects of morality I am trying to link to these emotions, and, 
importantly, because these emotions are not always linked to morality, I will henceforth avoid using 
the term or will rather use the term "morally relevant emotions". 
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1. Emotions concerning others: e.g., contempt, rage, displeasure. 
2. Self-conscious emotions: e.g., shame, embarrassment, guilt. 
3. Emotions related to the suffering of others: e.g., empathy, sympathy. 
4. Emotions related to praising others: e.g., gratitude, fear, elevation. 
This is quite an extensive list, although it is not, as I suggested above, exhaustive. 
Other emotions also seem morally relevant, such as emotions associated with the 
pleasure or joy of others. I will not spend time discussing all of these emotions, as 
for the moment it is enough to mention that they are often implicated in morally 
relevant matters for me to give a sense of the range of different emotions associated 
with morality. Indeed, I have already mentioned the role guilt and shame might play 
in giving rise to self-punishment for perceived moral transgression (Chapter 7). I will 
pass, then, to a more thorough examination of deeper connections between emotional 
response and morality. 
8:2 The motivational Dower of emotions 
Shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride are members of a family of 
"self-conscious emotions" that are evoked by self-reflection and self-
evaluation. This self-evaluation may be implicit or explicit, consciously 
experienced or transpiring beneath the radar or our awareness. But 
importantly, the self is the object of these self-conscious emotions. As the 
self reflects upon the self, moral self-conscious emotions provide 
immediate punishment (or reinforcement) of behaviour. In effect, 
shame, guilt, embarrassment and pride function as an emotional moral 
barometer, providing immediate and salient feedback on our social and 
moral acceptability (Tangney etal., 2007: 347). 
If being nice feels good then that is good reason for being nice. It is also 
a good reason for a pattern of behaviour to evolve and remain in an 
animal's arsenal (Becoff, 2004: 499). 
It is now time to put some of the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle together to get an overall 
picture of the connection between the ability to experience emotions and the 
motivational force of morality. At the start of this chapter I suggested some of the 
ways the experience of empathy might contribute to the belief that morality is 
something more than just a conventional rule. These suggestions will now be more 
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fully explored in this section. I will, in particular, augment my argument that a 
significant part of moral motivation derives from emotional responses that our 
experiences with others evoke. This argument will also lead to the proposal that the 
concepts of moral rightness and wrongness themselves may stem directly from the 
experience - whether it be positive or negative - of these emotions. 
Throughout this thesis, a consistent issue hanging over some of the discussions I have 
provided has been the need to explain the difference between what could be called a 
"conventional" or "social" rule and a specifically moral rule; morals are, after all, a 
type of rule, but a rule "with a difference". I have maintained that a partial 
explanation of this difference could be made in terms of the justification given for 
upholding one or the other. Moral rules, for example, are often justified ultimately by 
their being somehow linked to an intrinsic "right" or "wrong", terms which are 
commonly derived from the belief that there are objective moral facts. 
In this section, I will suggest that our belief that there is such thing as an intrinsic 
right or wrong derives from the experience of certain emotions. By way of 
illustration, when I see somebody in trouble, I might know that the morally correct 
thing to do would be to help them. Witnessing their struggle may also, however, 
inspire feelings of empathy in me, thereby causing me a certain amount of 
psychological pain. Not only might this motivate me to act (in part, to 
subconsciously relieve my own discomfort), it may also contribute to my coming to 
understand that behaving altruistically is the intrinsically right thing to do (in a way 
which I will describe shortly). Alternatively, one may be led to help the person in 
trouble based on the knowledge that suffering is something undesirable and that it is 
hence something that others most likely want to avoid as wel1. 86 
86 Jerome Kagan (1984), in particular, is one of the more well-known proponents of this argument. For 
Kagan, it is the emotional reaction to what would otherwise be an ordinary social rule, which turns it 
into a moral rule. Another well known basis of support for this idea comes from Jesse Prinz (2006) 
and Jonathan Haidt, whose views will be discussed in explicitly in Chapter 9. 
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This last point introduces another way in which our emotions contribute to our moral 
motivation. In Chapter Two I discussed kin altruism, and made reference to 
biological capacities that facilitate the forming of attachments to our kin, suggesting 
that empathy and sympathy might be amongst them. I argued for the plausibility of 
Michael Ruse's suggestion that such mechanisms while most likely selected for their 
role in facilitating kin bonding, have since enabled bonding between certain non-kin 
as well. While it is true that a mechanism which would lead us to form deep 
attachments to anyone would be maladaptive, it is nonetheless plausible to suggest 
that something more specific (like the emotions of sympathy and empathy), when 
combined with the ability to actually consider the circumstances in which the 
suffering is taking place, would permit a certain amount of discrimination. So while 
they kin bonding mechanisms may lead us to care about non-kin, we may not — and 
indeed do not — form attachment to just anyone. 
This point contributes, then, to the picture I am trying to sketch. Returning to the 
above example we might conclude that our act of helping may also be motivated by 
our ability to actually care about the welfare of others in a more general way, an 
ability which is also the product of experiencing emotions and being able to form 
relationships based upon them. 
These suggestions give rise to a further question: is it the moral rule that comes first 
or the emotion? Using guilt as an example, does the fact that one might feel guilt 
consequent to seeing the pain one has caused another in treating them unfairly lead to 
the decision it is wrong, or rather does one feel guilty because one has transgressed a 
socially imposed norm of treating people fairly?" The answer to this question will 
most likely depend on the situation at hand. It may, for example, lie partially in the 
division made earlier between personal and public morality. For instance, much of 
the "public morality" we "inherit" as children is often reinforced by a process 
whereby others actually induce certain emotions in us. For example, in Tasmania 
women are generally taught that it is not morally acceptable to expose one's breasts 
87 In other words, a variation of Plato's Euryphro's famous dilemma. 
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in public, except perhaps when breast-feeding a baby. This moral rule is generally 
reinforced by various means throughout adolescence in particular. To instil the idea, 
we might explain to a child that walking around naked is "not the done thing" This, 
in turn, might be reinforced by invoking shame and embarrassment in the child 
should they behave immodestly, even accidentally; for instance, the child might be 
ridiculed, or scolded, arousing more often or not the required emotional response in 
her. This emotional experience may be acutely psychologically uncomfortable for 
her, and as such may serve to instil the belief -by association - that her behaviour is 
wrong. 88 
Sometimes, however, public moral rules may be at odds with one's personal moral 
rules - such as in the case of vegetarianism (in a country where it is not widely 
practiced) that I discussed earlier. In this case, it is plausible to argue that it is 
sometimes the emotion which precedes the making of the moral rule. For even if 
killing animals for food is not morally proscribed by the local morality, feelings of 
empathy for the suffering of others may for some extend to other animals, both 
providing an affective motivation to alleviate it, and, importantly, instilling a more 
general belief that it is wrong to make them suffer unnecessarily. The belief that it is 
wrong may lead to the creation of rules as a means of both expressing this belief, but 
also as a means of encouraging others to adopt the belief as well. For some this will 
entail a vegetarian stance. Alternatively, as mentioned earlier, it may be the case that - 
the thought of eating meat disgusts certain people; an emotional reaction again may 
contribute to our belief that it is wrong. 89 It may, of course, have nothing to do with 
these emotions at all. The point stands, however, that it is very likely that intense 
88 The gradual imposition of clothing by missionaries onto native populations world-wide is a terrific 
example of the moral coming before the emotion. Before the missionaries came, it is reasonable to 
assume that certain native populations felt no shame in their nakedness. Once it was no longer 
acceptable, some of these native populations most likely adopted this moral rule into their own 
cultures, considering nakedness to be shameful. This was certainly how I experienced modesty norms 
during years I spent living in Central America and the Caribbean. In the Caribbean (at least in 
Martinique, where I lived) in particular, it is the colonial tourists (somewhat ironically) who these days 
arrive and insult the locals with what they perceive to be the visitors' lack of modesty on the beaches 
and in the streets. 
89 For an insightful introduction to question of disgust and its links to morality, see Dan Jones' 2007 
paper "The depths of disgust." (Nature, 447, 768-771.) 
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emotional experiences may lead people to conclude that certain actions (thoughts, 
beliefs etc.) are morally right or wrong, a belief that they express via moral rules. 
Hume famously referred to this process as one in which we undertake a "...gilding 
and staining [of] natural objects with the colours borrowed from internal sentiment." 
(Hume 1752, Appendix I). This is the position of Jonathon Haidt, for example — a 
position that will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter 9•90 
But maybe it is possible to go even further than this; maybe it is at times the very 
pleasantness or unpleasantness intrinsic to the experience of these emotions that 
constitutes the sense that something is morally right or wrong. Earlier on in this 
chapter the idea of the moral "ought" was explored. Here I argued that moral rules 
appear to be much more than mere social rules; they are endowed with something 
which Richard Joyce refers to as "moral clout". What I am suggesting here 
(somewhat tentatively) is that this "clout" might on occasion emanate from a series of 
intense intrinsically pleasurable or unpleasant experiences which we in turn express 
as being intrinsically "right" or "wrong" because they feel intrinsically right or 
wrong. Pleasurable experiences, for example, are experiences that we often seek out 
as ends in themselves; we do not need to go beyond the fact of experiencing the 
pleasure in order to explain why we might have sought them out. If the performance 
of certain acts likewise produces a certain type of pleasure, either directly, or via the 
experience of positive moral emotions, then one can understand why one might 
conclude that they are likewise intrinsically good: in other words, we transpose the 
experience of intrinsic pleasure into a judgment of intrinsic good. The contrary also 
holds. For example, it is plausible an individual's belief that it is morally wrong to 
hurt small children for fun seems might stem in part from the actual experience of 
psychological pain we feel when evoking the thought itself. This experience will 
serve importantly to strengthen his or her motivation to uphold a rule which prohibits 
hurting small children for fun. Moreover, it is highly probable that this is how the 
moral rule might have arisen in the first place. 
90 See, for example, Jonathon Haidt's 2001 paper, "The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social 
intuitionist approach to moral judgment." (Psychological Review, 108, 804-835) 
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Returning to the case of vegetarianism, we see a further illustration of this point. 
When a person who is emotionally upset by the idea of killing animals for food 
claims that it is morally wrong, it could be conceived as an attempt to objectify their 
own intrinsically painful experience via the rationalisation that killing animals is 
intrinsically wrong (Haidt, 2001). According to this hypothesis, then, the "rightness" 
or "wrongness" is not some kind of mysterious entity that we experience above and 
beyond the emotion, or some kind of objective property or fact that we somehow 
intuit; rather, it is the expression of the nature of the experience that these emotions 
engender. In other words, we objectify these subjective (indeed, subconscious) 
experiences and then project them onto the world as prescriptive rules and 
judgements: the product is morality. This is an idea that is sometimes captured by the 
term "moral projectivism", and was most famously espoused by David Hume (Hume, 
[1740] 1978: 167). 91 
Richard Joyce, however, has come up with a different idea. What puzzles him about 
a hypothesis like the one I have sketched here is explaining how it all works. As he 
himself states: 
No matter how much I dislike something, this inclination 
alone is not relevant to my judgements concerning others 
pursing that thing...one of the adaptive advantages of moral 
judgement is precisely its capacity to unite these two matters 
(2006: 117). 
He argues that in order to make this connection, a "certain kind of brain is required", 
a brain with "specific types of mechanisms geared for such learning" (2006: 139). 
His proposal is that the connection might plausibly be explained by the evolution of 
what he calls an "innate tendency to make moral judgements" (2008: 213) that 
enables us to make the transfer from a private internal experience to the "new 
creation" of a generalized rule (2006: 125). 
91 See Richard Joyce's discussion of this idea (2006:125). 
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While I agree that the existence of such a faculty — or adaptation, as he suggests it 
might be - would provide an easy way of explaining what would otherwise seem like 
a rather mysterious process, I nevertheless maintain that there are other explanations 
which describe how this process might occur which capture the different aspects of 
morality much better. Firstly, there are many reasons why my own experience of a 
situation might lead me to extend my conclusions to others. To begin with, a great 
number of our experiences actually involve others. Consequently, many of our moral 
rules concern managing our relationships and dealings with others (as argued in Part 
One). As this is the case, it is reasonable to conclude that in managing these 
relationships we want others to behave in ways that accord with our own wishes; or, 
more specifically with regards to morality, we want others to be bound by our moral 
rules and judgements in order that our desires be realised. For example, if I believe 
that paedophilia is morally wrong, I will usually extend this as a rule to everyone. 
This is partially because the judgement involves the actions of other people; by 
decreeing that it is wrong for everyone, I could be conceived as trying to make sure 
that it does not occur. 
Our extension of moral rules to others might also be explained by the nature of our 
experience of "wrongness" itself. In this section I have argued that our own 
experience of the "wrongness" does not appear to be accompanied by the experience 
that it is wrong "...for me only": it is rather a "wrongness" that at times gains a sense 
of being objective from the intrinsically unpleasant reaction this experience 
generates. Once objectified, it seems normal that the rule which we use to express it 
be applied to everyone, and not just to us. This extension will seem even more 
justified when we see that others have similar reactions to the same type of situations 
that we do, thereby giving our own conclusions more credence. 
These explanations do not, of course, describe processes of which we would be 
specifically conscious. We can also, however, explain them on a conscious level. 
For example, when we realise that others may not hold our views, we will often try to 
convince them that they are, perhaps, categorically wrong (in line with the way in 
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which we generally construe moral judgements ourselves). If we do not do this, we 
are tacitly giving them permission to engage in something that we might find morally 
repulsive. In other words, we do not want (indeed, don't often even believe we can in 
the first place) to say "I believe this, but that is just me; you believe as you like." To 
avoid this outcome, we might objectify our judgements, and eradicate the need to 
explain further by claiming that certain actions simply are ultimately right and wrong 
and do not need further justification beyond this. This kind of response can act as a 
means of attempting to stop any further inquiry. While this may begin to "...look 
massively self-obsessed an imposition of our wants on others" (Smith, 1991: 404), it 
is nonetheless a plausible description of what might actually happen in some cases. 
Of course, just because we want others to accept our rules as binding, does not mean 
that they are going to consider them binding. But because others are able likewise 
able to experience the "goodness" or "badness" of certain situations themselves (as I 
mentioned above), they often do not require that there be much further explanation or 
convincing once they have understood the consequences of certain actions; they share 
the experience of there being certain situations in life(because we are a species which 
share many similar wants, needs and desires) that we want to encourage or stop, and 
this, in itself, goes some of the way towards their acceptance of the extension of 
certain moral rules to all people. 
Thomas Nagel extends this point. He claims that people have good reasons to 
consider the welfare of others, for example, because it is rare that other people do not 
matter to us. The fact that we do care for them gives us a reason to refrain from 
harming them (Nagel, 1987: 6). While Nagel here means to mainly highlight the role 
of reason, his argument seems nevertheless perched on the melding of reason and 
emotion; we care about the interests of others because we are capable of empathizing 
with them, and, importantly, we are capable of caring for or even loving them. What 
we have, in sum, is a fusion of the two capacities working to produce the moral 
maxim. 
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I think most people, unless they're crazy, would think that 
their own interests and harms matter, not only to themselves, 
but in a way that gives other people a reason to care about 
them too. We all think that when we suffer it is not just bad 
for us, but bad, period (Nagel, 1987: 6). 
So while I think that Joyce's hypothesis has excellent explanatory power, I instead 
argue that the experience of emotions, in conjunction with our ability to reason about 
our experiences, is enough to explain how the transition from private experience to 
prescriptive moral judgement occurs. In this I am in agreement with Jonathan Haidt. 
I will, however, delay a more detailed discussion of this process to Chapter 9 where I 
specifically address the human reasoning capacity. For now I will elaborate on this 
hypothesis with respect to emotional experience in a bid to strengthen my case 
against Joyce and, more importantly, to strengthen my conclusion that morality is 
inextricably linked to human biology on many levels, but most clearly via its causal 
connection to a number of separate biological adaptations that humans have evolved. 
The next issue to address is whether or not my claims here are sufficient as an 
explanation for all moral motivation. With an end to answering this question, the 
issue of pleasure and pain as motivators will be examined. 
8:3 Pleasure and pain as motivators 
the impersonal badness of pain is not some mysterious further 
property that all pains have but just the fact that there is reason for 
anyone capable of viewing the world objectively to want it to stop, 
whether it is his or someone else's (Nagel, 1998: 140). 
"Tis obvious, that when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from 
any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and 
are carry 'd to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or 
satisfaction...Tis from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion 
or propensity arises towards any object: And these emotions extend 
themselves to the cause and effects of that object, as they are pointed out 
to us by reason and experience..." (Hume, 1994(1888]: 118-119). 
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The image that is emerging thus far is of a neurological and psychological framework 
which - amongst other things - enables us to be affected by the well being of others. I 
have suggested that at the heart of this framework are experiences of pleasure and 
pain, and — more moderately — comfort and discomfort. I also suggested that it is 
often our desire to avoid this pain (or experience the pleasure) which in turn 
contributes not only to our motivation to uphold moral principles and make moral 
judgements, but also to the belief that there is such thing as the moral right or wrong 
in the first place. 92 
This argument, however, requires some further discussion. Firstly, I have suggested 
that we are often propelled to do that which is pleasurable for us and to avoid the 
painful: this seems fairly uncontroversial. The reduction of human motivation to 
pleasure seeking and pain avoidance, however, appears somewhat exaggerated. It 
suffices to ask people whether or not they would trade attachment to Robert Nozick's 
(1974) hypothetical experience machine to life in the real world to discover that 
others consider this an exaggeration as well; rare is it to find any takers for the 
seemingly attractive endless stream of pleasures provided by the "experience 
machine" if it requires withdrawal from the real world (and its accompanying pains 
and woes.)93 As Kim Sterelny points out, our cognitive machinery is far more 
complicated than such a reductive approach suggests: 
... it is bizarre to suggest that an agent's only irreducible 
preferences are about pleasure and pain. Since preferences, like 
beliefs, are formulated in an open ended, rich system of mental 
representation there can be nothing in our cognitive engineering 
that restricts ultimate preferences to those about sensation. We 
92  Linking pain and pleasure to morality is not of course a novel approach. Utilitarianism is a 
normative ethical theory which holds that we ought to seek actions which maximize this pleasure (or 
utility) for the greatest number of people. It has an appeal to many people which derives from its 
provision of a good practical guide to morality based on what appears to be a fairly concrete fact about 
people; that is, that we seek to make our lives as ultimately pleasurable (and not just in a sensual way ) 
as possible. In the words of Jeremy Bentham (often considered the "founder" of Utilitarianism), 
"Nature has placed mankind under the government of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure — they 
govern us in al we do, in all we say, in all we think: Every effort we can make to throw off our 
subjection, will sere but to demonstrate and confirm it" (1789). 
93  This has been my own experience when I have proposed the "experience machine" to a number of 
undergraduate philosophy groups that I have taught. 
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can have preferences about any state of the world that can be the 
topic of our beliefs. Having only hedonistic ultimate preferences 
can be no consequence of our fundamental cognitive architecture. 
Moreover ...there is no evolutionary reason to expect such a 
constraint to be wired in. For there is no reason to expect 
preferences about sensation to be a reliable way of ensuring 
fitness maximising action (Sterelny, 2000: 287-288). 94 
This, however, is not what I am actually arguing; I have simply suggested that it is 
one of the possible routes to the belief that there are categorically binding rules, 
thoughts and actions. For the purposes of the point I am making in this section, it 
suffices that one simply accepts that (A) our actions and beliefs are often strongly 
influenced by the products of our sentient capacity (B) that our sentience is often 
strongly implicated in both our motivation to behave in certain ways, and, more 
controversially (C) our belief that in behaving in these ways we are acting morally. 
Secondly, and more pertinently, it might be objected that we do not judge everything 
that brings us pleasure to be morally right or good. Eating a chocolate bar brings me 
immense pleasure, but this does not mean that I consider it to be the morally right 
thing to do. How is it, then, that we differentiate the morally relevant issues from the 
morally irrelevant issues that arise from the experience of pleasure and pain? 
Part of an answer can be given with reference to what it is that has provoked our 
emotional reaction. For instance, I have made the claim that morality is often 
concerned with our dealings with others. 95 So, I could argue that my eating of the 
chocolate bar has nothing to do with morality unless it involves the well being of 
somebody else. For example, it could become a . moral issue if I had stolen the 
94 This is a good point. For example, the pleasure centres are activated by numerous drugs and alcohol 
which can be dangerous, if not fatal, to the organism. But then such is the way however with many 
adaptations; they often give rise to effects — or lead to outcomes - other than those for which they were 
initially selected. In any case, I have not argued that everything that we do that brings us pleasure is 
fitness enhancing. 
95 This, of course, is not always the case. The virtue ethicist, for example, will focus more on the 
development of virtues in oneself. These virtues, however, do involve other people indirectly for they 
often encompass the types of qualities that make a person less vulnerable to committing immoral acts 
which involve other people. 
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chocolate from my sister, and had thus deprived her of pleasure. It would perhaps be 
considered a matter of even graver moral implications if the chocolate bar was the 
difference between the life and death of 5 people for whom it was the last food. In 
sum, it is from the association with the "other regarding" aspects of some of the 
pleasurable things that we do that might transform them into moral issues. 
This, however, is not an entirely satisfying answer on its own, either. For one thing, 
there are many examples of moral judgements being applied to situations which 
involve ourselves only and have no (obvious) rapport with anyone else whatsoever. 
For example, some might consider masturbating - an otherwise pleasurable act which 
generally has no affect on anyone else other than the masturbator - to be morally 
wrong. Here we have two issues which threaten the proposals I have made so far: 
firstly, the act brings pleasure and yet is considered immoral; and secondly, it is an 
act which is not concerned with the welfare of anyone else. 
There are different ways that I could respond to this. Firstly, though, I must 
emphasise that nowhere have I suggested that all things that bring us pleasure are also 
morally good. In fact, many things that bring us pleasure are considered morally 
wrong (illicit drug taking, for example). What I have suggested is that the pleasure or 
pain that accompanies specific types of emotional experiences - and by these, I mean 
emotions of a particularly intense nature - sometimes act as a motivator to uphold 
moral principles and might even be able to explain why we consider certain moral 
principles to be categorically binding. 
One might still want to argue that I should then be able to draw a clearer line which 
indicates when something will be judged to be morally good, and when they will be 
judged to be "non-morally" good. What I suggest, however, is that there is no 
definitive line: sometimes it will simply be a case of individual circumstance that will 
dictate when this line might be drawn. While this may seem an unsatisfactory 
answer, it is nonetheless in keeping with my overall argument that morality cannot be 
pinned down to a particular role and that moral motivation cannot be traced to a 
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single specific source. For example, I have argued that emotions may give rise to 
moral rules (such as an empathetic reaction to the suffering of animals leading to 
vegetarianism). Then again, they may not. I suggest that in the cases where our 
empathetic reactions do lead to moral judgements, what these judgements actually 
express may differ as well. It might be that in expressing moral condemnation of 
eating animals I am expressing my desire that the killing of animals cease; this will 
be extended to others, because it is often others who are doing the killing and 
morality serves the purpose of making this extension. I might also be simply 
expressing my own feeling that there is something very wrong about killing animals - 
without being able to actually offer a reason - in the strongest language I have. 
Some situations, however, are likely to engender a more uniform emotional reaction 
from people. As I have suggested earlier in this thesis, humans do seem to be born 
with an array of mechanisms which are not quite as plastic as others. I have 
suggested that some of these mechanisms — including those that give rise to 
empathetic reactions (a point for which I will argue more fully in the next section) — 
have an adaptive role in ensuring that our offspring are cared for and that our genes 
are thereby passed on, and that they will thus be of a fairly intense nature. It is not 
difficult to imagine that the intense emotional attachments we have to our children 
and the emotional pain that gratuitous harm caused to them would elicit might have 
something to do with the moral condemnation that such harm almost universally 
receives. It also makes sense that moral rules which protect our children are more 
ubiquitous than those that protect unrelated species, since the biological mechanisms 
which forge our emotional commitments to our children were selected for their role 
in ensuring we care for them, specifically.96 
Importantly as well, I have argued that our emotional experiences may serve to 
augment our motivation to adopt or subscribe to an existing moral rule which has 
been imposed by someone else — in this case, then, the line has already been drawn 
96  In Part One I suggested that kin recognition mechanisms will aid us to make the difference between 
kin, and non-kin, for example. 
161 
for us. For example, masturbating may not involve anybody else, but if I live in a 
social group in which masturbating is considered wrong, and this has been "drummed 
into me" from an early age, then I might be led to feel guilty when I am doing it. 
This guilt, in turn, may contribute to my eventual belief that masturbation is morally 
wrong, by virtue of the intrinsically painful nature of the guilt. Or it might not, in 
which case the rule proscribing masturbation will remain a social rule only. This 
recalls Peter Singer's useful distinction between morals and rules in which he claims 
that while we can obey or disobey rules only, moral rules are about ensuring that 
values are "maximized" (Singer, 1979: 1 097. In this case, then, the line between the 
moral and the non-moral is something that is imposed by the social group that I too 
have come to adopt. It becomes a moral rule for me, however, once I accept that it 
has value. If performing an action is accompanied by a strong positive emotional 
reaction then it is likely that this may contribute to the value that it might have. 
This last point recalls an earlier one I made with respect to the process of norm-
internalisation that occurs when we are children. Here I can supplement this 
argument by adding the emotions as a partial explanation for how this internalization 
might occur. When a child is punished, they often experience a certain level of 
emotional pain (whether it be from having something taken away from them, or being 
scolded or in experiencing disapproval, for example). In the future, similar 
transgressions might also be accompanied by negative emotional experiences such as 
guilt, shame, or sorrow. Even when considering the transgression, a child might 
come to associate it with negative experiences and avoid it on these grounds. 
Eventually, by association, one can see the process by which the rule may be 
eventually internalized as a moral rule (that is, something which we not only know is 
wrong, but that we also experience as wrong). 
Richard Joyce, however, challenges the claim that punishment can in any way lead to 
the internalization of moral norms (Joyce, 2006: 137). In particular, he claims that as 
97 In Singer's words„ "The difference between a value an a rule is that it makes sense to maximise a 
value — to increase it as much as possible- whereas we can only comply with a rule". 
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yet there has been no satisfactory explanation for how the punishment of an action 
actually leads to the internalization of the norm in the first place. I argue however, 
that the explanations I have offered in this chapter suffice to explain the process. For 
instance, the fear that the threat of punishment engenders in a child, or even the pain 
that punishment inflicts, might alone be sufficient for the child to personally adopt the 
public moral rule as a personal moral rule. The child, according to this explanation, 
will generally come to not only be told that it is wrong; he or she will also come to 
experience it as wrong inasmuch as it involves the intrinsically unpleasant emotional 
experience. Later, wider experience of the world, coupled with the ability to reason 
about situations, may lead to either the concretisation of the belief or, conversely, to 
its rejection. It seems clear however that a strong painful emotional reaction is 
enough to explain how it is that punishment, for instance, at least contributes to the 
internalization of a specific norm. An extra faculty — such as Joyce's moral sense - is 
not required. David Lahti agrees: 
The evolutionary ethicist who postulates an illusion of 
objective moral guidelines as a vehicle for adaptive behaviour 
is proposing a biologically unprecedented mechanism for a 
purpose which is achieved regularly in nature by much more 
straight forward means. (Lahti, 2003: 644) 
In short, I have argued that moral rules derive from different sources, serve a number 
of different purposes and are employed to signify a number of different things. This 
means that it is not possible to say when exactly the line will be drawn between the 
moral and the non-moral with respect to the emotional pain and pleasure certain 
situations might cause. 98 What I do contend, however, is that part of what motivates 
us to believe there are categorically binding moral principles and, importantly, what 
leads us to form moral principles, is the pleasurable effects, or painful effects, that 
certain situations engender. I also contend that we are able to differentiate moral 
rules from other rules in the following ways: rules of a more general nature (A) do 
98 This could also be a considered a problem that Joyce's proposed adaptation also faces: we can just 
as easily ask at which point will a mechanism "objectify" our reactions, transferring a non-moral 
situation into a moral situation? 
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not elicit strong emotional reactions and (B) are not always importantly linked to the 
welfare of others (C) can usually be explained with reference to a tangible goal or 
end. While this does not allow a definitive distinction to be made in every case, I 
argue that this is because there is not one to be made in the first place. 
8:4 The neurological basis of emotions 
At various points throughout this thesis, I have claimed that my arguments suggest 
that there are not moral facts at the core of morality. This, I argue, is partially 
because we can explain why we believe that there are categorically binding moral 
facts without reference to their actually being such things as moral facts. Rather, 
there appears to be a series of "biological facts" at the heart of morality which explain 
the content of our moral codes much better than moral facts, in any case. That we 
associate morality with objective facts in the first place is because it is our way of 
expressing our belief that there are certain actions, thoughts or characteristics which 
are intrinsically right or wrong. Right and wrong, in turn, suggest that there is factual 
truth involved about which we can be right and wrong in the first place. Recalling 
again Michael Smith's quote, "...we seem to think moral questions have correct 
answers, and that the correct answers are made correct by objective moral facts" 
(Smith, 1991: 400). According to the explanation I have provided here, however, 
this postulate of "intrinsic" right or wrong may be derived in part from intrinsically 
pleasurable or painful experiences that feel right or wrong — it is not the experience or 
intuition of a truth that is independent of us. These experiences are, instead, derived 
from biological (but not necessary) facts about us: that we are very strongly opposed 
both to suffering ourselves, and, more centrally to morality, the suffering of others. 
This opposition we express using moral concepts. 
In this section, the proposed biological roots of these emotions will be briefly 
explored in order to support this argument. Here I will argue (as others have done 
before me) that without the ability to both experience certain emotions, and to 
understand that others experience them too, one's ability to be morally motivated is 
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severely impaired. 99 For example people who lack these abilities also often seem 
incapable of seeing moral rules as any different to ordinary rules. This supports the 
argument that our emotions are causally linked to our experience of morality as 
categorically binding since it suggests that part of the reason that people who have 
neurological impairment seem incapable of being morally motivated is (A) they do 
not see the moral principles as being categorically binding because (B) the moral 
principles themselves (or the subjects of the moral principles) rouse no emotion at all 
in them. Consequently, arguing for the plausibility that emotions (which both 
motivate us to follow and create moral rules) arise from a biological source (which 
has no necessary existence) also suggests that the "moral" of moral rules insofar as it 
is linked to these emotions also does not have any kind of necessary existence beyond 
the subject experiencing the emotions. 
It will not of course prove this point; one might argue, for example, that the capacities 
we have evolved are in fact just a means of perceiving the objective reality that is 
morality. This is a reasonable objection and I will address it again in Part Four. 
Briefly here, however, I mention three major points which suggest that this is not the 
case. Firstly, in the next section I will argue that the features of human biology which 
enable us to be morally motivated or simply to be "moral agents" did not evolve for 
anything directly to do with the purpose of "being moral" or "perceiving things as 
morally binding". When this point is combined with the contention that (A) there is 
irreconcilable relativity of certain moral rules (which also suggests — but of course 
also does not prove — that there are no moral facts [Part Two])' °°, as well as (B) that 
many of our rules seem to have been imposed for their social usefulness (which 
suggests that they are importantly linked to fitness enhancement (Parts One and 
Two), a strong case is erected for suggesting that morality is a useful evolutionary bi-
product, rather than a set of objective truths about the world that exists independently 
of humans. As stated, however, I will take these points up again in Part Four. In this 
section, I will focus specifically on the biological bases of emotional experiences. 
99 I will mention these people along with their particular arguments throughout this section. 
I°° This is Mackie's argument (1977:36). See Part Four for an elaboration of this point. 
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The hypothesis that emotional capacity is the product of neurological mechanisms is 
gaining in credibility. In fact, recent evidence has even led to conclusions about 
which specific parts of the brain are responsible for generating human emotions. 
These conclusions have been drawn largely from research into people with varying 
forms of brain damage. Most famously, of course, has been the research based on the 
case of Phinneus Gage, a railway worker whose skull, and consequently the 
orbitofrontal cortex, was perforated by an iron rod. While Gage apparently suffered 
no intellectual damage, aspects of his behaviour went into considerable decline. For 
example, while previously noted for his diligence at his place of work, post-accident 
he became an unreliable worker. His family life reportedly also went into decline as 
a result of an apparent lack of concern he increasingly showed for them (Harlow, 
1848). 
Other cases of orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) damage have since confirmed its role in 
regulating social behaviour (Dolan, 1999; Anderson, et al, 1999). Exactly how, is 
under debate. It has been suggested, for example, that damage to the OFC may 
impair the victims' ability to use emotional signalling (that is, when emotions 
associated with past events are recalled) to aid in making decisions about future 
courses of similar action. Instead, they have to rely simply on considerations of 
immediate significance (Dolan, 1999: 928). Also, many victims show an impaired 
ability to assess the outcomes of socially orientated actions. 101 This would mean that 
101 Another neurological mechanism suggested to be instrumental in generating moral judgements is 
the "violence inhibition mechanism" (VIM), which, as the name suggests, works to prevent violent 
reactions to certain situations. For example, it has been contended that the violence inhibition 
mechanism can be triggered by certain cues, such as seeing someone looking sad, or in pain. For 
Blair, this is a mechanism which is central to the judgement that something is morally bad, rather than 
just "conventionally bad" (Blair 1995). This claim has met with similar resistance to the suggestion in 
section 8:3 that pain and pleasure are at the heart of moral decision making. S. Nichols for example, 
has claimed that Blair's conclusion is flawed since, since the "VIM" can be activated and yet not lead 
to the judgement of something being morally wrong at all. Seeing somebody receiving a tattoo and in 
a lot of pain may activate the "VIM" but may not lead to a judgement that it is morally wrong for the 
tattooist to be doing what they are doing.(Nichols, 2002) 1°1 . As I replied to the similar objection in 
Section 8:3, context will most likely determine the transition. In the case of the tattooist, one's 
emotional reaction will not translate into a moral reaction while one is aware that it involves a situation 
of consensual causing of pain. A child who is not aware of this, hOwever, may conclude that what is 
occurring is something "bad". 
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adherence to and application of certain rules might become quite difficult. For 
example, if one cannot recall the positive emotions associated with certain acts 
performed in the past, one might be less likely to perform them regularly. Or, 
conversely, if negative emotions are detached from the thought of performing a 
particular action, then one might have less motivation to desist from performing 
them. If one argues, as I have done, that emotions are central to the generation of 
moral rules, then one can also understand how damage to these centres might 
interfere with the ability to even make the rules in the first place. These points help 
explain the behaviour of people like Phinneus Gage and their "moral" lapses. 
Studies of psychopaths are also revealing in terms of establishing the neurological 
basis of our tendency to differentiate the moral rule and an ordinary rule via the 
experience of emotions. For instance, while psychopaths do not seem to share the 
same extent of problems with theory of mind as those with autism, for example, they 
nonetheless manifest difficulty with emotional empathy, and often show little 
recognition of emotions such as sadness or fear in others (Blair, 2005: 710). 102 
Coupled with this is an apparent lack of ability to feel shame, guilt or remorse (Smith, 
1984: 191). In the words of Goodenough and Deacon: 
A psychopath can negotiate hierarchy and execute strategic 
reciprocity without difficulty, and can learn, and simulate 
moral behaviour when this suits his purposes. But, be it by 
inborn error, brain injury, or childhood deprivation, he lacks 
the capacity to experience moral experience, to feel anything 
in the way of empathy, to put himself in another's shoes. 
102 The condition of autism is also often used to illustrate a connection between brain impairment and 
the capacity to feel emotions, the condition of autism might be considered. While there is not the 
space or necessity to enter into a detailed discussion of autism here, (and besides, there appears to be 
much unresolved debate about the varieties and extremes of the illness) what is of relevance is that one 
of the most widely recognised traits of severely autistic people is their apparent inability to feel or 
understand certain emotions, notably empathy. This appears to derive primarily from an impaired 
ability to understand that others might feel differently than us in the first place; that is to say, that there 
are problems in terms of theory of mind in people with autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). It should be 
noted that this, is controversial as well (see Blair, 2005: 710). There are alternative theories about the 
cause of autism. It has also been ascribed to defects in the mirror neuron system, which interferes with 
an agent's ability to learn via imitation. Jeanette Kennett (2002) discusses this point and refers to 
Jacoboni and Dapretto (2006) as a further reference. 
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Morality without empathy is by definition oxymoronic 
(Goodenough & Deacon, 2003: 815). 
It is, of course, difficult to explain the psychopath's apparent inability to form moral 
beliefs about circumstances or people without begging the question somewhat. For 
example, simply concluding that a psychopath who has impaired empathetic capacity 
is not able to be morally motivated because of this impairment does not contribute to 
an argument that the emotions are centrally implicated in the formation of morality: 
it just assumes what one is trying to establish. Nevertheless the fact of the 
psychopath's impaired empathetic ability (coupled with a documented lack of ability 
to feel remorse or guilt) does seem to add to the evidence in favour of this contention. 
In order to bolster this claim, we might, for example, offer cases in which 
psychopaths do not seem to be moved by the moral rules of the majority. These 
should not be too difficult to find, considering that psychopathy is often (sometimes 
wrongly) linked to some of the most extreme forms of gratuitous violence (serial 
killings, for example). Violent crimes are not the sole domain of the psychopath, of 
course. Also, psychopaths do not necessarily commit violent crimes — or any crimes, 
for that matter. What does distinguish the psychopath from the ordinary criminal in 
terms of crimes they might commit, however, is that their apparent lack of ability to 
feel emotionally moved by friends or family members means that they are just as 
likely to commit crimes against them, as anybody (Walker 1966: 50: Walker and 
McCabe 1973, 226) 1°3 . This is famously supported by examples given in Hervey 
Cleckley's 1964 The mask of sanity. 1°4 Indeed, Cleckley's research is widely 
considered a rich source of examples which support a connection between 
psychopathy, emotional impairment and morality. 
103 This example was taken from Lloyd Fields (1996: 263). 
104 See Cleckley's Milt who left his ill mother waiting on a bridge by herself for over an hour because 
he was sidetracked by a number other minor whims that distracted him. Of particular note was his 
apparent lack of remorse, and also the fact that he was angered that his mother did not wait for him, 
but rather sought out help from someone else (Cleckley, 1964: 189). 
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Caution is required again, here, however, since I have suggested in Chapter 7 that we 
do sometimes form moral rules which have little relevance to what the public 
morality might prescribe. Indeed, in arguing, as I am, that there are no such thing as 
objective mind-independent moral facts, I am effectively opening the door to a wide 
range of possible moral rules which, as long as they are believed to be categorically 
binding and irreducibly right or wrong, qualify as moral rules. Perhaps one might 
argue, then, that certain psychopaths have their own individual moral rules which 
simply differ from what we would consider to be morally valid. The fact that there 
does seem to be a core set of quasi-universal moral rules that psychopaths tend to 
routinely violate (be kind to your family members, for example) suggests, however, 
that the reason they do violate them is that they are incapable of seeing them - or any 
rule, for that matter - as morally relevant (in the sense that I have given here) at all. 
This, both I and others contend, is because they have impaired empathetic ability: 
that is, they cannot form attachments based on (A) feelings of concern for the welfare 
of others and (B) deeply felt emotional responses. This consequently eliminates a 
large portion of the typical moral realm (a realm which is predominantly, although 
not exclusively, other regarding) from the psychopath's range of consideration. 
Accounts of their behaviour and attitudes, moreover, suggest that even if they do 
concern themselves with developing personal moral virtues, for example, they are 
virtues of a rather peculiar type. In sum, it seems unlikely that psychopaths genuinely 
subscribe to moral principles at all. 
Some, however, might argue that the term "psychopath" or "sociopath" is somewhat 
vague. It is indeed true that in the past people were locked away in asylums for 
behaviour suggesting "mental illness" which today is not considered mental illness at 
all. But while historically, it might have been conceivable to consider one culture's 
sociopath as another's visionary, today there is sufficient cross cultural evidence 
which indicates a commonality in traits between a core group of sociopaths and 
psychopaths throughout the world. To support this, neuro-imaging performed on 
psychopaths demonstrates that there is indeed a difference in the neurology of these 
people, including impaired functioning of the limbic regions as well as deficient 
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substance in the prefrontal cortex (Moll et al., 2005: 801). This, combined with some 
of the cases briefly discussed above, suggests that the neurological damage from 
which some psychopaths suffer is specifically to areas which generate certain 
emotional responses, such as empathy. 
Indeed, many of the conclusions drawn regarding the connection between 
neurological mechanisms and the ability to feel emotions have been gleaned from the 
use of neuro imaging which enables scientists to see which different parts of the brain 
are activated when certain emotions are being experienced. In one particular study, 
for example, a group of people were shown a number of a series of emotionally 
charged moral transgressions, whilst undergoing brain monitoring via functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI scans). The different pictures revealed activity 
notably in the anterior pre-frontal cortex (PFC), the Medial orbitofrontal cortex 
(OFC), the superior temporal sulcus (STS) region, brainstem and limbic structures 
(Moll et al., 2005: 803). Fear and disgust, notably, were shown to activate principally 
the brainstem and limbic areas of the brain, but not the OFC and STS (Moll et al., 
205: 803). Such findings firmly underscore the biological bases of our emotional 
reactions and their connection to our moral judgements. 
Before moving on, a final point is worth mentioning. What is particularly interesting 
in a comparison made between adult onset damage to the prefrontal cortex and 
infantile damage was that while both adults and children demonstrated difficulties 
integrating into the social system, differences regarding actual knowledge of social 
norms and morals were observed (Anderson et al. 1999). The results of this study 
suggested that while social behaviour and decision making ability is impaired as a 
result of damage to the PFC, normal intellectual abilities are not affected, as 
mentioned above. Consequently, adults who have learned what is socially or morally 
appropriate in their community are able to fall back on this knowledge even in the 
advent of prefrontal cortex (PFC) damage, resulting in less severely impaired social 
behaviour. The infants studied, however, did not have this information to begin with 
and were unable to use it or acquire it due to the early occurrence of their injuries. 
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(Anderson et al., 1999: 1035). Whether or not it could be said, however, that the 
adults were operating in a genuinely moral manner or rather simply in a way that 
mimicked this behaviour will be discussed presently 
Neuroscience, as mentioned earlier, is very much in its infancy. Consequently there 
is significant controversy regarding interpretation of findings and results. Consensus 
does tend to converge, however, on the conclusion that there appears to be a link 
between damage to specific parts of the brain and ability to connect with people on an 
emotional level. Accordingly, it becomes clear that questioning the ability of all 
people to experience emotions questioned in Section 8:1 is not as misplaced as it first 
seemed. It suggests that humans evolved specific emotional capacities and that these 
capacities are part of our neurology. It suggests, moreover, that these capacities are 
distinct, individual capacities — or "modules" as they are often referred to - since 
damage to certain parts of the brain might affect ability to feel certain emotions, but 
may not interfere with other neurological capacities such as the ability to think and 
reason (Psychopathy). In other cases, intelligence might be impaired, while other 
functions are more or less intact (Down syndrome) (Carruthers, 2004: 305). 105 
Indeed this accords with the arguments of Evolutionary Psychologists for the "Swiss 
army knife" (Cosmides, 1994) modular nature of the human brain which will be 
briefly discussed in the next section. 
8.5 Evolutionary psychology 
What is special about the human mind is not that it gave up "instinct" in 
order to become flexible, but that it proliferated "instincts"— that is, 
content-specific problem-solving specializations (Tooby and Cosmides, 
1992: 113 ). 
105 It should be noted that it is not at all clear that psychopaths' alleged amorality is the pure 
consequent of inability to feel empathy. Jeanette Kennett, for example, presents Hare's arguments for 
the existence of what she terms "rational defects" that plague the psychopath and which might have 
important ramifications for their ability to be considered moral agents. These include a certain 
"mental discontinuity" which affects one's ability, for instance, to consider long-term goals and to 
control one's impulses on the basis of these. This, according to Hare, may contribute to the 
psychopaths' amorality. (Hare [1993: 142] as cited in Kennett, 2006: 77) 
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The prior discussion recalls some of the claims of evolutionary psychologists, who I 
briefly mentioned in Part One where some of their contentions regarding kin-
identifying mechanisms were considered. While there is not the space to go too far 
into evolutionary psychology here, it is worth pausing to consider at least some of 
their arguments since they contribute to the portrait of humans as organisms 
biologically programmed to feel certain emotions. 
To begin with, one of evolutionary psychology's (EP) significant claims (which is of 
relevance here) is that much of what we do is still driven to a greater or lesser extent 
by a neural system which was developed during the time of our earliest ancestors 
(Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). 106 Consequently, they argue, there are significant 
portions of the way we think and react to certain situations that are governed by 
adaptations which were shaped by needs relevant to the members of the earliest 
societies. We are, in the words of Eaton and colleagues, "stoneagers in the fast lane" 
(Eaton et al, 1988). 
Some of the better known examples EP offers concern human sexuality and the 
preferences which guide humans in their choices of mates. They suggest such things 
as neural mechanisms which incline men, for example, to prefer women of a certain 
build (low waist to hip ratio, specifically) (Singh, 1993, Singh & Luis, 1995) which 
in turn is supposedly an indication of sexual ripeness and fecundity. Such desires or 
inclinations are what Ernst Mayr (1961) famously referred to as "proximate 
mechanisms" which propel us to avoid or seek out certain things which are 
biologically disadvantageous or advantageous (the "ultimate causes"). Of course we 
are not aware of why - evolutionarily speaking - it is that we have the attraction or 
repulsion, we are only aware that we have it. 
A desire to have sex with a specific person in a particular 
context for example, won't (of course) have been produced by 
106 	• 	• This time is often referred to as "the environment of evolutionary adaptation" and is usually 
considered to be during the Pleistocene. 
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reasoning that such an act is likely to fulfil some sort of 
evolutionary goal of producing many healthy descendants. 
Rather, it will have been generated by some system (a 
module) that has evolved for the purpose, which takes as 
input a variety of kinds of perceptual and non perceptual 
information, and then generates, when appropriate, a desire of 
some given strength. (Whether that desire is then acted upon 
will, of course, depend upon the other desires that the subject 
possesses at the time, and on his or her relevant 
beliefs.)(Carruthers, 2004: 299). 
Many of these preferences are experienced via neurologically generated emotional 
responses, according to evolutionary psychologists. The emotion of fear is a typical 
example of emotions that they claim evolved in the ancestral climate. The fact that 
many humans (and other primates apparently) seem instinctively frightened of 
potentially dangerous animals such as spiders and snakes is given as further evidence 
that these modules were evolved in an environment where these animals were more 
of a risk (Pinker, 1977: 386-89). 
Also cited frequently is the feeling of disgust we often experience at certain visceral 
displays or the sight of bloody injury or bodily infections. This is explained as an 
adaptation which serves the purpose of alerting us to something that is wrong, thereby 
inciting us to do something about it. If we enjoyed the sight of them, we would be far 
less likely to do something about it (Levy, 2004: 471). We also encountered the EP 
arguments earlier when examining mechanisms for kin altruism. Here I briefly 
explored biological mechanisms in place which lessen the likelihood that sexual 
relationships might be formed. Kin identifying mechanisms such as the major 
histocompatibility complex (MHC) have been shown to manifest themselves in a 
dislike (akin to disgust) of the odour of somebody who shares the same MHC with 
you. 
The likelihood that neurological mechanisms responsible for emotions evolved for 
such purposes should not be too difficult to accept. It appears entirely unsurprising, 
for example, that our biology might include adaptations which predispose us 
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positively towards sexual behaviour; reproduction is, after all, central to evolutionary 
success. Likewise the contention that some of the emotions that propel us to care for 
our newborn children are adaptations is also highly likely. 
Whether or not one finally accepts the entirety of evolutionary psychological 
explanation for behaviour is another question. While there is significant plausibility 
to much of what EP has to say about the configuration of the human brain as outlined 
so far, other claims are considered more dubious since, for example, they are a little 
too environmentally dismissive. For instance there is often not enough attention 
given to the role that culture plays in overriding some of the predispositions that EP 
suggests (Levy, 2004). To cite a famous example, in an oft-cited paper by D. Singh it 
was concluded that there is an innate male preference for the 0.7 waist hip ratio in 
women, as mentioned above. However, while this might be true for many men of 
many different cultures, there are nonetheless notable exceptions to this rule 107 . This, 
of course, does not amount to evidence against the predisposition, but it does 
highlight the importance of cultural influence with regards to mate choice (Levy, 
2004: 467-468). Also, even if there are these dispositions, EP has a tendency to 
exaggerate their potency. Humans may well fear snakes and spiders, but this is 
usually because we are taught to do so as well; we are also taught not to do so, as 
inhabitants of Papua New Guinea who actually eat spiders will testify (Diamond, 
1993: 265). Those arguing for a cultural role in behavioural shaping (as I do) might 
accept that there are these ancestral adaptive behaviours, but nevertheless claim that 
social learning and shaping can occasionally override these adaptive inclinations. As 
Neil Levy expresses it, "Human Beings are more complex, and more varied, both 
historically and culturally, than EP admits" (Levy, 2004: 471). 
These points, however, do not constitute the defeat of the EP argument for innate 
emotional modules. Rather, they are simply a reminder that biology can be shaped by 
environment — both social and physical. This was one of the main points of Part One. 
107  Levy cites the Yomybato tribe in Peru as an example of a culture that actually prefers that women 
have a very high waist-to-hip ratio. 
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For the purposes of the argument here, an acceptance of all that EP has to say is not 
required. It is enough to accept the following points: firstly, that we do have 
neurologically based emotional capacities — this seems uncontroversial; secondly, that 
these emotions are the product of capacities that most likely evolved as adaptations. 
(This too seems highly likely if one accepts the evidence presented here.); thirdly, 
that these capacities sometimes produce emotional reactions that have a profound 
effect on the way we perceive and react to our environment (which also seems 
plausible) and, importantly (as I have argued here), our propensity to perceive some 
actions, beliefs and attitudes as categorically binding (which, I am hoping, is starting 
to seem less controversial). 
8:6 The adaptive role of emotions 
If being nice feels good then that is good reason for being nice. It is also 
a good reason for a pattern of behaviour to evolve and remain in an 
animal's arsenal (Bekoff, 2004: 498). 
What I have argued, in sum, is that there are convincing empirical grounds for 
concluding that our emotions are causally linked to morality, since impairments to the 
parts of the brain associated with these emotions appear likewise to impact on the 
ability to understand — and hence care about — the welfare of others, a central 
component of moral rules. More importantly, however, is evidence that certain 
individuals with such impairments — like psychopaths — seem to have difficulty 
distinguishing moral rules from ordinary rules. There is thus also fairly strong 
evidence that the emotions are the product of evolved biological mechanisms. In this 
section, I will give a brief overview of the possible adaptive roles some of the 
different emotions have. This will help establish my argument that our emotions are 
the products of biological mechanisms selected for purposes other than the generation 
of moral rules, or a moral sense. Instead, I will argue that they have been "exapted" 
to other ends including the generation of moral rules, which themselves are often 
fitness enhancing, but not always. If my argument is successful, it will contribute to 
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my argument that the emotions are "moral" adaptations (that is, that they may have 
been selected for a particular role in morality). 
The first thing to note, as mentioned in Part One (and Part Two), is that finding the 
adaptive function of a trait is not always an obvious or straight forward exercise. 
This is particularly the case in neurology, which, as mentioned, is a relatively new 
science. Nevertheless, some of the more popular suggestions will be explored here in 
order to make my intended point. The second thing to consider, as Richard Joyce 
correctly points out, is that there is not a generalized "emotional faculty" as he puts it 
(2006: 94). Instead, there are a range of emotions which are the product of different 
biological mechanisms and which have been selected for different traits that they 
individually produce, as I have just suggested. Joyce also correctly points out that 
culture has a role to play in the differentiation of emotions (2006: 95). 108 In spite of 
this, however, he concludes that there does seem to be a basic cross-cultural 
convergence with respect to a set of general emotions, a position I will adopt as well 
in suggesting that empathy is amongst these emotions. It is also central to morality as 
it has been presented in this thesis, and as such, it is again a good candidate for 
consideration. 
There are various adaptive stories attached to the evolution of empathy, the most 
popular being that the mechanisms involved in generating empathy were, at their 
origin, adaptive means of ensuing a certain level of bonding between caretakers and 
infants (Plutchik, 1987) 109 . If this attachment does not occur, babies would most 
likely be abandoned at birth which for a human baby would signal death. It should 
108 Joyce mentions the identification of eight different words in Chinese which are differentiated from 
each other, but which are translated into English as simply referring to the emotion of "Shame" (Wang 
& Fischer, 1994). 
109 This is not the only hypothesis. Another, for example, is the idea that if we can empathise (in the 
sense of being able to take the perspective of someone else), we can also work out when somebody 
else is not telling the truth. It also helps us to manipulate people when we know what they are thinking 
(Smith, 2006: 4). Peter Railton gives an even broader adaptive story: "...empathy — understood as a 
capacity to simulate the internal states of others.. .by modeling them using ones own cognitive and 
motivational repertoire — is important not only to impartial benevolence, but also to language learning 
and communication, social accommodation, escaping or attacking an enemy, courting a mate, hunting 
a prey, or deceiving one's audience."(2000: 59). 
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not be surprising, then, that we have evolved adaptations which contribute to the 
likelihood that the bonding occurs. Plutchik, for example, discusses the connection 
between an infant's facial expressions (smiling, for example) and a variety of 
emotional reactions they elicit in parents (via emotional contagion). The emotional 
reactions in turn incite the parent to care for the child, which, according to Plutchick, 
constitutes the adaptive significance of the emotions themselves. As he himself sums 
up this argument, 
One ...important aspect of empathy in an evolutionary 
context is that it serves to bond individuals to one another, 
especially mothers to infants.. .From an evolutionary point of 
view, the organism is most vulnerable to the vicissitudes of 
the environment, including predation, when it is new 
born...Because survival is a problem from the moment of 
birth, certain mechanisms must exist both in the child and in 
the mother or caretaker to help ensure survival.. .emotions 
emitted by the infant function in part as communication 
signals that have various adaptive consequences for survival 
(Pluchik, 1983) for example, by attracting a nurturing adult to 
a hungry or lost infant (Pluchik, 1987: 43)• 110 
The evolution of the capacities required to produce empathy appear to predate Homo 
sapiens. Chimpanzees, our closest living relative, also have offspring which not only 
require a considerable amount of post-natal nurturing, but also exhibit similar kinds 
of behaviour eliciting such care as our own offspring do(de Waal, 2008). This 
suggests that they are homologous traits (Bekoff, 2004: 498) that both we and our 
primate cousins have retained from a common ancestor that existed prior to our 
evolution. Some of the other capacities I have claimed are central to the formation of 
morality, however, are much more recently evolved adaptations. The evolution of 
complex language (which, I have argued is human phenomenon), for example, is 
posited around 100 000 years ago, as mentioned in Chapter 6 (Lieberman, 1998). In 
Part Two I argued that language almost certainly did not evolve for the purpose of 
generating morality. It is, nonetheless, central to its existence. For example, language 
enables humans to actually express moral concepts, formulate rules based on these 
He cites a number of different papers that support this hypothesis, including Froth et al. (1978). 
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concepts (as I suggested in Part Two), and importantly, allows for the dissemination 
of these rules. Since morality thus appears to post-date the time during which 
complex language skills evolved, it seems reasonable to conclude that at least 
emotional contagion (for it is not clear that other living primates have theory of mind, 
as I will suggest in Section 8:7) predates morality significantly. Consequently, it does 
not seem plausible to suggest that empathy produced by emotional contagion was 
selected specifically for the role (I argue) that it now plays in both motivating and 
generating moral rules. 
I have argued in this chapter that many emotions arise from situations which involve 
the "interest or welfare" of others. Morality too is concerned largely — though not 
always — with our relationships with others, hence it seems fair that certain emotions 
are sometimes referred to as "moral emotions" in recognition of this relationship. I 
have avoided the use of this term because it suggests that the mechanisms involved in 
generating emotions were selected for functions significant to morality only. While I 
have argued that they are central to the morally relevant experiences, I do not claim 
that they are necessarily linked to morality, as I have argued with respect to empathy 
above. 
A more plausible general explanation for the evolution of much of our emotional 
"artillery", then, can be given in terms of its role in generating different aspects of 
pro-social behaviour. Because morality is importantly tied to prosocial regulation, as 
I have argued extensively in this thesis, these emotions have also come to have a 
significant role to play in the generation and maintenance of important aspects of 
morality as well. For example, Robert Trivers has famously argued that what he 
called "moralistic aggression" evolved in order to deter others from cheating (1971, 
1983). He also suggested that more generally human emotions were selected 
primarily for their role in managing reciprocation (1971). In his own words: 
Friendship dislike, moralistic aggression, gratitude, sympathy, 
trust, suspicion, trustworthiness, aspects of guilt, and some 
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forms of dishonesty and hypocrisy... [are]... important 
adaptations to regulate the altruistic system (1971: 35). 11 
This quote specifies that our emotions were selected for the purposes of generating 
altruism, which, as I argued in Part One, is a feature of most cultural moral codes. 
This is somewhat misleading, however; the altruism with which Trivers was 
primarily concerned was reciprocal altruism. I contend that reciprocal altruism is not 
the same thing as moral altruism. In the case of moral altruism, the conscious 
intention for behaving altruistically is not supposed to be selfish; it should be other-
serving. If! am performing a kindness for you only in the hope of receiving an act of 
kindness from you in the future, then I could not truly be said to be acting 
altruistically in a morally relevant way. This seems rather to be a selfish act since I 
am performing the action with view only to obtaining something for myself. This 
accords perfectly well with the system of reciprocal altruism and, as such, an 
explanation of how cooperative exchanges are enabled, and perhaps were enabled at 
their origins. Moral altruism, however, as I stated above, is usually conceived to be 
the opposite of selfishness. In the words of Singer, "Reciprocal altruism seems not 
really altruism at all; it could be more accurately described as enlightened self 
interest" (1981: 42). I suggest, then, that while the emotions were selected because 
they facilitated cooperation, moral rules emerged later in our evolutionary history. It 
is plausible, in fact, that they became particularly important as a means of ensuring 
that this cooperation occurred once groups grew to a size that would make the 
tracking of reciprocal exchanges quite difficult. 112 
It 	. 	. Guilt is another interesting emotion to explore with respect to its relevance to morality. Guilt is 
very often associated with moral transgression, and has been contended by some to actually have 
evolved for the purpose of "moral policing". (See Tangney et al. 2007). Guilt, however, can also arise 
from non-moral issues. For instance, eating a chocolate bar when on a diet may arouse guilt, but this 
can hardly be described as moral guilt. It seems highly plausible that guilt is a response to the 
transgression of an important rule, but that the rule need not be of a moral nature. It is a form of self-
punishment that arises in anticipation of the knowledge that one has committed a punishable offence. 
One does not, however, necessarily need to believe that one's crime is morally wrong to feel guilty. 
112 This is one of the suggestions that have been pitted, in particular, against difficulties that arise from the 
famous "tit-for-tat" scenarios that are used as explanations for the evolution of certain forms of cooperation. 
As Joseph Henrich points out, "tit for tat" relies on certain conditions that cannot be met when the pool of 
people becomes too large; it would become, for example, very difficult for a reciprocator dealing with 
hundreds of people over a long period of time to remember all transactions let alone respond accordingly to 
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In sum, then, accepting the argument that our emotions are the product of biological 
adaptations is not tantamount to saying that all of the traits or behaviours to which 
they have given rise explain their selective history. As we have seen in this chapter, 
and in Part One, many adaptations have given rise to behaviour that seems far 
removed from their original adaptive function. As Elliot Sober points out with 
regards to mathematics: 
Human beings now have the ability to do trigonometry; yet no 
one supposes that there must have been selection for that 
ability in our ancestral past. Rather, it is far more plausible to 
think that there was selection for some other suite of mental 
characteristics. Perhaps there was selection for increased 
intelligence and language use. Once these traits evolved, and 
human brings subsequently found themselves in environments 
rather unlike the ancestral ones, various spin-off properties 
became visible (Sober, 1998: 476). 
In a like manner, much that is generated by the emotions seems to be "spin-offs" of 
having the emotions. Some of these spin-offs may in some circumstances enhance 
our fitness prospects in turn. For example, it is clear that being able to experience 
empathy facilitates the formation of relationships with others beyond the immediate 
family. 113 While some of these relationships may prove fitness enhancing for the 
each one. Vast groupings as are seen in human societies, therefore, seem to be way beyond the limits of 
such strategies and therefore need to be explained in some other way. In the words of Henrich; 
most theoretical models of reciprocity explore only 2 person 
interactions. Despite this, many scholars have falsely assumed that the 
qualitative aspects of the 2 person results can be generalized to n-person 
situations. However, Boyd and Richerson's (1988) analysis of an n-
person repeated prisoner's dilemmas shows that the results do not 
generalize for groups larger than about 10 individuals. ...Reciprocity, on 
its own, is unlikely to solve the problem of cooperation in large groups. 
...(Henrich, 2004: 10). 
113 	• 	• This point has been elaborated by others. For example, Cameron Anderson and Dacher Keltner 
point out (citing the work of LaFrance & Ickes, 1981) that bonds between people can be created on the 
basis of the experience of certain emotions, and the communication of these experiences to others 
(2002, 22). To use a somewhat exaggerated example, one can see this kind of bonding occurring in 
situations when people group together to demonstrate their support of (or protest against) a certain 
political issue, for example. Anderson and Dasher also point to the fact that emotional reactions can 
even be a more accurate measure of trustworthiness, since, as they put it, "...it is more difficult to 
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individual (as argued in Part One) it seems highly unlikely that empathy-producing 
mechanisms evolved for this reason (Indeed, it would be positively maladaptive for 
people to be predisposed to develop positive emotional attachments to everyone they 
meet, a point I also made in Part One). But because emotional responses such as 
empathy can be filtered or tempered by other capacities (such as the ability to reflect 
and communicate) we can be more discriminate about the people with whom we form 
relationships. In the ensemble then, they may contribute to our survival prospects 
inasmuch as certain non-kin relationships can be fitness enhancing, but this does not 
mean that they are adaptations whose adaptive role is to serve this end. 
There is not the space here obviously to cover all of the different theories about the 
selective history of the emotions. What I contend, however, is that several key 
mechanisms involved in generating emotions such as empathy were selected for 
fitness enhancing characteristics relating to facilitating cooperation or kin bonding, as 
suggested above. The fact also that many non-human animals also appear to also 
experience certain emotions suggests that they are homologous traits that pre-date 
human morality in any case, as mentioned above. I have also suggested that they 
operate via proximate mechanisms which generate either painful or pleasurable 
experiences. As Franz de Waal put it, 
..If human sympathy is indeed the "inborn and indestructible 
instinct" that David Hume, Arthur Schopenhauer, Adam 
feign emotions than it is to deceive with words" (2002: 22) The sharing of emotions, then, may serve 
as a more solid proof of "solidarity", than a verbal expression of this solidarity might indicate. 
Matt Ridley expands this explanation in his claim that emotions provide the cement in many types of 
cooperative ventures that otherwise would not be undertaken on the basis of rational calculation alone 
since they imbue tem with a depth of importance that may even defy reason. (1996: 135-36) In this 
way they serve the group and its individuals by facilitating relationships that otherwise might not be 
formed. (He draws his conclusions from those found in Robert Frank's Passions within Reason 
[19881). In the words of Ridley: 
Rational people would be unable to convince each other of their 
commitment and would never close the deals. But we don't bring reason 
to such problems; we bring irrational commitment driven by our emotions. 
The entrepreneur does not cheat for fear of shame or guilt and she trusts 
her partner, knowing her to be a woman who does not like to face shame 
or guilt herself— a person of honour (Ridley, 1996: 135). 
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Smith and others declared it to be, it is only natural that it 
comes with a built-in compensation in the same way that sex 
and eating do (1996:87). 
I conclude then that human emotions such as empathy were not selected for the 
purpose of generating such things as moral rules, concepts or truths. What seems 
more likely is that (A) moral rules emerged from the growing social complexities that 
characterise human groups and our attempts to regulate these problems, as I argued in 
Parts One and Two, and (B) that part of their transition from social to "moral" rules 
can be linked to their becoming expressions of some of our strongest emotional 
reactions to situations we encounter during our lives, and our attempts to put these 
into words. 
8:7 Emotions and non-human animals 
I have suggested in this thesis that there is a significant gap in behaviour of other 
animals which seems suggestive of certain human moral behaviour and what we 
actually call genuine moral behaviour. I will discuss this in more detail in Chapter 
13. In this section, I will focus on whether or not other animals — notably primates — 
are able to experience certain morally relevant emotions. This will be done via a 
consideration of the extent to which they could be considered to have "theory of 
mind", which, I have argued, is central to certain forms of empathy. It is, more 
importantly however, central to the experience of moral motivation. 
Many different species of non-human animals exhibit what has been labelled 
"prosocial behaviour" in this thesis; that is, behaviour which enhances social 
cohesion within a particular group of animals. In this section I will argue that while 
this behaviour resembles moral behaviour, it lacks key ingredients that would warrant 
it being called morally motivated behaviour. For example, in Chapter One I argued 
that while the eusocial insects appear capable of performing feats of incredible self-
sacrifice, this could not be labelled moral altruism because it is not morally motivated 
behaviour; that is, there is no conscious intent to behave altruistically. Central to 
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morality as it has been presented thus far, is the ability to both understand that others 
have minds and to form intentions based on this understanding of others' minds 
(theory of mind); it seems very unlikely that the eusocial insects have this capacity. 
Non-human primates also demonstrate a remarkable amount of behaviour which very 
closely resembles forms of moral behaviour that can be found in human societies. 
For example, chimpanzees regularly groom each other and share their food with each 
other. Non human primates are also very genetically close to humans, so we are 
further inclined to consider their behaviour more closely in terms of deciding whether 
or not they are able to form morally relevant intentions. It would, therefore, be 
interesting at this point to consider other primates to see the role - if any - that certain 
emotions actually do play in their behaviour. 
The first thing to note is that evidence for the existence of a theory of mind in other 
primates is sketchy; any evidence that is produced usually can be explained in other 
ways that do not even require mention of a theory of mind. For example, James 
Rachels, in his book Created from Animals (1990:150) discusses an experiment 
carried out by the North-western University Medical School which was aimed at 
seeing whether or not rhesus monkeys could be considered altruistic (Masserman et 
al., 1964). It has also been used as a landmark case in arguing for the existence of a 
theory of mind in non-human animals. 
To recall the details of the experiment in brief, two rhesus monkeys were put in co-
joining rooms. One of them was given the choice of two chains to pull in order to 
receive food, one of which gave access to a greater amount of food than the other. 
The chain that gave the greatest amount of food, however, also delivered an electric 
shock to the other rhesus monkey in full view of the monkey pulling the chains. The 
aim of the experiment was to see whether the observation of (let's say) monkey "A" 
being hurt as a result of monkey "B's" actions in securing food would deter monkey 
B from attempting to secure food a second time. After allowing the shock to happen 
once, it was found that in the majority of cases thereafter, the chain puller (monkey 
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"B") would choose the chain that gave it access to the lesser amount of food, rather 
than the chain which administered shock to monkey "A." In an extreme case, one 
monkey almost starved itself for 12 days before pulling the chains at all. It was also 
found, interestingly enough, that the instance of monkeys refusing to pull the chains 
that delivered shocks was increased if the monkey had spent any time previously with 
the monkey undergoing the shocks. It was also increased if the chain — puller had 
experienced the shocks itself. Researchers concluded that that most rhesus monkeys 
would choose to go hungry, rather that causing one of their conspecifics pain by 
attempting to attain food. 
This example has been used not only as an example of moral altruism in non human 
animals, but also as an indication of the rhesus monkey's capacity for empathy. It is 
assumed in this case that the reason that the monkeys refused to pull the chains is 
because they were aware of the pain they were causing in their conspecifics and on 
the basis of an empathetic reaction, attempted to end it. The fact that the incidence of 
shocks diminished even further when the monkeys were familiar with each other was 
used as further proof that these primates have a theory of mind; not only do they 
appear to feel empathy, but they are also capable of sympathetic "feelings" toward 
others that they "know". 
But are we actually able to say this conclusively? After all, there are alternative 
possible and plausible explanations for such behaviour. For example, it could be 
argued that perhaps the monkey was merely frightened by what it saw without any 
particular comprehension of the given situation or any understanding of what was 
happening in the minds of the monkey receiving the shocks. Moreover, it should also 
be noted that not all of the monkeys in the particular experiment responded in such a 
way — some took their food regardless of what was going on. In a comprehensive 
article addressing this issue, C.M. Heyes gives an overview of some of the prominent 
literature and concludes as follows; 
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Unlike in research on the development of theory of mind in 
childhood... no substantial progress has been made through 
this work with nonhuman primates. A survey of empirical 
studies of imitation, self-recognition, social relationships, 
deception, role-taking and perspective-taking suggests that in 
every case where nonhuman primate behaviour has been 
interpreted as a sign of theory of mind, it could instead have 
occurred by chance or as a product of non-mentalistic 
processes such as associative learning or inferences based on 
non-metal categories (Heyes, 1998: 101). 
The findings, as this quote suggests are, of course, not conclusive. For the purposes 
of this work, however, they do not need to be. As emphasized throughout this thesis, 
it is extremely likely that other animals do possess varying degrees of the same or 
similar neurological functioning as humans. What becomes clear from many of the 
examples offered such as some of those discussed here, is that they are not as obvious 
or perhaps do not play as significant a role in the lives of the animals in question. 
While Kanzi the chimpanzee may indeed be able to communicate with humans, it is a 
capacity that was developed outside of his natural habitat and also, more importantly, 
is considered to be an exceptional case: his foster mother — who the researchers had 
originally tried to teach - was not able to communicate in a like manner. 
In sum, there is often something which differentiates like behaviour between humans 
and other animals with regards to morality; this "something", I conclude, is the fact 
that they do not have — or do not use — the same type of biological traits that humans 
have. While reciprocal altruism seems to be prevalent in chimpanzee groups, for 
example, altruistic actions performed with no expectation of return are rare. 
Reciprocal altruism, I argued in the previous section, is not the same thing as moral 
altruism. In fact, in one study by a group of some of the most eminent names in 
primatology, it was concluded that chimpanzees, our closest living relatives alongside 
the bonobos, manifest no concern for the well being of unrelated chimpanzees at all, 
further suggesting that empathy and its constituent capacities are less developed in 
chimpanzees (Silk et al., 2005: 1359). Jeremy Kagan also supports the argument that 
other primates are not able to experience central morally relevant emotions, such as, 
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for example, guilt. This, he claims, is because they do not appear to have the 
cognitive capacity to understand consequences, to remember past cases and draw 
inferences from these cases, or to apply rules or evaluate actions. In his own words: 
The emotion of guilt, which is central to human morality, 
cannot occur in any primate other than humans because guilt 
requires the agent to know that a voluntary act has hurt 
another and the behaviour could have been suppressed. Guilt 
requires the ability to infer the stat of another, to reflect on a 
past action, to compare the products of that reflection with an 
acquired standard, to realize that a particular action that 
violated a standard could have been inhibited, and, finally, to 
evaluate the self's virtue as a consequence of that violation. 
Guilt is not a possible state for chimps. Indeed, these animals 
are unable to make much simpler inferences; for example, 
they do not assume that a blindfolded adult can not see their 
actions (Kagan, 2000: 48). 114 
In conclusion, then, while other primates appear to have social rules, these rules do 
not seem to qualify as being moral rules: instances of moral-like behaviour, for 
example, can be more readily explained as being self-serving primarily (such as in the 
case of reciprocal altruism). That this is the case can be attributed to what evidence 
suggests is a lack of ability to form "other regarding" intentions that characterise 
many human moral rules. This is due to the fact that they do not seem to be able to 
conceive of the mind-states of their conspecifics. 
The study of other animals also sheds light on our own development, as it allows us 
to draw conclusions based on differences in behaviour between humans and other 
animals and the differences in mechanisms that produce that behaviour. In this case, 
we could argue that one of the central characteristics which enables humans to 
develop morally relevant intentions is the ability to be able to consider the wants and 
needs of others. This is supported by the fact that other primates do not seem to be 
able to give such consideration to others, which might explain why it is that their 
114  Kagan acknowledges that his findings are based on research taken from Povinelli & Eddy (1996). 
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rules do not resemble the moral rules of human groups in that they are not generally 
other-regarding. 
Summary 
Good and Evil are names that sigmly our appetites and aversions, which 
in different tempers, customs, and doctrines of men are dzfferent 
(Hobbes, 1651: ch 5). 
Recent studies of the emotions have provided significant contributions to the 
consideration of connections between morality and human biology. To begin with, 
they underline the important roles that different biological capacities play in our 
ability to behave, reflect or be motivated in a morally relevant way. In particular, 
emotions emerge as being central to the generation of concern and care for others. In 
this Part of the thesis I have suggested that the emotions themselves appear to have a 
neurological — and thus biological — basis: different parts of the brain seem 
responsible for the generation of different emotions, for example. Impairment to 
parts of the brain generally activated in experiencing certain morally relevant 
reportedly reduces ability to, for example, distinguish the moral from the ordinary 
rule. This, in particular, appears to be the case with various psychopaths that have 
been studied which suggests that the ability to experience certain emotions is central 
to one's ability to form moral intentions and to understand moral concepts. This, in 
turn, suggests that morality is ultimately a product of human biological mechanisms. 
The findings also aid in filling in some of the explanatory gaps encountered thus far 
in my account of morality. For example, one of the major puzzles arising from a 
purely prosocial account of morality concerns the issue of how humans have come to 
be concerned for non-related humans and even other species, as pointed out at the 
beginning of this section. I have argued here that the same capacities that enhance 
our biological fitness in terms of securing connections with kin are also central in 
securing emotionally based connections with others. The existence of such capacities 
thus also serves to explain why some of our moral behaviour departs from behaviour 
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that can be explained solely or even partially in terms of its contribution to fitness 
enhancement. The vegetarian's moral stance is difficult to explain if one takes the 
view that moral rules are merely social facilitators, since in some environments 
vegetarianism is likely to cause social marginalisation rather than inclusion. The fact 
that we are able to empathise with others beyond our group bridges these explanatory 
gaps significantly. 
More importantly, however, the existence of emotions accounts in part for what has 
been referred to as the "moral ought"; that is, a call to action (or to refrain from 
action) on the basis of it being the right (or wrong) thing to do where the "right" and 
"wrong" require no further justification. I might understand that causing harm to 
somebody is unpleasant for them; but when I see it happen, an ensuing feeling of 
sympathy or empathy may make it a personally negative emotional experience for 
me. Consequently, I not only understand that the action is wrong, I also feel that it is 
wrong. Such an explanation goes part of the way towards explaining Joyce's moral 
"Oomph" — that is to say, the conviction that some things just are right or wrong, and 
this in spite of what we may have been told to the contrary. 
In sum, then, it seems highly likely that human emotions are neurological adaptations 
that evolved because of the survival advantages they afforded our ancestors. It seems 
reasonable to postulate that some of these advantages included the attachments they 
enabled between caretakers and their offspring, for example. They also seem to have 
contributed significantly to the process of extensive socialisation of humans via 
facilitating extensive cooperation between non-kin as well, and enabling the 
development and maintenance of social bonds. These bonds, in turn, provide 
adaptive advantages to human beings — at least for some of the time. 
Morality is one of the bi-products of these adaptations, and likewise, has served 
adaptive-like ends. The fact that human emotions may not have been selected for this 
"exapted" function does not detract from the argument that morality is inextricably 
linked to human biology. Nor does the fact that moral rules are not always employed 
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for adaptive ends detract from the argument. Without some of the biological 
capacities discussed so far, morality as we know it could not have developed. 
Morality as such has not escaped Wilson's leash in terms of its origins. 
I suggest, therefore, that David Hume was right to insist on the importance of the 
emotions in explaining morality. Where he was mistaken, however, was in granting 
them omnipotence in explaining moral motivation. Reason, he argued, is implicated, 
but is not central to morality. As he famously put it, "Reason is, and ought only to be 
• the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and 
obey them" (1994 [1739-40]):119). In the section to come, this view will be 
challenged. For while it is undeniable that emotions play a vital role in the generation 
of moral intentions, I will argue that reason also has a significant role to play. 
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Not only does morality constrain our choices and actions, but it does so 
in an impartial way, reflecting the equal rationality of the persons 
subject to constraint.... The foundational crisis of morality is thus 
resolved by exhibiting the rationality of our compliance with mutual, 
rationally agreed constraints on the pursuit of our desires, aims, and 
interests. Although bereft of a basis in objective values or an objectively 
purposive order, and confronted by a more fundamental mode of 
justification, morality survives by incorporating itself into that mode. 
Moral considerations have the same status, and the same role in 
explaining behaviour, as the other reasons acknowledged by a rational 
deliberator. We are left with a unified account of justification, in 
which an agent's choices and actions are evaluated in relation to his 
preferences — to the concerns that are constitutive of his sense of self. 
But since morality binds the agent independently of the particular 
content of his preferences, it has the prescriptive grip with which the 
Christian and Kantian views have invested it (Gauthier, 1998:125). 
Introduction 
A significant amount of time has been spent emphasising the role our emotions play 
in motivating us to uphold moral principles. I have argued that an important part of 
this role lies in their contribution to generating the belief that moral principles are 
categorically binding. This focus has been principally a response to one of the major 
puzzles presented in this thesis, namely, how it is that we come to believe that moral 
principles are categorically binding in the first place. Our affective system is not, 
however, the only source of either this belief or the morals principles themselves. It 
often works hand in hand with — or is sometimes even preceded by - reasoned 
argument. 
In this chapter, the role of reason in morally relevant matters will be explored. To 
begin with, the various ways in which reason might be employed to make moral 
choices will be discussed. Included in this discussion will be the observation that 
reasoning can help determine how it is that we are going to apply existing moral 
norms, as well as whether or not the moral rules are still relevant in the creation of 
new moral norms. 
190 
These issues, however, are not so much about moral motivation as they are about 
formulating and applying moral rules. In this section, I will also argue that while 
emotions are at the heart of moral inotivation in the sense that they provide the 
"clout" of morality, it is nonetheless possible to become morally motivated 
consequent to a process of reasoning alone. For example, someone's reasons for 
upholding a particular moral stance may stem directly from what they feel 
emotionally propelled to do. It is possible, however, that they may reason themselves 
out of what they feel emotionally compelled to do in order to do what they consider 
to be their moral duty, for example. I will elaborate this point with reference to 
arguments presented by Jonathon Haidt, Neil Levy and Peter Singer. 
Finally, the idea of moral responsibility and moral identity will be explored in this 
chapter. Firstly, moral responsibility will be discussed to highlight the capacities 
usually required for one to be considered a moral agent. Secondly, while not directly 
linked to reason and reflection, I will discuss moral identity since it seems to accord 
often with a rational process of deciding how it is that one wishes to be perceived. A 
desire to establish a particular moral identity can thus also be considered to be a 
source of moral motivation. 
In this chapter, then, I will further my argument that morality is the bi-product of 
various biological capacities. Importantly, however, highlighting the role that reason 
has to play in generating moral concepts will reinforce my claim that morality cannot 
be considered an adaptation. As stated in Part One, an adaptation is a distinct 
biological trait that can be passed on from genome to genome. The core features of 
morality cannot be explained with reference to a single biological trait, but rather 
with reference to many. Morality cannot, then, be considered a biological adaptation 
itself. At the end of this chapter, I will re-state these arguments in the context of 
Richard Joyce's postulate that there might be such a thing as a singular adaptation 
which accounts for morality. 
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9:1 Reasons and Reasoning 
In Part One I argued that in order to behave in what is considered a morally relevant 
way one has to intend to do so. To do this would obviously require the ability to 
form, think and reason about one's intentions in the first place. Indeed, one of the 
features which I claim distinguishes moral altruism from the altruism of the bee or the 
ant is that the insect seems to be responding to biological cues, where as the human is 
aware of possibilities available and can make intentioned choices amongst them. 
These choices will often be based on a reasoning process in which one will firstly 
consider the options, the consequences of each option, and then decide which might 
best help one attain one's aim the best (Ayala, 1998). 
Reasons and reasoning are also central to judging the moral status of certain actions. 
For example, moral injunctions against stealing are very common cross-culturally. 
Deciding whether or not something counts as stealing, or even judging the severity of 
the stealing incident, however, will require a consideration of the particular 
circumstance. For instance, one might be much more likely to consider stealing a 
loaf of bread in order to prevent one's children from starving to death less immoral 
than stealing bread just for the thrill such actions might elicit. These are just a few 
examples of the sorts of occasions on which we are likely to specifically use reason in 
moral decision making. It is what Jonathon Haidt, (whose position will be discussed 
presently) refers to as the process of "moral reasoning" which he defines as 
"...conscious mental activity that consists of transforming given information about 
people in order to reach a moral judgment" (Haidt, 2001: 819). 115 
In general, life throws up a continual stream of different situations which call upon 
such reasoning processes. Above I mentioned the problem of judging particular 
actions according to the circumstances which lead to their performance. Sometimes, 
however, this process can become quite difficult, particularly when conflicting or 
115 Haidt claims that he is basing this definition on the work of Galotti (1989). 
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novel circumstances arise; indeed, some of the more contentious of modern moral 
dilemmas hinge on decisions about the application of certain moral rules to situations 
which do not seem clear-cut. Euthanasia, abortion and stem-cell research, for 
example are issues that rouse much debate about, amongst other things, the 
application of moral injunctions against killing. In the case of abortion, for example, 
significant debate hangs on the decision as to whether a foetus could be considered a 
person or not. Deciding the issue in order to make a moral judgement will require a 
process of reasoning and reflection about what, in this case, constitutes "a person". 
The points made so far in this section have been principally focussed on the 
importance of moral reasoning in the moral decision making process — that is to say, 
they have been concerned with the way in which we use reason to apply moral rules 
to a range of changing circumstances. What is not so clear, however, is whether or 
not reason has a central role in motivating us to adopt and apply a particular moral 
rule in the first place. I will now consider this question. 
9:2 Reason or Emotion: A genuine tug of war? 
A recurrent theme in Ethics concerns the role of both reason and emotion in the 
formation of moral judgements. This could be characterised as a sort of 
Kantian/Humean "tug of war", a struggle which epitomizes a debate that has divided 
philosophers for centuries. Hume, as we have seen, argued for the primacy of the 
emotions as moral motivators. He did not, however, deny that reason has a role to 
play in moral matters: 
...in order to pave the way for such a sentiment [i.e. a 
sentiment that forms the basis of a moral judgement] and give 
a proper discernment of its object, it is often necessary...that 
much reasoning should precede, that nice distinctions be 
made, just conclusions drawn, distant comparisons formed, 
complicated relations examined, and general facts fixed and 
ascertained (Hume, 1752).h 16 
116 As quoted in James Rachels (1991, 432). The insertion in this quote is Rachels' insertion. 
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Here Hume refers to the process of reasoning about circumstances relevant to our 
moral decision-making, much as I have done in the preceding paragraphs: it says 
nothing about motivation, however. For Hume, it is the emotions which provide the 
moral motivation, since it is these that "affect us"; reason, according to Hume, cannot 
do this. Kant, on the other hand, denied that this was the case, claiming rather that it 
is a response to moral duty which renders an act morally relevant in the first place 
and it is reason, not emotions which leads us to the knowledge of the moral law — and 
hence our duty. 
There is little need to enter too far into a discussion of either of these individual 
positions in great detail, particularly that of Kant which involves a complicated 
metaphysic which has little direct relevance to this thesis. One point that is relevant, 
however, is a common criticism of Kant's approach. This is the claim that in 
focusing on duty and reason we remove ourselves from what for many is key to 
moral motivation; a feeling of care for another, which, as it has been argued here, 
generates the desire to help someone. This, in fact, is part of Hume's reasoning for 
considering human emotions as the relevant source of moral motivation. 
As stated above, the question of moral motivation is one that has been debated for 
centuries. More recently, Jonathon Haidt, whom we encountered briefly in the 
discussion of morally relevant emotions, has joined the debate, providing a surge of 
support in favour of the human affective system as a prime mover in the making of 
and acting upon moral judgements. He proposes what he terms the "social 
intuitionist" model where "moral intuitions" are defined as "...the sudden appearance 
in consciousness of a moral judgment, including an affective valence (good-bad, like-
dislike), without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of searching, 
weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion" (Haidt, 2001: 819). What needs to be 
noted here is that Haidt is not making a straight reason/emotion dichotomy, since for 
him the term "intuitions" does not denote emotions only. He does, however, focus 
significantly on emotional response, and since this thesis too has been focused on 
exploring emotions, Haidt's points are highly relevant here. 
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Haidt's main argument is that reasoning, while relevant to moral judgements, is not 
often the process by which we form moral judgments. Reasoning, he claims, is 
usually a process which (if it occurs at all) comes after the judgement as an "ex post 
facto process" and serves to rationalise what one has already concluded." 7 He 
illustrates his point with a number of arguments and examples, sourced from a wide 
range of independent studies. Of relevance to this thesis in particular, however, are 
his arguments which focus on incest. In sum, he claims that while people tend to give 
rational explanations for the incest taboo (much the same as I did in Part One of this 
thesis) it is actually an emotional reaction to incest which explains why we come to 
believe that it is wrong and are thus motivated to avoid it; according to Haidt, the 
explanations come after the reaction as we attempt to rationalize our emotional 
reactions to explain them more cogently - or to legitimize them - to others. To 
illustrate, he considers a one-off consensual sexual encounter between an adult 
brother and sister in which contraceptive precautions are taken, and there are no 
subsequent ill feelings. Here is a scenario in which most of the rationalised 
arguments for the "wrongness" of incest - some of which I suggested myself in Part 
One - do not seem to apply. And yet, he argues, we still feel that something is 
morally wrong about this scenario. This "feeling", he argues, is the product of an 
immediate emotionally based intuition that incest is wrong. 118 In his own words, 
In the social intuitionist model, one feels a quick flash of 
revulsion at the thought of incest and one knows intuitively 
that something is wrong. Then, when faced with a social 
demand for a verbal justification, one becomes a lawyer 
trying to build a case rather than a judge searching for the 
truth (Haidt, 2004: 814). 
117 In this he is in accord with Freud (1900), who made a similar point. 
118 This explanation accords quite well with the account given of biological mechanisms discussed in Part One 
which inhibit the practice of incest. While the disinterest or even repulsion fostered by the mechanisms was 
concluded to be too weak to account for the social taboos, this was mainly due to the fact that incestuous scenarios 
appeal to much stronger emotional reactions in us — such as those in which children are involved, or in which 
there is not consent. 
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To further support his claims, Haidt discusses the way people seem to flounder for 
justifications of their moral judgements when the case at hand appears to "slip 
between the cracks," such as in his example of the incestuous encounter between an 
adult-brother and sister. For Haidt, the frequency of this response to in-depth 
questioning about our reasons — which he elsewhere refers to as a state of being 
"morally dumbfounded"(Haidt et al. 2000) — is evidence that moral reasoning usually 
occurs after the judgement has been made as part of a process of rationalisation. 
Haidt's arguments fit in well with the conclusions drawn in this thesis so far. While 
this, of course, is no reason on its own to accept them, the explanatory power that 
they have, is good reason. In particular, it completes the explanation of moral 
motivation given earlier in this part of the thesis where I concluded, for example, that 
moral rules appear to differ from other rules because of our belief that they are 
somehow intrinsically right or wrong. This belief, in turn, was explained as the 
product of either the positive or negative experiences that certain situations engender. 
These experiences often feel intrinsically right or wrong in many cases, but often for 
reasons that we are at a loss to explain — we are, indeed, often "morally 
dumbfounded" when a situation arises in which we must explain them. That we later 
justify these reactions in terms of them somehow being morally right or wrong 
(thereby implying that they are, as such, categorically binding) is well explained by 
the claim that we are simply rationalizing or "objectifying" the fact that we 
emphatically do or don't like a particular situation and emphatically do or don't want 
it to continue. 
Bruce Waller is another philosopher who challenges the assumption that morality is 
always dependent on rational reflection. Using the example of rescuing a child who 
is about to fall off a cliff, Waller demonstrates how it is possible that an act be 
considered morally motivated without it having been preceded by a series of 
considerations about what should be done in the situation. In the case at hand, in fact, 
deliberation as to whether or why one ought to save the child would seem, on the 
contrary, to be quite immoral. The person standing by who instantly reaches out to 
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save the child without such deliberation may say in hindsight that they acted to save 
the child, but at the time, appeared to act without any such deliberation; in fact such 
deliberation would usually have been fatal at the time of the event. Waller refers to 
this as "non reflective...intentional moral behaviour" (Waller, 1997:343). He claims 
that talk about acting upon reasons can be misleading in its implication that moral 
behaviour is always based on rational reflection. For Waller, it is the original 
intention that counts in pinpointing the source of moral motivation, and this is not 
always reason based. 
There are different ways of responding to this point. One might, for example, argue 
that Waller's example does not really prove what he sets out to prove. While it is true 
that the rescuer may not have paused to think about what would be the correct course 
of action, it is also true that the rescuer, as an adult, has presumably had a lifetime of 
experience with the type of moral reasoning that would lead to such a response. 
Many moral norms are so firmly entrenched in us that it is not surprising that we do 
not deliberate each time we behave in a moral manner. A situation as simple as the 
one given, that is, "child in danger — need to help", could be processed in a 
microsecond based on our prior knowledge that that is what we ought to do: 
deliberation - no, but indirect application of reason - yes. Alternatively, Waller's 
claims can be used as further support for Haidt's argument that we act on "intuitions" 
which are instantaneous and about which we reflect later. 
What this scenario highlights is the difficulty involved in isolating the prime source 
of motivation in the making of moral judgements. This is not a problem. For while I 
have argued that emotional responses are at the core of much that motivates us 
morally, I nevertheless maintain that reason also can take this place at times. Indeed 
it should be noted that Jonathan Haidt himself does not rule out the role of reason in 
motivating moral behaviour and judgements either. He correctly claims, for instance, 
that people often use moral reasoning to persuade others to adopt their moral 
positions. That is, moral reasoning is often used in a social context in which moral 
positions are being discussed. What Haidt disputes, however, is the idea that moral 
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reasoning has a significant causal role in our own private moral deliberations and 
judgements. While he does not say that it never occurs he nevertheless maintains that 
it is rare. In his own words, "People engage in moral reasoning not so much to figure 
things out for themselves in private but to influence others" (Haidt, 2004: 284). In 
fact, he narrows the occurrence of private moral reasoning down to those actively 
involved in the domain of philosophy, mentioning Peter Singer's arguments, 
moreover, as examples of the kind of "very disturbing conclusions" which result from 
using reason alone to motivate moral judgements (Haidt, 2001: 829). I contend that 
Haidt underestimates the role reason plays as a private moral motivator. By way of 
illustration, I will discuss one of Singer's perhaps less "disturbing conclusions" — that 
we should not kill animals or food. 
Singer's position (sketched in more detail in Chapter 7) is that it is wrong to kill 
animals for food based on an argument that includes animals other than humans in the 
group of organisms which ought not to be harmed because of their "sentience." That 
is to say, he argues that if we claim that the "wrongness" of causing humans 
unnecessary suffering derives from their ability to feel pain, then we should also 
apply this moral reasoning to other animals which are also capable of feeling pain. 
While it is true that the moral rule — "one ought not to cause sentient beings to suffer 
unnecessarily" — is already established, the extension of this to other animals is based 
on a process of reasoning. It in turn creates a new moral rule; that it is wrong to kill 
non-human animals. The motivation in this case, however, appears to stem from a 
rational, rather than an emotional basis since in extending the moral rule, I am doing 
so in response to reason-based persuasion. Reason, then, is implicated directly in 
both the making of moral judgements, and importantly, generating the motivation 
required for acting in accordance with them. Neil Levy agrees: 
Why is it that the circle of moral concern has grown over the 
past two hundred years, so that many people formerly 
excluded from it, or given little moral weight, have been 
included as full members of the moral community: people of 
all races, homosexuals, women, increasingly even animals? 
These changes have been too swift and too widespread to 
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reflect genetic mutations. Instead, they are much more 
plausibly seen to be the upshot of moral argument (Levy 
2004: 84). 
While of course Singer is himself a professional philosopher, and hence he falls under 
the limited domain of "private moral reasoners" delineated by Haidt, it seems 
somewhat exaggerated to suggest that this form of reasoning is such a rarity. It does 
not seem unreasonable to suggest, for instance, that a person considering Singer's 
arguments will either accept or reject his moral reasoning by engaging the very same 
reasoning skills that Singer has used to form the arguments in the first place. Perhaps 
this process thereby renders such people "philosophers" themselves. As mentioned in 
section 9:1, however, the rapidity of changes in world technology, combined with the 
increased problems of limited resources and over population, for example, have 
entailed that philosophers and non-philosophers alike are increasingly being faced 
with moral quandaries of a rich and diverse nature. These, moreover, may and often 
do entail the rational reconsideration of long-standing moral and emotional 
commitments. So while I agree with Haidt's emphasis on the role that the human 
affective system has to play in forming moral judgements, I think it is unreasonable 
to suggest that it is only a very small percentage of the population that engages in the 
type of private moral reasoning that is capable of affecting their moral judgement. . 
Singer, for example, points to another important role that reason has to play with 
regards to morality; this is the role it plays in helping us to defend our values — or 
extend them - to others. According to Singer, we often attempt to do this by 
justifying them in terms of "...some broader impartial principle" (1981: 109). I have 
also suggested this. If we cannot do this, our principles simply remain personal 
preferences that "...from the collective point of view, should receive no more weight 
than other preferences" (1981:110). So even though we sometimes use moral 
concepts to express the strength of our convictions specifically (although perhaps not 
consciously) we generally do not want them to be perceived as being subjective, since 
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as such, we might lose a lot of the power we have in extending our convictions to 
others. I 9 
Reason-based considerations often come into play not only in the objectification of 
our moral principles, but also in the determination of dilemmas that arise between 
what one considers to be one's moral duty towards others, and one's own desires for 
oneself. In other words, we use a process of reasoning to motivate ourselves when we 
otherwise might not feel motivated. For example, sometimes it might appear 
appropriate to forgo one's personal desires or inclinations in order to behave in what 
one believes (based on a process of reasoning) is a morally correct way. 21 0 This 
requires the ability to reason in favour of an alleged ascendancy of what we feel to be 
our moral duty over our own personal preference and to be thereby motivated to 
forgo the latter for the former. A good example of how this might occur could be the 
oft-used case of the crying baby in the war zone. In this scenario, a group of people 
are huddled in a bunker trying to hide from the approaching enemy. Suddenly the 
baby of one of those hiding starts crying. The dilemma consists of either choosing to 
suffocate one's own baby in order to save everybody, or allowing the baby to 
continue to cry, in which case everybody would die. It is reasonable to imagine that 
the mother's personal desire would be to save her baby. Reason, however, might be 
able to move her to do what would perhaps be considered her moral duty; i.e. saving 
the other people. 
That there is such a potential for conflict between the notion of duty and emotionally 
charged preference is also illustrated quite well by Phillipa Foot's famous trolley car 
scenario (Foot, 1967). In one of the variations of this scenario, a trolley car is 
"9 Singer goes on to use this argument as the basis for his Utilitarianism, claiming that if we are being 
rational, we will come to see that our interests are not any more important than others' interests, and 
that as such we should give them equal consideration. This, he argues, is "...a uniquely rational basis 
for ethical decision-making" (1981:110). While I will not be making any normative claims in this 
thesis about what we "ought to do" as Singer has done here, what I retain nonetheless from Singer's 
argument is the process whereby we might use reasoning to both arrive at moral rules, and, 
importantly, the way we often use our reason to extend our "preferences" to others. 
120 Peter Woolcock also makes this point (2000:44). 
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careening out of control towards a crossroads which present two alternatives for 
continuation. If one leaves the trolley car to follow its natural course, it will kill five 
people who are in its path. If, however, somebody changes its course, the trolley will 
kill one person only. The difference is that the person who does this then becomes 
responsible for the death of the person in doing so. The difficulty here is that the idea 
of actually killing a person is morally repugnant to many people. If you were a 
Utilitarian, for example, you would be morally obliged to do it nonetheless since 
otherwise five people will be killed instead of one. 121 Such scenarios can be 
endlessly multiplied to illustrate the difficulty that is presented when one pits one's 
emotionally fuelled desires or inclinations against what one might rationally think is 
one's moral duty. 
As mentioned above, however, separating reason and emotion is not as clear cut an 
issue as it might appear on first considering these examples. For in most situations, 
reason and emotion do appear to be very much interdependent. For example, in the 
trolley car example, the belief that what we ought to do is save five people might be 
based partially on feelings of empathy for those five people, rather than being just a 
pure, reason-based decision. It might simply be less emotionally charged than the 
feelings that might arise from feeling personally responsible for killing somebody. 
One might argue, then, that in the cases given above, the ultimate motivation for 
acting is, in fact, emotional since the rational arguments themselves are based on the 
extension of one's empathetic considerations to others; the "expanding of the 
circle". 122 
Also, while a sense of moral duty might not accord with what we feel most deeply 
about, emotions may still come into play in the form of shame or guilt if we 
transgress what we have reasoned is our duty. For example, as children we are often 
taught what constitutes our moral duties; that is to say, we are taught what it is that 
121 Of course, this is one of the main criticisms levelled at Utilitarianism as well; that is, that it seems 
too rational and calculating in its approach, weighing up numbers and outcomes at the expense of the 
individual circumstance and the emotional basis certain moral decisions carry with them. 
122 This is a variation of W.E.H Lecky's (1869) famous expression, from which Peter Singer derived 
the title of his book, The expanding circle (1981). 
201 
we ought to do. Later on in life, the moral rules may be reinforced by our emotional 
artillery such as when we transgress a moral rule and subsequently feel guilt about 
what we are do. This may be the result of specific self assessment or it may just arise 
without our evoking it. In any case, these emotions arise from thinking about our 
actions and ourselves as perpetrators of these actions. 
Emotional reaction to a situation may also follow a decision that something is right or 
wrong based primarily on reasoned argument in its favour. As Neil Levy expresses 
the same argument, "...sentiment follows conviction: it does not always lead it" 
(Levy 2004: 84). In the case of vegetarianism, for example, we may not have thought 
about the sentience of other animals. On rational reflection of Singer's argument, we 
may accept his reasons for not eating other animals and become committed 
vegetarians. This reasoning may be partially based on feelings of sympathy or 
empathy for other animals who we now consider to be capable of feeling pain, like 
humans for whose suffering we feel empathy. 
Finally, emotions may be deliberately used to bolster one's rational argument. This is 
also one of Haidt's points. He claims that it is this, moreover, rather than the logic of 
argument, which has the most power to persuade people (Haidt, 2001: 819). Such 
emotional persuasion or appeal is one that is often used, for example in the 
campaigns of anti-abortionists and animal liberationists. Pictures of aborted foetuses 
and mutilated animals are designed to provoke the kinds of emotional distress that are 
so effective in moral persuasion of this type. 
While these scenarios might be considered revelatory in terms of what drives our 
moral motivation, however, as stated above they do not require a decision as to 
whether it is reason or emotion which is behind a particular moral decision; this thesis 
is not arguing for the legitimacy of reason over emotion in terms of either one being 
the unique source of moral motivation. Indeed it cannot, since one of the 
ramifications of my arguments is that moral rules have no ultimate objective truth, 
but are rather dependent on the beliefs, needs and desires of those that uphold it. 
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Arguing that either reason or emotion is the more legitimate source of moral 
motivation would be to suggest that there is some kind of external standard applicable 
to morality. 
One thing we can do, however, is offer theories about which came first in the story of 
the development of morality. What I have argued so far is that moral concepts spring 
primarily from the ability to experience emotions and the motivation that these 
emotional experiences provide. The argument goes further than this, though. It has 
also been argued that the very belief that there is moral right and wrong often stems 
from these emotional experiences. In Section 2:1 I also concluded that while we do 
not have definitive answers regarding the adaptive function of many traits, some are 
considered more plausible than others. There is very good reason, for example, to 
maintain that emotions such as empathy have an adaptive role in assuring the bonding 
process between caretaker and offspring. These same biological mechanisms that 
regulate emotional responses seem to also be widely present in the animal kingdom, 
suggesting that they most likely evolved in a common ancestor that predates humans; 
that is, to use the appropriate terminology, they are "homologous traits". In terms of 
a time frame, then, it is reasonable to suggest that the emotions have priority since 
advanced levels of reasoning appears to be a human phenomenon, and as such, is 
much more recent. The fact that reasoning contributes to the passage from "moral 
intuition" to moral rule, could be the key to explaining why humans have moral rules 
in the first place. That other primates do not appear to have either advanced 
reasoning ability or advanced moral systems (indeed- arguably any moral systems) 
further suggests that there is a connection between both reason and emotion in the 
formation of moral rules. 
Before leaving this section I will highlight the interconnectedness of reason and 
emotion one more time by addressing a common criticism of the argument that 
emotions and desires are not strong enough to explain the categorical force of 
morality. Richard Joyce expresses this criticism quite well: 
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...we have evolved an innate disposition in favour of certain 
types of action, against certain others. This disposition is not 
merely the development of appropriate emotions or desires: it' s 
not merely that I want to look after my children — but I feel 
that I ought to. I feel, if you will, that there is a requirement 
upon me to look after my children; that I must. Desires, after 
all, are unreliable things: after a long day, a parent might not 
particularly want to care for the children...Morality as a 
system of categorical imperatives compensates for the 
limitations of desire (Joyce, 2000: 715). 
Here I argue that our emotions may still explain why we feel that we ought to look 
after our children. When, however, we do not have this desire for one reason or 
another, human rationality might step in to fill in the gaps that our flagging emotions 
may at times leave open. I might, for example, be experiencing anger towards my 
children that takes away any desire I have to look after them. In this case, the anger 
could even eclipse the strength of our emotional attachment to them. Reflection, 
however, will often serve as a reminder of what we value, especially at times when 
our values are undermined is such a way. So while we still have the "ought," it is 
being temporarily derived from another source, however. 
In sum, then it seems fairly clear that both reasoning and emotional capacity are 
central motifs in the explanation of not only moral motivation, but also the 
development of morality in the first place. John Teehan agrees, claiming that since 
both increased intelligence and the evolution of more complex emotional capacity 
most plausibly were evolutionary responses to the requirements of social living, it 
seems foolish to pit them as being "...the eternal combatants of most dualistic 
philosophies...". Rather, they should be considered as "partners" in the effort to 
manage human sociality (Teehan, 2003: 52). As partners, moreover, they serve to 
explain how it is that we come to extend our own personal emotionally based 
reactions to certain situations to others via the moral "ought". As such this 
explanation provides a plausible alternative to Richard Joyce's moral sense as an 
explanation of how this process might occur. In Peter Singer's words, "Reasoning is 
inherently expansionist. It seeks universal application" (1981:99). 
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9:3 Moral responsibility 
While it is true that moral deliberation is not always central to our moral decisions, as 
Waller points out and as I have argued, moral deliberation is nonetheless often at the 
core of some of the moral decisions that we make as adults. Whether it be simply 
deciding when and where applying a particular moral tenet might be appropriate, or 
whether it be deciding whether or not the moral tenet itself is appropriate. In fact, we 
generally don't tend to consider someone even capable of being morally responsible 
if for some reason or another they are unable to engage in moral deliberation. This, 
in itself, is a strong argument for the central role reason maintains in motivating 
morality. For example, we are more likely to exempt somebody from moral 
responsibility if they can be shown to have had no choice in the way they behaved 
due to their inability to reason effectively. Children, for example, are not considered 
to be morally responsible because of their inability to understand moral concepts, 
amongst other things. This, however, is not so much because they are considered 
emotionally immature, but rather because they are intellectually immature. In the 
words of Jeanette Kennett: 
While young children display a proto moral awareness ... 
they are not yet full moral agents. It is at least in part their 
undeveloped capacity for rational deliberation and self-control 
that is critical in exempting them from the moral 
responsibility that attaches to full moral agents. (Kennett 
2006: 76) 
People under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or people with certain mental 
disabilities which impede their reasoning ability are also generally considered to be 
less responsible for their actions than those exercising full rational capacity, as 
mentioned previously. 
Interestingly, tests conducted on patients suffering damage to the VMPC 
(Ventromedial prefrontal cortex) have shown that while they score poorly in moral 
decision making involving empathetic responses, they are able to make the 
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calculations requisite for making a utilitarian decision in the case of moral dilemma 
(Tahni and Frith, 2007). In one experiment conducted, using the infamous runaway 
trolley case, it was discovered that in general the patient with VMPC damage was 
much more likely to push someone in front of the train to save the five people than 
the control participants. This has led researchers to speculate that damage to the 
VMPC affects the moral decision making only by removing the emotional component 
of the decision, but that this does not impede the agent's ability to decide on a 
particular course of action according to moral considerations (Talmi and Frith, 2007: 
866). 
What needs to be considered here, however, is whether or not a decision made which 
does not take into account the welfare of others, but is rather just a learned response 
could be considered morally intended. The conclusions of this thesis suggests not. 
Rather, it seems that moral rules become simply social rules to the agent in question. 
The psychopath, for example, may have learned what is and is not morally 
appropriate in their society, and may be able to apply these rules without too much 
difficulty but studies of psychopathy suggest that psychopaths are not able to make 
the distinction between conventional and moral reasons when it comes to considering 
rules (Blair, 1995, 1997; Kennett and Fine, 2008). In the words of Kennett and Fine: 
Their poor performance on the moral-conventional distinction 
task and their incompetence in the use of evaluative language, 
suggests that psychopaths deviate so significantly from the 
folk that it is reasonable, on empiric grounds, to conclude that 
they do not have mastery of the relevant moral concepts 
(2008:219). 
That is to say, they are not acting in response to rules that they consider to be morally 
right or wrong, but rather in response to a set of general rules that they know they are 
supposed to obey. This would seem to eliminate them from the class of "moral 
agents" to whom we can attribute moral responsibility. 
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This is a contentious point and while there is not the space or need here to enter the 
discussion more fully, a few relevant points should be mentioned. To begin with, it seems 
reasonable (based on the arguments presented in this thesis) to conclude that psychopaths 
cannot be considered morally responsible because they do not act with moral intent. This 
was also the reason that the eusocial insects are also not considered to be morally 
responsible agents. One might reply, however, that according to the arguments in this 
thesis, moral intent in humans also derives from biological adaptations over which (in 
reality) we have little control. Consequently, we might think we are intending to be 
morally altruistic, when in fact we are just appeasing the negative experiences seeing 
somebody else suffering elicits in us. In other words, morality is merely instrumental to 
self-serving ends. This would seem, in the words of Robert Trivers, to "...take the 
altruism out of altruism" (Trivers, 1971:35). 
This recalls a similar, traditional argument which is often pitted at altruism in general. 
According to this argument, it is not possible to act without self interest or expectation of 
some kind of personal gain. In response, we might point to altruistic acts which do not 
entail any chance of overt reciprocation, the recipient of one's favours being ignorant of 
their benefactor. Peter Singer uses the example of giving blood as being an act of non-
reciprocal, moral altruism, as testified by 98% of donors surveyed (Singer, 1981:133). It 
is possible, however, to judge even this as a selfish act of self-gratification. For while I 
receive no materialistic return for this act, I am nonetheless rewarded by the "warm, fuzzy 
feeling" that I experience at the thought of my fantastic self sacrifice. Bringing the 
argument back to the one I commenced in the previous paragraph, I might claim that I am 
not sacrificing myself in any way. Instead, I am relieving unpleasant feelings of guilt or 
empathy that sick people in need of blood transfusions might produce in me. In giving 
blood, then, I am thereby satisfying my own selfishly based desires to experience pleasure 
or to avoid pain and I am not behaving altruistically at all. This recalls Ghiselin's famous, 
somewhat eerie confirmation of this point; 
No hint of genuine charity ameliorates our vision of society, 
once sentimentalism has been laid aside. What passes for 
cooperation turns out to be a mixture of opportunism and 
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exploitation...Given a full chance to act in his own interest, 
nothing but expediency will restrain [a person] from 
brutalizing, from maiming, from murdering — his brother, his 
mate, his parent, or his childe. Scratch an "altruist" and watch 
a "hypocrite" bleed (Ghiselin, 1974: 247). 
But can altruism be so easily explained away. Is it impossible that humans can ever act in 
any way other than selfishly, or has a theory such as the one presented in this thesis 
succeeded in taking "...the altruism out of altruism" (Trivers, 1971: 35) rendering it an 
apparently empty term? Perhaps there is no such thing as genuine "moral altruism" at all. 
This conclusion, however, seems somewhat exaggerated. To begin with, we demand too 
much of moral altruism. While it is true that we do consider motivation central to moral 
altruism, what we consider to be the right kind of motivation is not as strict as presented 
in the above argument. To begin with, it has been argued here that there is no ultimate 
"good" or "bad", but rather a system of values inspired in humans by biological features 
that we have evolved. Amongst these biological features are those that inspire not only 
physical sensations in us, but also emotional experiences. While these may not be totally 
under our control, we do experience them as positive or negative. Recognising that others 
experience these as well and the desire to inspire positive rather than negative experiences 
in others may provide vicarious positive emotions for us, but the important detail is that 
we have the desire to help the other person. After all, there are always other options 
available that would be even more directly self-serving. I could, for example, choose to 
spend my time reading a good book if I am seeking pleasure-centred pastime. So while I 
may still be gaining positively myself from the altruistic exchange, the point is that there 
has been altruism; a desire to provide something positive for somebody else at the cost of 
using one's resources in a more directly self-serving way. The intent to benefit others at a 
cost to oneself for the sake of enhancing the others welfare without any expectation of 
personal gain is at the heart of moral altruism. 
In sum, then, the fact that our values spring ultimately from biological sources does 
not need to detract from that value. The love that one feels for one's family, the 
kindness one feels towards others may have biological origins, but the fact that we 
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feel them creates genuine value for us. This might not save morality for those who 
demand mind-independent facts as justificatory bases, but in terms of morality 
representing a value system that we have by virtue of being humans, morality still has 
a recognizable role to play as being the sum total of these values, desires and beliefs 
which form what we call moral intent. The psychopath does not appear to have the 
same types of beliefs or desires, nor, it would seem, does the ant or the bee (Fields, 
1996: 261). I conclude, then, that neither could be considered to behave with moral 
intentions. 
9:4 Moral identity 
Righteousness is a source of motivation. We gain by thinking 
that we are right, and by convincing our allies and 
enemies.. .It provides.., a rationale for sinking deeper into 
self-deception about our motives and for justifying acts that 
could not otherwise be justified (Alexander, 1987: 123). 
Thus far in this part of the thesis, a variety of sources of moral motivation have been 
explored. In this section, I will briefly touch on the idea of "moral identity" as 
another source of motivation. "Moral identity" is a term which refers to the way in 
which our personal moral codes impact on our idea of who we are; our personal 
identities, in other words. While it is not directly linked to reason, it has been placed 
in this chapter in recognition of the fact that it involves people reflecting about whom 
they are and attempting to shape their lives according to who they would like to be. 
Sam Hardy (2006) is particularly insistent on the inclusion of moral identity as a 
source of moral motivation. He refers in particular to a study by Colby and Damon 
of people throughout history who have been particularly noteworthy for their virtue. 
Amongst the findings was that the specific individuals' moral codes were intricately 
interwoven into the way in which they perceived themselves in terms of their beliefs, 
desires and motivation (Colby & Damon, 1992). This entails that we might 
sometimes be motivated to uphold moral principles because in doing so, we are being 
"true to who we are" or, importantly, "who we would like to be". 
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This leads to the next point: moral identity is also linked to one's reputation, as 
discussed earlier in the section on reward and punishment. It is better socially, to be 
perceived as someone who is trustworthy and honest in order to be able to embark on 
any venture which requires some degree of cooperation with another. People are less 
likely to want to interact with someone in a cooperative venture if they think the 
person in question is dishonest. On the reverse side, certain key positions in a social 
group demand a moral identity which appears to be of a reasonably high calibre 
(whether or not it actually is in reality); teachers, policemen, political leaders and 
religious practitioners in particular fall into this category and are expected by the 
community at large to exemplify the virtuous life. This perception of our moral 
identity would also provide motivation to lead this kind of life (or at least appear to 
do so) in order that we be deemed to be worthy of the roles in question. As such then, 
a desire to establish a positive "moral identity" could be included in the list of sources 
of moral motivation. 
9:5 Morality: adaptation, exaptation or neither? 
I have argued that there is much evidence in favour of the contention that morality is 
fundamentally connected to human biology. In Part Two, I offered arguments that 
the capacities required to actually form moral rules - as well as enforce them - 
required a number of capabilities themselves the product of biological adaptation 
(language, learning and teaching abilities, for example). In this part of the thesis I 
have argue that the human affective system is instrumental in generating the "moral" 
aspect of these rules via its contribution to our belief that these rules are categorically 
binding. Categorically binding rules may also emerge from a process of reasoning, 
either with or without a direct emotional input. What we have then is morality 
emerging from a number of different sources, which might call upon different 
capacities at different times. 
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Consequently, trying to find a particular "moral adaptation" becomes very difficult. I 
argue, moreover, that we do not actually need to postulate such an entity; the 
explanations for the origins and nature of moral judgements given thus far in the 
thesis are sufficient to account for what I have identified as the fundamental aspects 
of morality. I have also accounted for the variability of perceptions people have of 
morality in terms of the variety of sources from which they derive. For example, I 
have argued that sometimes we make moral decisions which might be influenced by 
the activation of innate biological mechanisms (altruistic behaviour towards 
offspring); sometimes we make moral judgements because we have been socialized 
into believing that they are morally correct; sometimes we make moral judgements in 
response to strong emotional reactions we have had; and, also, sometimes reflection 
alone can lead us to conclude that it is better to avoid or embrace certain moral rules. 
Pinning all of these pathways to morality down to the operation of one specific 
adaptation would not do justice to all of these variable aspects of morality. Rather, 
explaining them as the consequence of a number of different capacities and 
circumstances allows for morality to be explained in a more comprehensive and — 
more importantly — plausible way. 
Richard Joyce recognises the difficulty of pinpointing a "moral adaptation" but 
refuses to see in it the defeat of his postulate that morality or "moral thinking" has 
been biologically selected (2006: 140). He claims that morality, for instance, "...is a 
complicated and nebulous affair" and that "moral judgments no doubt implicate many 
different psychological and neural mechanisms" (2006: 141), but when he himself 
poses the all important question "which of the evolutionary processes...is responsible 
or the human moral sense?" he can only answer that "...we don't know" (2006: 140). 
As I have done, Joyce admits the logic of his argument is "inference to the best 
explanation". He nonetheless concludes that "innateness" is the best explanation for 
morality (2006: 137). This seems somewhat strange since himself (A) recognises the 
input of a number of implicated biological mechanisms, and (B) recognises that it is 
hard, in the first place, to even capture what morality is, but still wants to argue for a 
specific adaptation that accounts for morality. 
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In this thesis, on the other hand, I suggest that while the mechanisms producing the 
morally-relevant capacities were biologically selected and are innate in this sense, 
what Joyce refers to as the "moral sense" is unlikely to be a naturally selected trait 
since it depends on so many other adaptations. As such it is more plausibly 
represented as a bi-product of adaptation, rather than an adaptation itself. Neil Levy 
argues in a similar way, claiming that morality, instead of being an adaptation, is an 
"exaptation", a term we encountered in Chapter Two which denotes a trait which 
serves another role other that that for which it was selected. In his own words: 
I am suggesting that morality might be an exaptation. We 
evolved a set of moral emotions, and, as a consequence, a 
conception of morality as objective and unconditionally 
binding. We then exapted this concept: using it is an 
independent measure of behaviour (2004a: 86). 
While I agree with Levy that the word "exaptation" captures morality much better, I 
maintain still that caution is required with such language. To say that "morality is an 
exaptation" still suggests that there is a single adaptation that was then exapted, 
which, I argue, misrepresents morality. 
Summary 
It is reasonable to conclude that we are often motivated to behave in morally relevant 
ways based on a reason-based decision to do so. Also, reason comes to play in 
helping us determine both how we should apply a particular moral principle, and how 
we should judge the moral worth of a particular act. I also observed that sometimes 
our decision to uphold a particular moral principle may conflict with what we feel 
ought to be done. This, however, is not to suggest that moral decision making is 
always an either/or situation. Our motivation might stem from reasoned argument, 
but this argument might include consideration of how we actually feel about certain 
situations. I might, for example, decide to let a runaway trolley kill the five people 
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on the track because I reason that I could not live with the guilt of being personally 
responsible for the death of one person. 
In this chapter I also suggested that without the capacity to reason and reflect one 
cannot be considered morally responsible. This is why people who are intellectually 
impaired are not considered to be able to make morally relevant decisions. I followed 
this observation with a brief discussion of the idea of "moral identity" which I 
presented as more rationally based source of moral motivation. Here I concluded that 
some people deliberately set out to mould their lives according to a moral ideal that 
they have perceived. Living up to this ideal thus provides a strong source of moral 
motivation for them. 
I concluded this chapter with a consideration of how we might see Joyce's proposal 
of a "moral adaptation" in the light of conclusions I have sought to establish 
throughout Part Three. I argued that a consideration of the different ways in which 
we come to form moral intent precludes the possibility that we can talk about a single 
adaptive trait which accounts for all of these aspects. Furthermore, I contend that my 
account of moral motivation eliminates the requirement of a singular "moral 
adaptation" in any case. 
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In this part of the thesis I discussed moral motivation, arguing that it derives from 
different sources which are sometimes intimately connected, and at others are more 
disparate. I started with the contention that sometimes we are motivated to uphold 
moral rules in response to the prospect of reward or punishment. I concluded, 
however, that while such prospects might provide behavioural motivation, they are 
inadequate as an overall explanation for moral motivation. In particular, they cannot 
adequately explain why people choose to maintain particular moral positions 
regardless of whether there is social reward or punishment involved in doing so. 
This, I explained, is because what we consider genuine moral motivation derives 
from the intent to do (think, be...) things that are categorically "right" or "wrong", 
rather than from the intent to avoid punishment, or reap reward. I did, however, 
suggest that systems of punishment and reward may and do serve to inculcate moral 
principles and that consequently we may come to actually believe that they are 
categorically right or wrong indirectly via reward and punishment. 
At the core of this discussion, the moral "ought" made its reappearance. This I 
defined as a word which encapsulates belief we have that some actions (thoughts, 
characteristics...) are categorically, rather than instrumentally, right or wrong. I 
argued that it is this concept, for example, which differentiates the moral rule from 
the ordinary social rule. This discussion, in turn, gave rise to a distinction between 
two different types of moral code which are relevant to our lives; "public morality" 
and private or "personal" morality. I made this distinction here in recognition of the 
fact that sometimes we believe that certain things are morally right or wrong 
independently of what our social group might tell us to the contrary. I also suggested 
that public morality was more closely linked to the fitness enhancing (and hence 
more obviously instrumental) ends of social cohesion. Personal moral codes, on the 
other hand, are not as often thus orientated. I recognise, however, that much that will 
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constitute our personal moral codes will almost certainly overlap with the public 
moral code of our social group. 
As an illustration of the propensity of personal moral codes to stretch Wilson's 
"leash," I considered vegetarianism. Moral vegetarianism is particularly interesting 
since it is as an example of a moral principle which often leads to social 
marginalization, rather than social cohesion. This underlined my suggestion (made in 
Part Two) that moral rules have become more than mere socially useful injunctions; 
they seem rather to stem from a genuine belief in moral concepts such as "right" and 
"wrong". This observation ushered in the need to account for this belief. In Chapter 
8, then, I provided a lengthy discussion of the way in which belief in moral right and 
wrong arises from our emotional experience of the world. I concluded that our ability 
to experience emotions fills in some of the gaps that remain in explaining moral 
motivation, and the common belief that moral beliefs, thoughts and principles are 
categorically binding. In particular, I argued that emotions allow us to form 
attachments to others in the first place and lead us to behave in ways that promote or 
reject them. Many of our behavioural choices could be said to be fuelled by the 
positive or negative emotions the respective relationships generate. If they are 
positive feelings, we will wish to increase them, if they are negative, we will 
generally work towards eliminating or avoiding them altogether. Moral concepts as 
such become bound up in the expressions of our emotional reactions to others. For 
example, I argued that the capacity for empathy provides an affective motivation to 
help others by causing us to experience in part their suffering, thereby prompting us 
to alleviate it; that we see it as moral motivation stems in part from our belief 
(corroborated or initiated by our emotional experience) that it is wrong that they 
suffer. This experience we express using moral concepts. 
This observation led me to make an even stronger (and far more speculative) claim. I 
suggested that the very sensations our emotions engender are often experienced as 
evidence that something ought to or ought not to be the case in a more general sense. 
As such, moral concepts could plausibly be conceived as sometimes being the 
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expression of these deeply felt emotional experiences and the fact that they are of an 
intrinsically pleasurable or painful nature. That these experiences can be particularly 
intense, moreover, can partially explain the "oomph" with which we imbue our moral 
j udgements . 
Finally, an excursion was made into some of the "biological machinery" that is 
responsible for generating human emotions in order to emphasise the connection 
between morality and biology that I have sought to make in this thesis. In this section 
I focused on people who have suffered damage to parts of the brain implicated in 
producing emotions in order to reveal how such damage affected the victims' ability 
to form moral concepts. This not only provided evidence for a connection between 
emotions and morality, it also contributed to the more general conclusion that 
morality has no reference beyond organisms that have such capacities. Another 
important aspect of my discussion was the claim that the emotional capacities which 
have led to our formation of moral concepts, almost certainly were not selected for 
this purpose. This, I argued, sheds a lot of light on where we can place morality in a 
metaethical framework. If moral concepts are the bi-product of a series of 
evolutionary adaptations (that themselves did not evolve to "reveal" an objective 
morality) then we might then conclude that there is no such thing as objective moral 
facts. This argument, which is not my own, will be taken up in Part Four. 
In the last chapter, the role of reason as a moral motivator was explored. Discussed 
in particular here was the role that reasoning plays in our forming and motivating our 
decisions to act. For example, I argued that in order to reach moral decisions, we 
have to be able to reflect about circumstances both past and present. I went further 
than this, however; I suggested that sometimes we arrive at our moral principles via a 
process of reasoning alone. Often, however, reason and emotion appear to work in 
tandem in providing the content of our moral codes 
Morality and its accompanying concepts of rightness and wrongness, in sum, derive 
from a series of rational and emotional capacities that humans have evolved. Some 
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of these capacities have led to moral rules that feed directly into the adaptive uses for 
which the capacities themselves no doubt evolved (facilitating human relationships, 
for example). Others have fed into the development of moral rules which are not so 
obviously linked to adaptive ends — behaviour which has traditionally been difficult 
to explain in terms of an evolutionary history of humans. The result resembles what 
Bernard Williams has called an "Internal reasons" account of morality, an account 
which depicts morality as agent originated and thus not the product of an objective, 
external code at all (Williams, 1981: 105). 
In the final part of this thesis, some of the ramifications of my conclusions will be 
discussed. This will include comments about the metaethical position of this thesis, 
as well as a brief speculation about the application of this thesis to the case of other 
animals. 
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General Introduction 
In this part of the thesis, I will consider some of the implications of my thesis. As 
these implications are not central to my thesis as a whole, the consideration will be 
only brief, and Part Four will only comprise two short chapters. 
One of my principal aims in this thesis has been to find a plausible connection 
between human biology and morality. Thus far, I have offered an explanation for 
both how it is that we have come to have moral rules and, more importantly, why we 
commonly believe that these moral rules are categorically binding. In particular, I 
have suggested that we often see them as such because we believe that they 
correspond to mind-independent moral facts. I have argued that this belief is the 
product of various biological traits that humans possess. In doing so, I have not 
needed to make appeal to the existence of mind-independent facts at all. In Chapter 
10, I will provide some brief arguments which support my initial assumption that 
there are no mind- independent moral facts. To do this I will draw upon the 
arguments presented in this thesis which suggest that moral facts are unnecessary to 
an account of morality, and, that their existence seems unlikely in any case. 
I will then briefly consider what the sum of my arguments might be able to tell us 
about the metaethical status of morality. I will argue that while there do not seem to 
be any moral facts, and that belief that there are moral facts is erroneous, this does not 
entail that morality itself is an illusion, a view that Michael Ruse - a well known 
proponent of the error theory - also endorses (Ruse 1986:252-255). Rather, I will 
suggest that morality can be redefined so as to represent our belief that moral 
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principles are categorically binding, but which nonetheless recognises the ultimate 
subjectivity of morality. 
Finally, in Chapter 11 I will briefly discuss my contention that morality is a human 
phenomenon and explain why it seems unlikely that other animals have moral rules. 
This will serve both as a summary of the points I have made with regards to non-
human animals, as well as means of reinforcing the nature of morality as a bi-product 
of human biological evolution. 
219 
...There are kinds of importance, and we naturally say that some things 
are morally important, others aesthetically important and so on. But 
there must be a question at the end, in a particular case or more 
generally, whether one kind of importance is more important than 
another kind (Williams, 1989: 182). 
Ethics is an attempt to escape from ...subjectivity" (Russell, 
1998[19351:40). 
Introduction 
In this thesis I have argued that morality is the bi-product of a series of human 
characteristics that are either directly or indirectly the product of human biological 
evolution. That this is the case invites the conclusion (which I have drawn) that 
without these characteristics, morality would not exist. Indeed, throughout the thesis 
a comparison with non-human animals was given in order to specifically suggest that 
non-human animals do not have moral rules because they lack characteristics which 
are central to the formation of and adherence to moral rules. I will elaborate on these 
conclusions in Chapter 11. While this is not the only possible conclusion that might 
be drawn from the arguments in this thesis, it seems the most plausible conclusion, as 
I will argue in this section 
This chapter will also be devoted to a brief consideration of what my thesis suggests 
in terms of the metaethical status of morality. I will argue that belief in mind-
independent moral facts is erroneous; as such, I agree with the error theory of 
morality, most famously espoused by J.L. Mackie (1977), but more recently taken up 
by Michael Ruse (1986) and Richard Joyce (2000). I will argue, however, that even 
if such belief is erroneous this does not entail that we should reject morality or 
"deprogramme" ourselves (Woolcock, 1993: 428) to stop using moral concepts. 
Rather, we need to redefine morality in a way that no longer makes reference to 
objective mind-independent moral facts. Morality, as I have presented it in this 
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thesis, is the product and expression of a series of beliefs, wants and needs that are 
considered to be of utmost importance to those that harbour them. Morality also 
serves to protect and promote these values and as such serves a valid and important 
role that corresponds to the reality of people having values which require protection 
and promotion in the first place. As such, the status of morality as I have presented it 
is essentially subjectivist. 
10:1 Are there moral facts? 
I began this thesis with the assumption that there is no such thing as mind-
independent moral facts, and have offered explanations for the common belief that 
there are such facts. In this section, I will offer several arguments which support my 
initial assumption. I will not spend a considerable amount of time on this question, as 
it is not central to the main conclusions I have presented in my thesis. Rather, it is 
my main conclusions which suggest that the existence of mind-independent facts is 
unlikely. While I cannot prove that they do not exist, I can at least claim that they are 
unnecessary to account either for the origins of morality or the common belief that 
moral rules are categorically binding. In this elaborating this claim, I shall employ 
similar arguments to those made before me by, (amongst others) Richard Joyce 
(2000, 2006) and Michael Ruse (1986). 
As suggested above, the kind of account of the origins of morality that I have 
provided does not prove that there are no such things as objective moral facts. This is 
an objection raised by Wim Van Der Steen (1999) as well as Philip Kitcher (1985) to 
similar types of argument. It might be argued, for example, that our biological 
capacities have merely enabled us to understand or perceive moral facts that exist 
independently of our perceiving them. As such, just because we require a series of 
capacities to understand morality does not then mean that the moral facts would not 
be there if we did not have the capacities. As Kitcher argues, our knowledge of 
mathematics also relies on our having certain abilities, but we nevertheless do not 
consider mathematical rules to be entirely subjective (Kitcher, 1985). Van Der Steen 
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argues that we require a further thesis "...like (A), that the processes that determine 
what moral beliefs people have are entirely independent of which moral statements (if 
any) are true" (1999: 50). He concludes that "It is unclear why (A) should be true" 
(1999: 50-51). 
There is much merit to this objection. It falters, however, with respect to one 
significant point; the analogy is imperfect. For example, there is little disagreement 
about certain fundamental mathematical propositions; that 1+1 =2 is rarely 
questioned, for instance. It is, moreover, something we can empirically test, without 
alternative conclusions being reached; no matter how many times, and in how many 
different circumstances I put one thing with another, I come up with two things. This 
is a point that Gilbert Harman makes (Harman, 1977: 9-10) with regards to both 
science and mathematics. 
Observation...is relevant to mathematics. In explaining the 
observations that support a physical theory, scientists 
typically appeal to mathematical principles. ...Since an 
observation is evidence for what best explains it, and since 
mathematics often figures in the explanations o scientific 
observations, there is indirect observational evidence for 
mathematics. There does not seem to be observational 
evidence, even indirectly, for basic moral principles (Harman, 
1977: 10). 
This point is supported by the fact that there is also considerable variation in what are 
considered to be moral truths. Typically controversial issues such as abortion, 
homosexuality, and euthanasia continue to cause dispute because of the lack of 
consensus regarding moral truths. Even a common moral taboo such as the incest 
taboo has had cultural exceptions. While this does not prove that there is not one set 
of moral facts, the difficulty of finding this set of facts and the basis upon which it is 
formed suggests that there might be no such thing. In making this point, I am in 
agreement with both Bruce Waller (1996) and John Mackie (1977). In Macicie's 
words: 
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Such variation is in itself merely a truth of descriptive 
morality, a fact of anthropology which entails neither first 
order or second order ethical views. Yet it may indirectly 
support second order subjectivism; radical differences 
between first order moral judgements make it difficult to treat 
those judgements as apprehensions of objective truths 
(Mackie, 1977:36). 123 
To further support my contention that there are no such things as mind- independent 
moral facts, two different arguments presented in this thesis are also relevant. To 
begin with, I argued that morality emerged as a solution to the various problems 
presented by group living. For example, in Part One I suggested that one of the 
difficulties that arise in social situations is the problem of sharing up limited 
resources and the dispute that this is likely to cause. Moral tenets which encourage 
cooperation and fairness serve to ensure that social cohesion is maintained. In this 
sense there is little separating moral rules from ordinary rules in terms of the 
instrumental role that they play in maintaining social order. In such an instrumental 
role, they become mutable: more importantly, however, they need to be mutable in 
order to be relevant to varying needs or changing circumstance. The fact that some 
moral rules appear to be more steadfast than others reflects more the fact of humans 
having basic common survival needs that require fulfilment or protection, rather than 
their instantiation of some kind of moral truth. 
The second argument is related to the above argument. I have provided an 
explanation for the social utility of morality which leads us to question why we have 
morality at all and not just social rules. In response, I actually appealed to the 
concept of moral facts. I suggested that what seems to separate the ordinary rule 
from the moral rule is the belief that morality does indeed represent some kind of 
truth about ultimate value that derives from a series of mind-independent moral facts; 
123  Neil Levy makes some very useful comments concerning conclusions drawn about the non-
existence of God base on the suggestion that we are biologically adapted to believe in God, as 
compared with similar conclusions about belief in morality. In his words, "If there is a God, his 
existence is entirely independent of our belief in him... But it is very plausible to think that morality is 
not like this. It is not independent of us and our beliefs, in the way in which God.. .is. Instead, it is at 
least partially constituted of our beliefs and moral emotions."(2004: 80). 
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in brief, we seem to believe that that there are moral facts. Part Three of this thesis, 
however, was devoted to demonstrating how such a belief might arise. I argued, for 
example, that belief in the intrinsic rightness or wrongness of morality derives from a 
number of sources which have no necessary existence themselves. Three sources 
were identified; (a) the ability to feel emotionally attached or repelled by people or 
situations; (b) the ability to reason and reflect; (c) our vulnerability to the social 
conditioning that occurs as a part of the process of social learning we undergo as 
children. Here I provided evidence that impediments to certain of our abilities to 
think or feel likewise seemed to impede the ability to behave or reason in a moral 
way. For example, the psychopath whose empathetic capacity is limited likewise 
appears to have a limited capacity to develop or follow moral rules. While this does 
not prove that moral judgements have no objective truth value, it supports the claim 
that they don't by suggesting that belief that certain moral principles are true or false 
is capacity-(and environmentally) dependent. This suggests that the moral principles 
do not actually have to be true in order for us to believe that they are: we just have to 
have the capacities that incline us to believe that they are. If we do not have these 
capacities, we are no longer inclined to believe that they are morally right or wrong. 
The fact that the sources of these beliefs also lead us to different conclusions about 
what is morally right or wrong further undermines the credibility that there are mind-
independent moral facts, as mentioned previously. Important, moreover, is the idea 
that these beliefs are the product of adaptations which were selected for functions that 
have nothing directly to do with the generation of either moral rules, or belief in 
moral rules. I emphasised this point in detail in both Chapters Sand 6. This, then, 
satisfies Van Der Steen's requirement for a "further thesis" identified above; that is, 
his requirement that the sources of people's moral beliefs have nothing to do with 
whether or not the moral principles are actually true. To re-iterate, morality is the bi-
product of adaptations which were selected for characteristics that have nothing to do 
with the truth or otherwise of moral judgements — nor, for that matter, were they 
selected specifically because of their role in the generation or particular content of 
moral rules. This, according to Michael Ruse, who also proposes the same argument, 
renders "ultimate principles" redundant in an account of morality. In his words: 
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The objectivist must agree that his/her ultimate principles 
are...redundant. You would believe what you do about right 
or wrong, irrespective of whether or not a "true" right or 
wrong existed...Given two worlds, identical except that one 
has an objective morality and the other does not, the humans 
therein would think and act exactly the same ways. Hence the 
objective foundation for morality is redundant" (Ruse, 1986: 
254). 124 
As emphasised, while these arguments do not prove that there are no such thing as 
moral facts, my thesis nevertheless provides an alternative explanation for our moral 
beliefs and rules which coheres much better with the fact of humans as biological 
organisms and for which, importantly, there is strong empirical evidence. Mind 
independent moral facts, on the other hand, make appeal to entities about which there 
is neither consensus, nor for which there is much evidence. Indeed, such facts are not 
only difficult to find, that they are somehow "out there" renders them, as Mackie 
famously claimed, metaphysically "queer" (1977:38-42). In his own words: 
If there were objective values, then they would be entities of a 
very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the 
universe. Correspondingly, if we were aware of them, it 
would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception 
or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of 
knowing everything else (1977:38). 
Before leaving this section, an alternative approach to the issue of moral facts which 
merits mention here is that espoused by moral naturalists. Richard Joyce gives a 
useful definition of moral naturalism, describing it as the "...view according to which 
moral properties and relations exist and can be comfortably integrated within a 
naturalistic view of the world — the kind of world that science can investigate."(Joyce, 
2006: 145) He further cites Utilitarianism as a good example of a moral naturalistic 
position. (A Utilitarian, for example, might define value as "happiness". 
Consequently, we can discover facts about moral values by investigating what it is 
empirically that produces happiness). (Joyce, 2006: 145) 
124 . s 
A quoted in Lillehammer (2003: 576) 
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One of the principal problems posed by naturalism of this type - as Joyce and others 
point out - is actuallyfinding the naturalistic facts which can then be translated as 
moral facts. I25 In other words, in order to arrive at these "moral facts", we require an 
explanation in naturalistic terms that would account for them. To begin with, what 
we find, as I have emphasised throughout my thesis, is that we are initially hampered 
in our search for these natural facts since "moral facts" are themselves very difficult 
to locate. For example while there is certain cross-cultural convergence of a number 
of broad moral tenets, their uniform maintenance nevertheless remains subject to 
change and variation in accordance with differing environments, culture, individual 
desires and biological make-up. Consequently, it is difficult to even find 
uncontroversial candidates for moral facts in the first place. This aside, even if we 
were to propose candidates, the biological facts from which they are derive are 
indeed, as Joyce claims difficult to locate. For instance, as I have argued that 	, 
morality is not in any sense an "evolved adaptation" itself, we cannot look to this for 
a source of biological facts from which moral facts can be derive either, as others 
have attempted to do. 126  Moreover, even though I have made abundant appeal to 
"nature" in my account of morality, my conclusion gives rise to a portrait of moral 
values which are neither reducible to any definitive "facts" about human beings in 
general, but are rather contingent upon a plethora of different features about humans 
which contribute variably to their formation and nature. Furthermore, any "facts" 
about human beings relevant to morality only describe why we might form or adopt 
certain moral tenets: they do not justify them. These considerations I suggest to be 
further evidence for my conclusion that moral facts are not only unneeded to explain 
morality, but also that they are simply not there for the taking even if they were. As 
such I reject the type of moral naturalism described by Joyce above. 
Finally, as I mentioned to begin with, my thesis has sought to make a connection 
between morality and biology. The existence or otherwise of moral facts will does 
125 Joyce cites Gilbert Harman (1986) as another who raises this issue. 
126 See Collier and Stingle(1993). 
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not affect my conclusion that the two are causally connected. I maintain, nonetheless, 
that they do not exist. I will now consider the ramifications that such a proposition 
might have for morality. 
10:2 The moral error theory 
In the previous section I briefly stated reasons why I consider that the existence of 
objective, mind-independent moral facts is quite unlikely. This conclusion is 
problematic, however, since morality, as I have presented it here, is widely perceived 
as having some kind of objectivity. I maintain, along with John Mackie, and more 
recently, Michael Ruse and Richard Joyce, that our belief in morality so perceived is 
"erroneous." The principal difference between Ruse and Joyce's positions and mine, 
however, is that they both argue for the existence of an adaptation which accounts for 
this aspect of morality. For Ruse, the belief that morality is objective is the 
adaptation. For Joyce, it is a trait which instils a sense of obligation about the 
expressions of what (I have argued) are ultimately our desires. In my thesis, on the 
contrary, I have argued that our belief that morality is objective and our sense of 
moral obligation can be explained without recourse to "morality-specific" 
adaptations: rather I have argued that these aspects of morality are the bi-product of a 
number of different biological adaptations which were selected for other functions. 
Such an argument, however, does not affect the conclusion that a belief that our 
moral judgements express truths that correspond to objective moral facts is erroneous. 
So where does a moral error theory leave us? On first consideration, it might seem 
that the most sensible thing to do is eliminate talk of morality altogether, thereby 
adopting a moral nihilistic position. In the words of Joyce, "Surely to see nonsense 
for what it is requires, on pain of irrationality, its rejection?" (Joyce, 2000:731). 
Joyce does not take this path, however. He has argued, in response to Ruse, that it is 
not irrational to include "fictions" such as morality in our lives since they are fictions 
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which are "useful." 127 That morality is indeed useful was argued in Part One with 
particular focus on the way in which morality serves to boost social cohesion and 
hence individual survival prospects. In fact, morality appeared to be a central 
component of the regulation of human cooperation. 
But ordinary rules also play this part very well without the need to refer to "fictitious" 
concepts such as the moral right or wrong, so Joyce's answer does not, initially, seem 
very satisfying. There are, however, significant differences that I have drawn 
between ordinary rules and moral rules that may help explain why we maintain moral 
concepts such as "right" and "wrong". To begin with, I have argued that the moral 
right or wrong is imbued with a certain power or authority that ordinary rules do not 
have. In this sense, morality proves useful in that it provides an added motivational 
boost to adhere to the rules it prescribes. But while this might explain why we might 
choose to maintain moral concepts — and indeed how they perhaps developed in the 
first place, as argued in Chapter 3 - it nevertheless ignores a significant part of what 
this thesis has tried to establish about morality. While it is certainly plausible that 
moral rules and concepts have most likely been used by humans in response to the 
need for order and cooperation in a social group, they represent much more than this. 
Indeed, the very fact that moral concepts wield such authority and power also implies 
that that there is something about us in the first place that makes us amenable to its 
power and authority. In Part Three, I argued that morality is deeply entwined with 
our capacity to care or "feel" deeply about certain matters, a capacity which appears 
to be the product of a variety of innate mechanisms. Morality, I suggest, represents 
the values we develop and the rules we make which protect and promote the subjects 
of our care and concern. Morality, however, not only represents the belief that some 
matters are of utmost importance and value: it also represents the conviction that 
they are of such importance that not only we, but others too, ought to do whatever 
they can to promote and protect them. While the importance or value we attach to 
certain matters might lead us to believe that our convictions have some kind of 
127  This is Joyce's position in 2000. He is less clear about his position with regards to moral 
"fictionalism" in 2006, although still claims that he is "rather fond" of it. (2006: 167) 
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correspondence to objective facts, the possibility that there are no such facts does not 
necessarily diminish or eliminate either the importance attached to these matters or 
the conviction that others should find the same matters important as well. 
One might question why we need moral discourse to express such beliefs and 
convictions, however. If morality is ultimately defined as being the expression of 
needs and wants, whether individual or collective, why then use moral language at 
all. As William Hughes claims, it seems more "rational" "... to eradicate moral and 
ethical language altogether, and replace it with the language of needs and wants" 
(Hughes, 1986: 306). 128 This question becomes particularly pertinent when we 
observe that what is considered a "moral issue" remains hugely variable, and 
seemingly irreducible to a set of common principles. Such variability underlines the 
subjective nature of our moral opinions and as such suggests that they would be more 
realistically expressed in the language of "preferences" or "desires". In Chapter 7, for 
example, I discussed vegetarianism, a moral position which although widespread, is 
nonetheless a minority moral position in the Western world. The values it seeks to 
protect are also not apparently reducible to any universal maxim, since there seem to 
be great variety in people's motivation for being a vegetarian. For example, the 
choice might arise from ecological concerns, animal welfare concerns or perhaps 
from an aversion to the taste of meat. This suggests that it would be perhaps more 
straightforward to simply talk about what we like and don't like, rather than employ 
terms which suggest that these wants and needs are objectively valid, when they are 
not. 
This, of course, is a conclusion which is highly distasteful to many, if not most, 
people for reasons I have just emphasised - when we claim that something is "morally 
wrong," we are generally not simply expressing "any old" want or need: we are 
expressing values which we consider to be of such importance that we think others 
should adopt them as well. That we actually do prescribe our values, however, can 
also be partially accounted for in a practical way as well. For instance much that we 
128 As quoted in Joyce (2000:727). 
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care about actually involves other people or organisms. As such, by attempting to 
oblige others to care about these things as well we are ensuring that certain of our 
values are being maximised (Singer, 1979: 11). 129 When, for example, my friend 
tells me it is wrong to consume other animals, she means to say that all people should 
refrain from consuming animals — by doing so, she not only emphasises the strength 
of her values, she also helps to lessen the number of animals that are suffering. When 
she says that she wants to eat strawberry rather than chocolate ice cream, however, 
she might be expressing another of her preferences, but the difference is that (A) it is 
not a preference which (presumably) she wants to express as a matter of utmost 
importance, (B) she most likely doesn't care whether or not I share her preference, 
partially because (C) whether or not I eat strawberry ice-cream will not affect the 
satisfaction of her desire to eat it. Moral rules, then, can be practically differentiated 
from other types of rule firstly by the fact that they represent the pinnacle of a 
hierarchy of "wants and preferences" that we have; and secondly because these 
"wants and preferences" often involve others, so we will try to convince others that 
they should be considered of utmost importance as well in order to maximise our 
values. 
Our concerns are not over, however. The fact of irreconcilable variety in moral 
principles that a subjectivist approach obliges us to accept might worry us in other 
ways. Simon Kirchin expresses this concern quite well with respect to ethical 
relativism: 
We are often troubled by ethical relativism. There exist first-
order ethical judgements and practices which are different 
from our own judgements and practices. Upon reflection we 
might feel perturbed because there is nothing which 
establishes our judgements as being the true and correct ones. 
We might wonder further if any judgement can be justified as 
the true and correct one and that, instead, all ethical 
judgements are as good or true as each other. This second 
129  This is one of the ways in which Peter Singer actually differentiates the moral from the social rule. 
As he puts it, "The difference between a value an a rule is that it makes sense to maximise a value — to 
increase it as much as possible- whereas we can only comply with a rule". 
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thought is characteristic of ethical relativism. 	Ethical 
relativism is threatening because it conflicts with another 
deeply held conviction or ours, that there are uniquely correct 
and true ethical judgements, where that correctness and truth 
is not dependent on any particular idiosyncratic way of living 
or thinking (Kirchin, 2000: 413). 
This, then, is a different concern; it is the concern that we might be mistaken in 
considering certain of our values to be of utmost importance, since others might be 
equally valid. History, however, has shown that the fact of variation in what different 
people consider to be of utmost importance has not led people to abandon their moral 
principles. This, I suggest, is because it cannot, since moral principles are not the 
kind of principles that can be so easily abandoned. That this is the case can be 
explained in part by the origins of these principles, as suggested in Part Three. For 
example, the emotional attachment that one has for one's children will usually entail 
that one considers it to be morally wrong to cause unnecessary harm to them. That 
not everybody agrees with this may seem abhorrent to us, but one can accept this 
disagreement without it necessarily affecting either our desire that our children not be 
harmed, or our need to express this desire in the form of a categorical imperative — 
indeed one might even suggest that it cannot affect this desire, since unless we are 
psychopathic, our empathetic reactions to our children will generally entail that we 
can't help but consider it of utmost importance that they not be harmed. Indeed, as I 
mentioned above, the fact that there might be people who would harm our children 
will most likely heighten the need for concepts which express both the strength with 
which we maintain our convictions and our desire that others embrace this conviction 
as well. 
This leads to a second point. While it is true that there is a remarkable diversity in 
moral rules, there is nonetheless a quasi-universality which is borne of certain shared 
wants and needs throughout human kind: or, as Michael Smith puts it, there is a 
"...convergence in our desires" (Smith, 1991: 409). For example, in Part Two, 
cross-cultural moral variety was briefly examined with a view to determining whether 
or not there was the extent of variety that there appears to be on the surface. Here I 
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suggested that some outwardly disparate moral tenets are in fact quite similar in that 
they are just different ways of protecting a set of shared values. A number of these 
shared values can be accounted for by the fact that as a species we share a similar 
biological makeup that gives rise to certain fundamental experiences of the world 
(such as, for example, our susceptibility to pain and pleasure) and certain 
fundamental needs (to be fed, to reproduce etc.). Such needs form a core set of 
values that are central and common to humanity. In the words of Peter Singer; 
There seems to be a popular belief that the taboo on incest is 
the only moral rule that holds everywhere. The reality is that 
some much more significant ethical principles carry weight in 
virtually every human community. These include; obligations 
on members of family to support their kin; obligations of 
reciprocity, to return favours done and gifts received; and 
constraints on sexual relationships...The precise form of the 
obligations or constraints varies from one society to another, 
but the significance of these universals lies in the fact that 
obligations of kinship, reciprocity, and sexual relationships 
form the core of all human ethical systems — and they also 
guide the behaviour of our close non-human relatives (Singer, 
1979: 57). 
Other values, however, may arise as the product of a process of agreement in which 
we decide that the values should be protected (Gauthier, 1988). In Part One, for 
example, I argued that many of our moral rules emerged out of the collective need to 
find rules which ensure group cohesion. This includes the need to foster altruism and 
to curb selfishness, or to regulate human sexuality. In this sense, a hankering for 
objectivism can be achieved by a process that Peter Woolcock describes as 
"procedural objectivism" (Woolcock, 2000: 42): that is, it can be achieved when a 
group of people get together and come to some kind of "agreement" about what is 
and what is not going to constitute a set of moral rules. According to this, the claims 
can be "true" or "false" according to whether they have passed through a procedure 
whereby they have been agreed upon by the group in question. I3° This is the 
approach described by constructivists such as Scanlon (1982) and Korsgaard (1996) 
130 Woo!cock has drawn this point from B. Barry's Justice as impartiality (1995: 11.) 
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and it also a process which in Part Two I suggested accounted for a significant 
amount of what we call "public morality". 
On a more local level, then, such processes will entail a certain universality that arises 
from people getting together and making collective decisions based on what is right 
or wrong (or, in the language I have adopted in this section, what is considered to be 
of "utmost importance" in the group). This process also accords with the arguments I 
presented in Chapter 9 where I suggested that we sometimes arrive at the conclusion 
that some things are of utmost importance via a process of reasoning. Peter Singer, 
for example, argues that rational reflection allows us an appreciation of the fact that 
other people have interests, wants and needs as well, and that we can use morality to 
express our understanding of the importance of these interests. As he claims, "By 
imagining ourselves in the position of others... and taking on their tastes and 
preferences we can arrive at a reasonably confident verdict about which action will 
satisfy more preferences" (Singer, 1981: 101). These verdicts we can then codify 
into moral rules (if we are so inclined). 
In sum, it would seem foolish to reject morality on the basis that it does not in fact 
correspond to the way in which many of us perceive it. Rather, we need to recalibrate 
the way we perceive morality. What we would have in its place, I suggest, is a 
modified concept of morality which does not appeal to moral facts, but which 
nonetheless represents the "clout" of our moral judgements. Although one might still 
be inclined to argue that without some kind of mind-independent moral facts almost 
anything becomes a moral issue, the fact that this does not actually occur supports the 
postulate that morality does have a recognizable role to play in the lives of most 
people — notably, as I have suggested, that it represents the fact that we consider some 
things to be of considerable importance: this importance, I argue, is aptly expressed 
by moral concepts. Moreover, the ability to understand the minds of others, to suffer 
as they suffer, to form relationships with them also provides the basis for the forging 
of generalised rules that extend what we consider important to others for 
consideration as well. 
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Summary 
Moral rules are the means by which we express some of our strongest desires and, 
also, the way we go about trying to get others to share these desires or, at least, to not 
contravene them. Morality, I suggest can be validly redefined in terms of this role. 13I 
Moral rules can be distinguished from ordinary rules in terms of the subject matter 
they treat: the profound, emotional and rational attachments (and detachments) that 
we have towards situations involving ourselves and others. As many of these spring 
from deep-seated, biological fuelled reactions to situations which seem to escape our 
direct control, it is, moreover, very difficult to simply discard these beliefs, ideals and 
values. In sum, then, the error theorists are correct when they claim that belief in 
objective moral facts is erroneous, but if we change our definition of morality to 
preclude appeal to moral facts - as I have done here - then the error theory need no 
longer apply. Consequently, we no longer need to take a moral nihilistic approach 
and/or argue that morality should be rejected. 
131 I am not, of course, the first to define morality in such a way: C.L. Stevenson proposed a similar 
definition in 1944, a position which has come to be known as "emotivism". 
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Shapter 	Moral ffrfirri  
Of all the differences between man and the lower animals, the moral 
sense is by far the most important (Darwin, 1871: ch 4). 
We are primates. And we better take this monkey business seriously. 
(Suddendorf, 2002: 712-713). 
Introduction 
I have argued that morality emerged as a bi-product of biologically generated 
capacities some of which were selected for their contribution to what I have called 
"human sociality." Principal among these evolved traits are those that have been 
selected for their contribution to human language and social learning skills, as well as 
those which constitute the human affective system. Throughout this thesis, other 
animals have been used as a point of comparison. This has been primarily with the 
end of establishing whether or not certain features of both culture and morality can 
plausibly be attributed to the existence of specific biological traits. One of the main 
conclusions I reached was that while other primates (for example) exhibit similar 
capacities to humans, they either do not have those that are centrally implicated in the 
development of complex cultures, or, if they do, they are at best rudimentary. As 
many of these capacities also contribute to the formulation and expression of moral 
principles, and, importantly, the motivation to uphold them, it might also be expected 
that moral principles also do not figure in primate life. In this brief chapter, I will 
consider this postulate in more detail. 
11.1 The moral animal 
The first thing to consider is that if one maintains that moral rules arose as part of a 
system of social regulation (as I have argued), then the fact that other animals also 
live in groups might lead us to expect that they too might have similar forms of social 
regulation. And this is what we find. One need only look at a bunch of chickens 
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around the grain bowl to realise that there are "rules" about which chicken is allowed 
first peck at the grains. Ant and bee colonies are of course the paradigm of social 
cooperation, with each insect playing a specific role in maintaining the vast, complex 
colony of which they are a part. Likewise, examples of morally relevant behaviour 
appear to abound throughout the animal kingdom, particularly examples of what 
appears to be morally altruistic behaviour: the prairie dogs which risk their lives to 
act as sentinels of danger; the bird that will feign injury to divert attention of a 
predator from its young; the chimp that adopts the offspring of a deceased; the 
dolphins that have allegedly saved humans from sharks. 
Too often, however, comparisons between human and non-human behaviour are 
plagued by our propensity to draw conclusions about the nature of acts which rely 
solely on observation without further investigation into the motivation which has 
inspired the acts. This is a mistake, because considerations of intent and motivation 
are in fact central to deciding whether or not an action can be considered morally 
relevant. In Chapter 2, I argued, for example, that while the eusocial insects appear 
to be supremely virtuous, evidence suggests that they behave without the kind of 
conscious intent to be altruistic that characterises moral altruism in humans. 
Consequently, I concluded that their behaviour cannot be classed as being morally 
altruistic. 
There are those, who would protest the validity of even attempting to draw any 
conclusions about the motivational states of animals based on the observation of 
behavioural similarity between us and them. To do this, they claim is to apply 
anthropomorphic attributions to organisms that are not human and who therefore 
cannot be assumed to be cognitively comparable. Consequently, one also cannot 
assume that they are motivated in a comparable way. I32 So even if we try to "practice 
`dogomorphism'", as Marc Bekoff claims that he tries to do (2004: 489), according to 
this argument we are nevertheless prevented from truly knowing much about the 
cognitive states of other animals: all we seem left with is behaviour that appears to 
132 Daniel Povinelli (2000) is particularly critical of arguments by analogy of this nature. 
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parallel human behaviour and the inference that it was carried out with the same kind 
of end result in mind as the human behaviour. 
However, when the animal in question is a primate with whom humans share a very 
similar genetic makeup (such as the chimpanzee or the bonobo) certain analogies do 
appear more justified. Similarities in behaviour, for example, suggest that perhaps 
the traits in question were present in some form in the common ancestor which links 
us to the pan species (i.e. chimps and bonobos)on the evolutionary tree, and that both 
we, and our primate cousins have maintained the trait long after we evolved into 
separate species (Boehm 2000: 81). What we find, moreover, is that there are enough 
similarities in terms of genetic makeup and behavioural repertoire between our 
species and theirs to render behavioural comparisons useful in terms of what they can 
tell us about the evolution of certain traits. In the words of Thomas Suddendorf, 
If all members of a clade, a complete group of organisms 
derived from a common ancestor, share the same trait, it is 
more parsimonious to assume that the common ancestor had 
that trait than to propose that each species developed it 
independently. (2003: 707). 
Consequently, when certain non-human primate behaviour strongly resembles human 
behaviour, then we perhaps have a more solid basis for suggesting that it is motivated 
by similar considerations. 
In Chapter 6 some of the ways in which humans could be differentiated from other 
animals were suggested including, most significantly, our allegedly more advanced 
powers of reason and recall, both of which I argued are central to the formation of 
moral principles. Darwin himself made a similar point. 
A moral being is one who is capable of reflecting on his past 
actions and their motives- of approving of some and 
disapproving of others; and the fact that man is the one being 
who certainly deserves this designation, is the greatest of all 
distinctions between him and the lower animals (1871:ch.11). 
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These days, however, such claims of exclusivity are becoming increasingly debated. 
Famous, well respected primatologists such as Franz De Waal and Jane Goodall 
tirelessly point out behaviour which suggests that other primates have similar 
cognitive capacities to our own, even though they might be somewhat limited. For 
De Waal and Hack, the existence of systems of reciprocity amongst non-human 
primates indicates the presence of cognitive ability which is more sophisticated than 
often suggested. 133 For example, while food sharing is not uncommon throughout the 
animal kingdom, they suggest that in apes, food sharing often forms part of the kind 
of calculated systems of reciprocity also found in human societies. In this case, food 
will be shared in return for a like service having been rendered by the receiver in the 
past, or in anticipation of such reciprocation in the future. If De Waal and Flack are 
correct, such systems indicate the existence of some of the capacities that I have 
suggested (both above and throughout this thesis) are central to human morality. For 
example, a system of reciprocity suggests that there are concepts of obligation within 
the group that are created by recognition of "debts incurred and favours owed". This, 
in turn, indicates that there is the neurology in place that is required to remember, 
process information and calculate future requirements, notably the type of rational 
behaviour that Darwin felt was central to the difference between humans and the 
"lower animals" mentioned above. 
De Waal recognizes, of course, that there are several other plausible hypotheses for 
why non-human primates might share their food, and that not all of these are 
consistent with the kind of "morally-intended" motivation that we associate with 
human morality. For example, Richard Wrangham (1975) advanced the proposal that 
food sharing comes about as a response to harassment from other members of the 
group coupled with the possibility of aggression as the result of non-compliance. 
According to this explanation, then, the primate does not share food out of a sense of 
fairness, kindness or even, in the hope of having the favour returned at some future 
133 References to de Waal (except where otherwise indicated) are drawn from his 2000 paper — Any 
animal whatever': Darwinian building blocks of morality in monkeys and apes."(Co-authored by J.C. 
Flack). 
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point, but rather because it is responding to intimidating threats. This kind of fear 
reaction brings to mind the case of the Rhesus monkeys discussed in Chapter 8 in 
which the monkeys abstained on occasion from taking food if they could see that 
doing so caused pain to a conspecific. While this looked like an act inspired by 
empathy, another plausible hypothesis was that the monkey was merely frightened 
into inaction by the sight of a conspecific creating a lot of noise. 
De Waal and Flack, however, support their argument with what they claim to be 
incidents not only of punishment taking place in chimpanzee groups in response to 
failed reciprocity, but also revenge. They claim, for example, that chimpanzees that 
have been intervened against by other chimps are more likely to intervene against 
these same chimps in future interactions, suggesting that in doing so, they are taking 
their revenge (De Waal & Flack, 2000:5). The ability to seek revenge again suggests 
that the chimps can recall prior behaviour, and that they can also calculate means of 
punishing offenders in the future. For De Waal, these examples provide further 
evidence for the type of calculated reciprocity which typifies human social 
interactions and indicates that the capacities required for something as sophisticated 
as implementation of rules of justice and fairness may also be present in 
chimpanzees. 
Reciprocal altruism differs from other patterns of cooperation 
in that it is fraught with risk, depends on trust, and requires 
that individuals whose contributions fall short be shunned or 
punished, lest the whole system collapse (De Waal, 1996: 24). 
Finally, it is interesting to note that altruistic behaviour of this nature is often 
extended beyond kin to other group members in chimpanzee communities (Flack & 
de Waal, 2000: 17). This differentiates their altruism from the altruism of the 
eusocial insects which can be adequately explained in terms of kin selection. It also 
brings non human primates to the type of other regarding behaviour that typifies 
human behaviour and, specifically, our moral systems. 
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But does it? It is arguable whether reciprocal altruism can even be called morally 
relevant altruism in the first place. I have, for example, emphasised that 
consideration of intent is central to a decision about the moral status of certain 
actions. The intent central to reciprocal altruism, however, is bound up with 
considerations of what one will "get out of' the exchange, rather than with intent to 
behave kindly towards another. As such, it does not seem like altruism at all, but 
rather simple selfishness in the form of a desire for reciprocation of a given action or 
a desire to avoid punishment: "genuine altruism", on the other hand, signifies 
behaviour that is performed with another's welfare, rather than one's own, in mind. 
This is a point for which I argued in Chapter 8. 134 
One might of course reply that the moral concepts of fairness and justice are 
intimately connected to reciprocal altruism (as I argued in Part One). This may be the 
case. If morality is predominantly about protecting values (as I have also argued) 
then behaviour which seeks to promote fairness and justice must be, and indeed is, 
included in the sphere of morally motivated activity. It is not clear, however, whether 
the concepts of fairness and justice do actually figure in the reciprocal exchanges of 
other primates, however. To begin with, it is unclear why they would even need to 
have such concepts in the first place. In terms of utility, groups of primates would be 
able to keep accounts of who has done what to whom fairly easily, since there are not 
vast numbers in their social groups to account for in the first place. As such, the 
chances of "getting away" with not reciprocating and avoiding punishment are 
significantly reduced. Most reciprocal transactions, then, could be dealt with 
specifically via punishment and reward systems. The concepts of justice and fairness 
are more "useful" as a sanctioning device for large numbers of people when accounts 
of people's behaviour cannot be so easily kept, and hence there is more of a chance 
that transgressions go unchecked. Moral concepts such as "right" and "wrong" also 
serve in this case to sanction behaviour via personal policing. Thus, while I might be 
134 In Section 8:7 I also included the observation made by a number of well-respected primatologists 
that other primates do not seem to manifest "other-regarding" preferences, in any case: cooperation 
with non-kin is usually self-serving. 
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able to get away with being unfair or unjust, the knowledge that I am "doing the 
wrong thing" may deter me from unfair or unjust actions. 
More significantly, however, it seems unlikely that without formal language, other 
animals could even form complex rules let alone moral concepts such as "justice and 
fairness" in the first place. In Part Two, for example, I suggested that language is 
intimately connected to the ability to reason. Reason, in turn, is critical to both the 
formation and application of rules, as I contended in Chapter 9. Evidence suggests 
that other primates do not possess either complex language skills, or the general 
intelligence required to understand complex intention in others (as illustrated by the 
Pinker's dishwashing chimpanzee in Chapter 6). In fact, there is little evidence that 
other primates are even able to understand the minds of others to be able to theorise 
about how their actions might affect others in the first place and to form moral 
concepts based on these conclusions. In Part three, for example, I suggested (along 
with others) that the evidence of theory of mind in other primates is sketchy. In sum, 
it seems unlikely that moral concepts figure in the social regulatory systems that 
feature in non-human primate groups. At best, we have what has been called "proto 
morality" (Kitcher, 2005: 176; Haidt, 2001: 827) and a number of rudimentary social 
rules. 
Summary 
This has been only a brief consideration of whether or not other animals have 
morality. A more considered treatment of the issue would require far more space 
than I have here. Since the conclusions I have drawn in this thesis are not contingent 
upon a firm decision about this issue, I will not dwell any more upon it: rather, it 
could be considered a "secondary" conclusion. It is also a somewhat tentative 
conclusion as I mentioned earlier on in this section, it is extremely difficult to draw 
any hard and fast conclusions about the behavioural intentions of other animals. In 
trying to do so, one risks succumbing to an unjustified anthropomorphisation of other 
animals. However, as I emphasised at the beginning of this chapter, considering the 
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common lineage we share with other primates, to suggest that there is no basis at all 
for comparison is to be blatantly anthropocentric. As Konrad Lorenz put it, 
You think I humanize the animals?... Believe me, I am not 
mistakenly assigning human propensities to animals; on the 
contrary, I am showing you what an enormous animal 
inheritance remains in man to this day (1952: 144). 
What does seem reasonably clear is that there are certain rules in place governing the 
social interactions of other primates and consequences for breaking the rules. That 
these might be called moral rules, however, seems unlikely. For example, while 
altruistic behaviour in non-human primates may resemble certain types of human 
altruistic behaviour there is nonetheless a large gap separating their behaviour and the 
range of morally intended behaviour that typifies human life. This, I argue, can be 
attributed to the fact that the various capacities central to morality are far less 
developed - if they exist at all - in these same animals. I nevertheless consider the 
study of these gaps useful in reinforcing evidence that morality is the product of 
human biological evolution by suggesting that it is fundamentally capacity 
dependent. 
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The issues that have been presented in this part of the thesis have only been treated in 
a summary fashion. More thorough treatments of these questions have filled 
volumes. That I have not given them greater consideration is because firstly, 
conclusions reached about some of them are highly speculative and secondly, these 
conclusions are not central to the establishment of my central theses, as I have 
emphasised throughout this section: as such, they are secondary conclusions. 
Nevertheless, they are questions which seem to arise naturally from what I have 
sought to establish, and as such require mention. In this part, then, I have drawn the 
following (tentative) conclusions. 
+ The existence of mind-independent moral facts seems highly unlikely. 
+ That this might be the case does not entail that morality is an illusion, but 
rather that morality requires redefining in a way that eliminates suggestion 
that there are mind-independent moral facts. 
• Morality, I suggest, can be defined in terms of its representation of our 
conviction that some things are of "utmost importance." 
+ Other primates manifest evidence of having social rules which govern 
their groups, but it is unclear that we can call them moral rules. 
Part Four is the last major section of my thesis. A final chapter will provide a 
synthesis of the main conclusions that I have drawn and as such will also serve as a 
general conclusion. 
243 
General Introduction 
Throughout this thesis I have argued for a series of conclusions which have as their 
focus the presentation of morality as a bi-product of human biology. In this final 
chapter, the major conclusions outlined in the introduction of this final part will be 
both stated and briefly explained with reference to the arguments presented for them 
in the various parts of the thesis. These conclusions are (briefly) as follows: 
• Certain moral rules, such as those that prohibit incest and those that encourage 
altruism towards kin, coincide with biological mechanisms which both 
disincline and incline us respectively towards these same actions. The fact 
that they are moral rules, however, cannot be explained solely with reference 
to these adaptations. (Part One). 
• Certain moral rules can be considered fitness enhancing in terms of the role 
they play in enabling humans to live together in groups harmoniously (itself a 
fitness enhancing way of life for humans). (Part One). 
+ Consequently, there are a number of moral rules that are cross-cultural, since 
the bulk of the problems that arise in human groups revolve around the 
universal problem of sharing limited resources amongst individuals. (Part 
One). 
+ Cross-cultural moral variety can be partially explained with reference to the 
differing environments in which people live. (Part Two). 
• Morality is the fruit of our ability to formulate, transmit and be motivated by a 
number of different rules that we consider to be categorically binding. These 
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abilities derive from a series of evolved biological mechanisms. (Parts Two & 
Three). 
• As the process of formulating, transmitting and motivating moral rules calls 
upon a whose range of different biological traits working together at times, 
and alone at others, it is not plausible to maintain that morality is the product 
of a single biological adaptation. (Parts Two & Three). 
•• That moral rules are perceived to differ from other rules is because they are 
often (mistakenly) believed to derive from objective, mind-independent moral 
facts — as such they are considered true not just for ourselves, but for 
everybody. This belief provides motivation to uphold moral rules for many 
people and as such is a core feature of morality. (Part Three). 
4. Our tendency to make moral judgements that we consider categorically 
binding is not, contrary to the suggestions of Richard Joyce, the product of a 
biological adaptation. Rather, it is the product of a number of different 
biological traits in combination with a range of environmental factors. In 
particular, our belief that the moral judgements we make are categorically 
binding springs from or is reinforced by a number of different sources 
including (A) inculcation by one's social group (B) emotional experiences of 
an intrinsically pleasurable or painful nature, and (C) rational reflection. (Part 
3). 
• While we might believe that moral rules derive from objective, mind-
independent moral facts, we are mistaken in doing so. This claim is supported 
by the fact that the sources of this belief do not require the truth of moral rules 
to explain why we believe them (Part Four). 
• While belief in objective mind independent moral facts is erroneous, this does 
not entail that we should eliminate moral concepts or rules. Moral concepts 
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and rules express, promote and protect what we consider to be deeply 
important beliefs, needs and desires. If morality can be redefined to exclude 
reference to moral facts and to include considerations such as these, it regains 
an important role. (Part Four). 
• It is highly unlikely that other animals have morality. (Part Four). 
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I. Certain moral rules, such as those that prohibit incest and those 
that encourage altruism towards kin, coincide with biological 
mechanisms which both disincline and incline us respectively 
towards these same actions. The fact that they are moral rules, 
however, cannot be explained solely with reference to these 
adaptations. (Part One). 
I began this thesis questioning how morality might have originated within the bounds 
of the evolutionary history of human beings. The first suggestion I made was that 
moral rules might be the product of specific biological adaptations like many other 
human traits. An examination of the two likeliest candidates for such adaptations — 
incest taboos and kin altruism — followed. I concluded that biological mechanisms 
which incline us to avoid incest, but be kind to our kin, were insufficient to explain 
the origins of moral rules which sanction the same behaviour. 
This discussion also served to highlight the utility of many of our moral rules. For 
while I concluded that moral rules are not individually derived from specific 
biological adaptations, what did become apparent was that moral rules at times serve 
to fill gaps that biology leaves upon in terms of assuring our own survival prospects. 
For example, a socially imposed taboo against incest serves not only to decrease the 
likelihood of malformed offspring: it is also a means of preventing the threats to 
familial stability that incestuous relationships are likely to entail. More importantly, 
however, was the more general observation that moral rules contribute to the survival 
potential of humans by fostering human cooperation. In this sense then, moral rules 
can serve a similar purpose to biological adaptations: they are not, however, directly 
derived from biological adaptations. 
2. Certain moral rules can be considered fitness enhancing in terms of 
the role they play in enabling humans to live together in groups 
harmoniously (itself a fitness enhancing way of life for humans). (Part 
One). 
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In Part One I argued that survival prospects are augmented when humans live together in 
groups. Living in groups is advantageous - amongst other reasons - because human 
offspring are so vulnerable after birth. Group-living arrangements enable the labour of 
raising children to be shared more efficiently and successfully. Social cohesion, however, 
is hindered by the fact of limited resources and the competition that this engenders. Large 
components of our moral codes seem obviously intended to facilitate social cohesion via, 
in particular, the constraint of aggression that can arise from such competition. It is 
plausible to suggest that morality — rather than being the product of specific biological 
adaptation -is the issue of human decision to control their social environment by means of 
implementing categorical rules. In other words, humans create moral rules themselves in 
response to what they perceive as being socially problematic, or advantageous. 
3. Consequently, there are a number of moral rules that are cross-
cultural, since the bulk of the problems that arise in human groups 
revolve around the universal problem of sharing limited resources 
amongst individuals. (Part One). 
The explanation summarised in (2) also serves to explain why there is a degree of 
commonality in cross-cultural moral codes. As humans all share a similar biological 
makeup, a core group of their needs are likewise going to be similar. Consequently, 
it might be expected that at least some of the issues that arise in human communities 
might be the same - like, for example, the issue of procuring enough food to survive, 
the issue of acquiring a mate and reproducing, the issue of having to procure both 
these in a way that is not going to provide too much disruption and contention 
amongst the rest of the group. The moral rules that are common to cultures 
throughout the world reflect some of these needs. Examples are moral proscriptions 
against stealing, cheating and killing and prescriptions encouraging certain forms of 
altruism, kindness and trustworthiness. 
4. Cross-cultural moral variety can be partially explained with 
reference to the differing environments in which people live. (Part 
Two). 
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The conclusion that moral rules enable groups of people to live together more 
harmoniously than otherwise supports the suggestion that moral rules may have been 
developed by people to serve this purpose in the first place. Taken as the unique 
explanation of why moral rules emerged, however, this account is unsatisfactory. In 
Part Two I explained why and began to address some of the "issues" a predominantly 
prosocial account of morality inadequately treats. I started with the issue of cross-
cultural variety in moral rules and concluded that it can be partially attributed to the 
impact of varying environments. I suggested that as different environments give rise 
to different needs, the moral rules concerned with the satisfaction of these needs will 
likewise vary. 
I also contended that the social environment — in particular the culture of one's social 
group - has a significant impact on the content of moral codes. Cultures represent, 
amongst other things, the collective beliefs of their members. These beliefs extend to 
issues that go beyond basic survival requirements and touch upon broader existential 
and metaphysical matters. The conclusions that we draw pertaining to the meaning 
and value of life, we seek to both protect and promote via a series of rules and 
principles. That these beliefs vary throughout the world can be attributed not only to 
differing geographical location, but also to the cumulative nature of human learning 
throughout time. The accumulated variation in beliefs, traditions and needs, then, 
helps explain not only why there is so much variety in moral codes throughout the 
world, but also why morality has gone beyond concerns grounded uniquely in matters 
of social cohesion. 
5. Morality is the fruit of our ability to formulate, transmit and be 
motivated by a number of different rules that we consider to be 
categorically binding. These abilities derive from a series of evolved 
biological mechanisms. (Parts Two & Three). 
In Part One I concluded that moral rules are not the mere formalisation of specific 
biological propensities. While it is true that adaptive mechanisms might fuel our 
propensity to behave, feel and think in certain ways, the moral rules themselves 
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emerge from a number of different sources, or a combination thereof. For example, 
some moral rules are the product of human decision that they will or, more 
pertinently, "ought to" shape our behaviour; that is, there often seems to be a decision 
making process involved in the adoption of moral rules. So moral rules, while 
distinguishable from other types of rules, are nevertheless dependent on some of the 
same capacities required for not only the making of other rules, but also the 
transmission, learning and adaptation of these rules to changing circumstances. In 
keeping with my aim of explaining the origins and development of morality, I 
provided a brief discussion of some of these capacities. In particular, I focused on 
biological mechanisms involved in what I called "social learning", since social 
learning is what permits aspects of cultures and moral codes to become both 
entrenched and to spread. In particular I suggested that the human ability to reason 
and reflect is instrumental in the formation of moral rules, since it enables us to form 
intentions. The nature of one's intentions is central to deciding whether what one 
does has moral relevance. Reasoned considerations are thus not only pivotal in the 
formation of some moral rules, but they can also contribute to the belief that some 
actions, thoughts and characteristics are intrinsically right or wrong. 
6. As the process of formulating, transmitting and motivating moral 
rules calls upon a whose range of different biological traits 
working together at times, and alone at others, it is not plausible to 
maintain that morality is the product of a single biological 
adaptation. (Parts Two & Three). 
In Part Two, I discussed the ways in which the capacities for language, imitation and 
learning contributed to the formation and transmission of moral codes. In Part Three, 
I focused on the role that both the human affective system, and our ability to reason 
and reflect, play in generating moral concepts. These capacities were compared to 
equivalent capacities in other animals in a bid to (A) explain why we might be 
reluctant to call their social regulatory systems "moral" systems, and (B) to pinpoint 
which specific capacities are responsible for the generation of this difference. 
Recalled also was the fact that these capacities are the product of biological 
adaptation, a point which serves to emphasise two of the major conclusions of this 
250 
thesis. The first major conclusion is that morality is the product of a number of 
different, independently evolved adaptations. As such, it is not appropriate to call 
morality itself a biological adaptation. Secondly, discussing the role each of the 
different capacities plays in generating moral rules, beliefs and concepts serves to 
underscore the biological basis of morality. This basis, in turn, contributes to 
evidence that morality is human dependent and not the expression of some objective 
entity that exists independently of us. Contributing to this secondary conclusion is 
the argument that the adaptive mechanisms involved in the generation of moral rules 
were not selected for the role they played either in forming moral rules, or revealing 
their "truth". Indeed, many of these mechanisms were almost assuredly in place prior 
to the emergence of both culture and morality. 
7. That moral rules are often perceived to differ from other rules is 
because they are (mistakenly) believed to derive from objective, 
mind-independent moral facts — as such they are considered true 
not just for ourselves, but for everybody. This belief provides 
motivation to uphold moral rules for many people and as such is a 
core feature of morality. (Part Three). 
In Parts One and Two I discussed moral rules in a way that rendered them almost 
indistinguishable from any other type of rule that a society formulates. Moral rules, 
however, are distinguishable from other types of rule in terms of the reasons given for 
adhering to them. Most rules, for example, are usually instrumental in achieving 
some practical end result; moral rules, on the other hand, are prescribed because they 
are considered to be intrinsically right or wrong. They are the formalisation of the 
belief that there are certain thoughts, characteristics and actions that are appropriate 
(or inappropriate) not with respect to their consequences alone, but because these 
consequences themselves correspond to objective standards of right or wrong. As 
such they are not usually held to be right and wrong just for ourselves, but for 
everybody. An account of the origins and nature of morality must provide an 
explanation of these moral concepts as well.. 
8. Our tendency to make moral judgements that we consider 
categorically binding is not, contrary to the suggestions of Richard 
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Joyce, the product of a biological adaptation. Rather, it is the 
product of a number of different biological traits in combination 
with a range of environmental factors. In particular, our belief 
that the moral judgements we make are categorically binding 
springs from or is reinforced by a number of different sources 
including (A) inculcation by one's social group (B) emotional 
experiences of an intrinsically pleasurable or painful nature, and 
(C) rational reflection. (Part 3). 
In Part 3, I discussed the emergence of moral concepts, focusing in particular on why 
we believe that moral principles are categorically binding. To begin with, I discussed 
a causal link between this belief and our socialisation. Firstly, punishment and 
reward systems were investigated to see what role they might play in fostering belief 
in the concepts of moral "right" and "wrong". I concluded that such systems might 
contribute to belief in moral concepts as a part of the general process of socialization 
one receives as a child. As children we often come to believe that significant 
amounts of what we are told by our parents, teachers or general society is true, 
whether it is reinforced with punishment and reward or not. It is for this reason that 
social learning is central to the development of certain of our moral rules. 
Socialisation and enculturation are by no means the unique source of belief in moral 
concepts, as evidenced by the fact that aspects of personal moral codes are often at 
odds with the local moral code. Further explanation was thus deemed necessary. In 
Part One, I discussed the possibility that moral rules are the product of adaptive 
mechanisms selected to ensure that certain types of behaviour are either avoided or 
embraced. I concluded that morality is far more complicated than this. What I did 
acknowledge, however, was that certain adaptations might contribute to our belief 
that certain actions are right or wrong. Kin recognition systems, for example, may 
lead us to feel drawn to some (notably kin) and repelled by others. While these 
mechanisms alone do not "explain" the existence of moral rules that encourage kin 
altruism, they may nonetheless contribute to our belief that, for example, we ought to 
be kind to our children, by making us feel positively inclined towards them on a 
physiological level. 
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These points complement the argument I presented in Part Three. Here I reasoned 
that the human emotional system is a major source of our moral concepts. In 
particular the experience of empathy was given a central place in this explanation. 
Empathetic reactions lead us to care about the welfare of others in part via the distress 
that the misfortune or suffering of others might create in us. We express our concern 
via the moral rules that we embrace. I also suggested that these reactions engender 
the experience that some situations are "right" or "wrong": as such, moral concepts 
and the rules to which they give rise are partially the expression of the intrinsically 
positive or negative experiences of pleasure and pain. 
In the same way that I suggested that other biological mechanisms implicated in the 
generation of morality did not evolve for this purpose, I maintain that the human 
affective system likewise has other adaptive significance. The mechanisms involved 
in generating empathy, for example, were most plausibly selected for their role in 
assuring the bonding of caretaker to offspring. Others, such as disgust and repulsion, 
are most likely to have been retained because of their biological utility in alerting us 
to unclean, unhealthy and hence unsafe objects. 
Finally, I suggested that sometimes our moral principles — and our belief that they are 
categorically binding - are derived from a process of rational reflection and reasoning. 
It is in this way, for example, that we often come to discard moral principles that we 
are taught as children and adopt others. I might have been told as a child that it is 
immoral to have sexual relations before marriage, but may decide later that there does 
not seem to be any good reason for this and therefore abandon the moral rule. 
Sometimes reason may lead us to override what we feel emotionally drawn to doing 
(for example, giving a promotion to our favourite nephew rather than to the 
hardworking employee who has actually earned the promotion), but they more 
frequently seem to work in tandem (the guilt I know I will experience in giving my 
nephew the promotion may lead me to choose otherwise, as well). I also suggested 
that sometimes we may employ moral "reasoning" as a means of explaining, or 
justifying our emotional experiences to others in a way that adequately expresses 
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their strength. My instant reaction to scenes of torture is of deep horror; a subsequent 
process of rationalisation might lead me to conclude that what I saw was not just 
horrible, but intrinsically wrong. This judgement expresses not some perception of 
objective truth, but rather my emotionally fuelled conviction that torture should never 
happen. The process of rationalisation, however, transforms this essentially 
subjective experience into a response to what one considers to be the transgression of 
an objective moral rule. 
Part Three, in sum, explored a series of different factors that contribute to our belief 
in moral concepts such as right and wrong and the motivation to which these beliefs 
give rise. Together, they provide a plausible explanation for moral motivation and 
belief in moral concepts that does not require us to appeal to such things as mind 
independent moral facts. They also do not require an appeal to specific adaptations 
which account for our "tendency to make moral judgements" (Joyce) or which 
account for our "belief in the objectivity of morality" (Ruse). These are some of the 
major conclusions I have sought to establish. 
9. While we might believe that moral rules derive from objective, 
mind-independent moral facts, we are mistaken in doing so. This 
claim is supported by the fact that the sources of this belief do not 
require the truth of moral rules to explain why we believe them 
(Part Four). 
This conclusion is partially derived from evidence that without certain of the 
capacities that I contend are responsible for the fact that we have morality, the ability 
to form moral rules - or to differentiate them from other rules - is impaired. More 
importantly, however, I have argued that the biological selection of these capacities 
had nothing directly to do with their contribution to either the generation of moral 
rules or, the belief that our moral rules are categorically binding. This suggests that 
morality in terms of a set of rules, attitudes and concepts is incidental to having these 
capacities and could not exist independently of the individuals that have these 
capacities. It does not prove that mind-independent moral facts do not exist, 
however. Yet when this evidence is combined with an account of (A) the social 
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utility of morality and (B) the mutability of morality, the argument for objective 
moral facts seems far less tenable. Instead, we have an account of morality which 
explains both its development and perceived nature in a more plausible way, and 
which is supported, moreover, by empirical evidence. 
10. While belief in objective mind independent moral facts is 
erroneous, this does not entail that we should eliminate moral 
concepts or rules. Moral concepts and rules express, promote and 
protect what we consider to be deeply important beliefs, needs and 
desires. If morality can be redefined to exclude reference to moral 
facts and to include considerations such as these, it regains an 
important role. (Part Four). 
In Part 4, I briefly discussed the metaethical status of morality. I concluded that 
belief in objective moral truths is erroneous. I did not, however, take this to require 
the rejection of morality, nor the retention of morality as a mere "useful fiction." 
Rather, I suggested that we needed to redefine morality in such a way that recognises 
the role it plays in protecting our most deeply felt values, and in recommending these 
values to others. 
11. It is highly unlikely that other animals have morality. (Part Four). 
In the last chapter of Part Four I claimed that it is very unlikely that other animal have 
rules of a moral nature. I based this claim on the observation that other animals do 
not seem to have the cognitive machinery required to form moral concepts in the first 
place. Also, it is unclear whether other animals possess a theory of mind which 
would enable them to form prescriptive rules based on a consideration of others goals 
and intentions. These conclusions are by no means definitive. Our fundamental lack 
of hard evidence regarding the neurological capacities of other animals means that we 
can only offer hypotheses and that these are often contentious. Moreover, it is 
unclear that even if we did understand their neurology better we would be able to 
make justified comparisons between ourselves as humans and them as other animals. 
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General Conclusion 
Morality is central to the way in which we conduct our lives, guiding and shaping our 
relationships, professional decisions, goals and aspirations. In spite of the apparent 
ease with which we seem to acquire certain moral beliefs, morality itself is 
nevertheless something which for many of us remains deeply puzzling. For some 
moral quandaries may not go beyond the difficulty of applying well-established 
moral principles to a myriad of changing circumstances. Others are troubled by more 
fundamental questions regarding the origins and nature of these principles, as both 
this thesis and a long, rich history of philosophical enquiry and debate testifies. 
My aim in writing this thesis has been to provide plausible solutions to some of the 
more puzzling questions which arise from considering morality as the product of 
human biological evolution. As I have provided a detailed synthesis of my proposed 
conclusions, it is unnecessary to discuss them in detail once more. Instead, a brief re-
statement of them will conclude this thesis. 
Firstly, my thesis has been primarily concerned with demonstrating that morality is 
the bi-product of a number of evolved traits that were selected for fitness enhancing 
benefits which have nothing directly to do with morality. Amongst the traits 
discussed were those that contribute to, and were most probably selected for, what 
has been termed "social learning"; the abilities to imitate, recall, reason and 
communicate were amongst the capacities mentioned in particular. In liaison with 
these capacities, are those that induce emotions such as sympathy and empathy in us. 
I argued that these emotions are central to the experience of moral rules as 
categorically binding, a core feature of morality. I also claimed that the content of 
our moral codes is importantly shaped by the environment in which we live. 
Secondly, I offered an account of moral rules in terms of their contribution to social 
cohesion. Here the question "why do we have morality?" was answered partially by 
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the postulate that moral rules enable us to live together and partake of the benefits 
that co-existence endows. Principal among these benefits of coexistence, of course, 
is survival. I argued that the values underpinning many of our moral rules are the 
product of both individual and group based decisions about what is of value. I also 
contended that such rules are often made in response to the absence of biological 
mechanisms which shape our behaviour in a more deterministic way. It is our 
biology, however, which has afforded us the behavioural plasticity that enables us to 
do this. In other words, while the "dogma" may have gone walking, it has not 
escaped the leash. 
More importantly, however, I concluded that morality is the product of both 
conscious and sub-conscious attempts to give some kind of external sanction to our 
beliefs, instincts and desires. Some of these have little if anything obviously to do 
with evolutionary ends, but are nonetheless considered to be of utmost importance. I 
have attributed our belief that they are of such importance to a combination of 
emotional response, rational argumentation and social indoctrination. The 
subconscious, intuitive like nature of some of these processes combined with the 
strength of the convictions they generate contributes to the belief that these 
convictions correspond to some kind of objective truth. I have made the claim that 
there is no such thing. 
Finally, I have provided an explanation for why and how it is that we have morality 
which is in keeping with some of the latest scientific evidence concerning both the 
evolution and nature of human beings. This in itself is not sufficient reason on its 
own for its acceptance, of course. The fact that I have also provided a plausible, 
comprehensive account for both the origin and nature of morality that does not 
require any appeal or reference to non-empirical qualities, features or beings, is very 
much in its favour. As such, not only is it more parsimonious, it is also more 
credible. 
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Gathering up these various points, I conclude that my thesis provides a valid 
explanation not only for the possible origin of morality, but also for how it came to 
develop into what it is today. I have provided an account of the prescriptive nature of 
morality via an excursion into of the various sources of motivation for behaving 
morally. I have offered an explanation of our belief in the factual nature of moral 
concepts which does not require appeal to mind-independent moral facts. Other 
philosophers have provided similar accounts. The significance of my thesis, 
however, is that I have provided a more integrated representation of both morality 
and the evolutionary processes which are pivotal to its origin and perpetuation. 
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